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ABSTRACT 
EFFICIENCY AND FRONTIER ANALYSIS 
WITH EXTENSION TO 
STRATEGIC PLANNING 
SEPTEMBER 1992 
CATHERINE S. LERME, B.S., LYCEE MICHEL MONTAIGNE 
M.S., ECOLE NATIONALE SUPERIEURE DE CHIMIE DE PARIS 
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
directed by: Professor Agha Iqbal Ali 
Whatever the economic entity, firm, industry, or nation, intensified worldwide 
competition has increased the need for effective competitive strategies and renders more 
pressing the need for methods to analyze swelling volumes of information prior to 
making any decision. A successful strategy is the equivalent of an efficient production 
plan, allowing a player to operate on the frontier of its feasible achievements. In 
practice however, such frontiers are not known and have to be estimated empirically. 
Locating an empirical frontier is at the core of Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), a mathematical programming technique developed by Chames, Cooper et al. in 
1978 to evaluate the relative performance of decision-making units (DMUs). Several 
models have since emerged, all aiming at the identification of which of n DMUs, each 
characterized by s outputs and m, determine an envelopment surface. DEA therefore 
represents a methodological opportunity for the strategy field. 
vi 
The viability of DEA rests on its ability to foster sound economic decisions and 
the economic principles embedded in DEA performance evaluations must be clearly 
enunciated. The overall purpose of this research is hence twofold: 
1) the integration of DEA with production theory via the concepts of 
efficiency. 
2) the formalization of DEA as a tool for strategic planning. 
This dissertation develops a new measure of efficiency that is shown to be 
superior to existing measures in terms of the number of properties it satisfies and also 
with respect to the economic interpretation it affords. A unifying perspective of DEA 
models is offered by means of a taxonomy which affords systematic connections between 
the various models and production theory, hence providing a consistent interpretation of 
all models and their limitations. A new model, called the Frontier model, is developed 
which strengthens the bridge between DEA and economics and addresses the 
measurement of economic efficiency. All developments are supported by numerical 
illustrations. Finally a new model, the Comparative Advantage model, is developed that 
adapts the methodology of DEA to identify a DMU’s competitors and derive information 
regarding the DMU’s comparative strengths and weaknesses to assist the unit in 
formulating its strategy. An application to regional economics using Census of 
Manufactures data is presented. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
"Like management science, the strategy field lies at the 
crossroads of a number of more established fields of study. 
Due to its stage of development, position, and focus, many 
theoretical and methodological opportunities exist which 
have yet to be tapped." 
[Day et al., 1990, p iii] 
1.1 Introduction 
Whatever the economic entity, whether it be firm, industry, region, or nation, 
intensified worldwide competition has increased the need for effective competitive 
strategies and renders more pressing the need for methods to compile, analyze and 
synthesize swelling volumes of information prior to making any decision. Borrowing 
from the concepts of production theory, a strategy is the equivalent of a production plan. 
Both can be seen as a set of decisions which define a planned course of action. 
Preliminary to the formulation of a competitive strategy are first, the identification of 
multiple, often conflicting, objectives, and second, an objective assessment of the current 
relative positioning of all the competing players. A successful strategy is the equivalent 
of an efficient production plan, allowing a player to operate on the frontier of its 
feasible achievements. Clearly, if all players can be characterized by measures of 
achievements of predefined objectives which define their respective production plans, 
then the successful strategy of a competing player enables the player to get ahead or, at 
a minimum, to persist at least as well as its competitors. In practice however, such 
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frontiers of feasible achievements are not known. They can only be approximated by the 
observed best, non-dominated achievements in a Pareto-Koopmans sense if we exclude 
any a priori ranking of the predefined objectives. 
The concept of locating an empirical frontier is at the core of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), a mathematical programming technique developed by Chames, Cooper 
et al. in 1978 to evaluate the relative performance of decision-making units (DMUs). 
Several models, based on different sets of assumptions, have since emerged, all aiming 
at the identification of which of n DMUs determine an envelopment surface when each 
DMU is characterized by s "output" measures and m "input" measures. The identified 
envelopment surface represents an empirical frontier and the envelope-defining units 
identify efficient performances. DEA therefore represents a methodological 
opportunity for the strategy field. It offers a convenient and fast way to process 
empirical data thereby providing useful guidance in decision-making and strategy 
formulation, and allowing timely responses in fast changing environments. However, 
prior to the formalization of DEA as a tool for strategic planning, an assessment of the 
state of the art regarding the mathematics of DEA and its ties to production theory are 
warranted. Indeed the viability of DEA rests on its ability to foster sound economic 
decisions and it is crucial that the economic principles embedded in DEA performance 
evaluations be clearly enunciated. The overall purpose of this research is hence twofold: 
1) the integration of Data Envelopment Analysis with production theory. 
2) the formalization of Data Envelopment Analysis as a tool for strategic 
planning. 
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The remainder of this introductory chapter expands on the motivation and purpose of the 
research presented in the next four chapters. 
1.2 Integration of DEA with Production Theory 
Most textbooks for micro and managerial economics introduce production theory 
by defining a production function as the extremal relationship between the various levels 
of inputs (typically referred to as factors of production) used and the maximum level of 
output that can be attained. In the more general situation where multiple inputs combine 
into multiple outputs (typically referred to as joint products), it is customary to refer to 
the relationship between inputs and outputs as a production correspondence. This 
relationship is characteristic of the available technology which represents all the known 
ways of combining a predefined set of inputs to produce a predefined set of outputs. 
Each such combination is referred to as a technique of production or production process. 
A new technology corresponds to a modification of the input set and/or a modification 
of the output set. We assume in what follows that technology remains constant. 
Assuming a production unit is characterized by an input vector x, and an output 
vector, y, the input possibility set of y and the output possibility set of x are respectively 
defined as the set of input vectors that may be substituted for one another to obtain y (x 
belongs to that set), and the set of output vectors attainable from x (y belongs to that set). 
Focusing for now on the engineering aspect of the technology, productive efficiency, also 
referred to as technical efficiency, is exclusive of value consideration for the inputs and 
outputs, and is synonymous with Pareto-Koopmans efficiency. It means that no output 
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can be increased without simultaneously raising at least one input and/or decreasing at 
least another output, or that no input can be decreased without simultaneously decreasing 
at least one output and/or increasing at least another input. It follows that technically 
efficient production units define/map on the frontier of the production possibility sets. 
That is, a production unit (x,y) is technically efficient and defines the frontier of the 
production possibility set if it is both input efficient (i.e. x belongs to the frontier of the 
input possibility set of y) and output efficient (i.e. y belongs to the frontier of the output 
possibility set of x). 
Assuming that the production function is known and well-defined by a single 
continuous function with continuous first and second order partial derivatives, production 
theory is then concerned with setting guidelines regarding the choice and levels of input 
utilization or the quantity of outputs to generate so that the producer may optimize some 
predefined objective. Profit maximization and cost minimization are the two most widely 
studied optimizing behaviors for the producer, and are generally studied within a specific 
institutional framework, typically a perfectly competitive environment. This particular 
choice of institutional framework offers the advantage that prices for the inputs and 
outputs can be considered fixed and given throughout the analyses. Within the context 
of prices for the various inputs and outputs productive efficiency is referred to as 
allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency is tied to a valuation of the various inputs 
and outputs. It characterizes production units which exhibit an optimal behavior (cost 
minimization or profit maximization). It should be apparent that technical efficiency is 
a prerequisite to allocative efficiency. 
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It is important to emphasize that the guidelines set by production theory rest on 
the assumption that the production function is known. For instance, according to these 
guidelines, a producer wishing to minimize the firm’s costs by controlling the 
consumption of its inputs needs to evaluate, from "his/her" production function, the 
marginal product of the various inputs. His only recourse is to rely on estimated 
production functions. 
The empirical approach to production analysis is traditionally equated with the 
estimation of production functions and their associated cost functions. The primary 
technique employed is regression analysis whose limitations have often been publicized 
in the DEA literature and are summarized next. 
The main argument against regression analysis is that it requires the 
prespecification of a functional form which typically relates a single dependent variable 
(i.e. a single output) to multiple independent variables (i.e. inputs). Multiple forms, for 
instance a Cobb-Douglas, translog, or constant elasticity of substitution function, are 
usually tested and the one that best fits the data is selected. However, the implicit and 
explicit assumptions underlying the function and their ensuing implications regarding 
relations among the estimated parameters are not simultaneously compatible with the 
empirical data [Drhymes, 1990]. The technique also assumes that all empirical data 
points are representative of technically efficient operations, and the deviations from the 
estimated average relation are attributed to statistical discrepancies. This assumption is 
not acceptable if one’s purpose is precisely to distinguish betwen efficient and inefficient 
behaviors. To this end DEA offers an alternative approach to production frontier 
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determination which offers greater flexibility than regression analysis in terms of less 
required assumptions. 
The relation of DEA to economics is anchored in production theory particularly 
via the works of Shephard [1953, 1970] and Farrell [1957] concerning productive 
efficiency. Shephard, in the DEA literature, is traditionally credited with the 
introduction of a theoretical function whose purpose is to gauge the parsimony of an 
input vector in producing a corresponding output vector. Farrell’s noted contribution, 
though limited to the single output case, is his attempt at measuring efficiency directly 
from observational data. 
Production possibility sets (i.e. input possibility sets and output possibility sets) 
and hence their frontiers are seldom known a priori, underscoring the relevance of 
Farrell’s efforts to determine them empirically. Instead of specifying a functional form 
for the production correspondence, thereby assuming existence and uniqueness of that 
function, the empirical approach of DEA is to assume properties for the production 
correspondence and estimate, from the available observations, the possibility sets that are 
consistent with these properties. Existence of a production function is then equivalent 
to consistency of the properties and uniqueness is equivalent to completeness of the set 
of properties. 
Assuming for now a consistent and complete set of properties has been defined, 
Data Envelopment Analysis allows the determination of an empirical frontier enveloping 
a set of data points. The empirical frontier is then used to evaluate the relative efficiency 
of production units or decision-making units (DMUs). There are a variety of 
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mathematical models which effect data envelopment. These models for DEA differ in 
their estimation of the empirical frontier (they assume different properties for the 
production correspondence) and/or their evaluation of inefficient DMUs. However, 
using any DEA model, the behavior, or performance, of all DMUs operating on the 
identified frontier is deemed satisfactory and earns those DMUs a status of efficiency. 
All DMUs operating beneath the frontier are labelled inefficient. If one is only interested 
in determining whether a production unit is technically efficient or not, then it suffices 
to check that no input can be reduced and still allow the production of the given output 
vector and that, given the available resources, more of any output could not have been 
obtained. However, if one is interested in determining the degree of technical 
inefficiency of a production unit, as summarized by a scalar index, then one is confronted 
with the problem of measurement of inefficiency, or amount of waste. Such a concern 
is highly relevant to provide, for instance, a criterion on which to base resource 
allocation, or to optimize the expected benefits of limited auditing resources by focusing 
on the identified inefficient production units, or simply to gauge the relative handicap of 
production units. 
The first task is hence to define a measure of efficiency that captures its economic 
underpinnings. The measure should allow a meaningful ranking of DMUs that reflect 
their relative achievement with respect to behaviors prescribed by production theory. 
Essentially the measurement of inefficiency, which equates with the measurement of 
waste, involves aggregating quantities measured in different units, namely excess inputs 
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and slack outputs. Defining a coherent method of aggregation across inputs and outputs 
is therefore central to the measurement of technical inefficiency. 
An inefficient DMU lies in the interior of a production possibility set and the 
sources and extent of inefficiencies for such a DMU are identified by comparing the 
DMU’s performance to that of an efficient DMU. Measuring the unit’s degree of 
(in)efficiency hence necessitates the selection of a reference point on the frontier. 
Obviously infinitely many such reference points are feasible candidates. However, 
reasonable criteria can be introduced that will reduce the set of selectable referent points. 
Mathematically, these criteria result in a projection mechanism that, for each inefficient 
DMU, identifies a referent point against which the DMU’s inefficiency is to be gauged. 
The DMU’s shortcomings, which are the roots of its inefficiency, are revealed in the 
form of excesses in input consumption and deficiencies in output production. These 
revealed shortcomings can then constitute the core of any remedial plan of actions. It 
follows that each possible projection on the envelope can be seen as an optimal response 
to distinct managerial objectives. This projection mechanism effects the evaluation of 
the relative performance of the DMUs and is the embodiment of economic principles. 
These principles may focus primarily on controlling input consumption or primarily on 
output production, or on avoiding waste without distinction between inputs and outputs, 
they may be defined within a short-term horizon or within a long-term horizon. 
The second task is hence the identification of the specific and inherent economic 
principles underlying the evaluations effected by existing models for DEA. It is essential 
to enunciate these principles since different principles, coupled with various sets of 
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properties regarding the production function, define different projections, leading to the 
selection of different referent points and also to different efficiency scores. The 
knowledge and acceptance of the underlying principles and assumptions regarding the 
production correspondence are necessary to convince the DMUs to implement the 
recommended changes contained in the identified referent unit. These principles and 
assumptions then become the criteria for selecting a projection procedure and its 
associated efficiency assessments. Such knowledge also contributes to the unification and 
a better understanding of the theory of Data Envelopment Analysis, hence preventing its 
misuse, and fostering its reach to new areas of applications. Last but not least, it adds 
flexibility to the methodology of DEA and fosters the development of new models that 
can be tailored to reflect specific concerns of distinct economic environments. In 
particular concerns about allocative efficiency can be addressed by acknowledging the 
role of prices in performance evaluations and ensuring that realistic economic tradeoffs 
across inputs and across outputs are properly reflected. This concern is relevant to bring 
efficiency evaluations closer to economic efficiency ratings which should warrant sounder 
recommendations to inefficient operating units. Satisfying this need will strengthen the 
bridge between DEA and economics. 
1.3 Extension to Strategic Planning 
The methodology of Data Envelopment Analysis is by no means restricted to 
production processes. If the notion of input is generalized to encompass any measure 
such that the lower its level the better, and the notion of output is similarly generalized 
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to encompass measures such that the higher their level the better, then DEA extends 
naturally to strategic planning applications. The measures correspond to objectives and 
their level can either reflect past or projected achievements or competitors’achievements. 
In this case however, no direct causal relationship can be assumed to exist between inputs 
and outputs, that is the inputs are not instrumental in "producing” outputs. By analogy 
with a production situation, a successful strategy allows the decision-making unit to 
position itself on the empirically determined frontier of feasible achievements. Such units 
therefore demonstrate, by being identified as efficient, that they enjoy some comparative 
advantage, relative to all other units, from which their efficiency derives. However, 
since it is unlikely that the frontier of feasible achievements remain static, these efficient 
units must engage in constant analysis and active planning if they are to sustain their 
efficiency. It is therefore important for an efficient unit to identify who its current 
competitors are that may threaten its efficiency. It is equally important to identify the 
sources of the unit’s comparative advantage and the extent of its comparative advantage, 
that is whether it represents a comfortable cushion against competitors attacks or a 
precarious condition warranting undivided managerial attention. Finally the assessment 
of its current competitive environment should allow the efficient unit to define its future 
strategy in terms of choice of input mix, choice of output mix, and level of operations. 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
Chapter 2 takes an indepth look at concepts of efficiency and is concerned with 
measurement of efficiency. In particular the issue of existence of a measure of efficiency 
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satisfying desirable properties is addressed by, first, reviewing existing measures and 
their relative merits with regard to these desirable properties, and, second, by developing 
a new measure that is shown to be superior to these existing measures in terms of the 
number of properties it satisfies and also with respect to the economic interpretation it 
affords. 
Chapter 3 deals with the methodological aspects of efficiency measurement and 
focuses on Data Envelopement Analysis as a viable methodology to assess the relative 
efficiency of decision-making units. In particular Chapter 3 offers a unifying perspective 
of DEA models. It develops a taxonomy which affords systematic connections between 
the various models and production theory, hence providing a consistent interpretation of 
all models along with their limitations within the context of production theory. Finally, 
a new model, called the Frontier model, is developed which strengthens the bridge 
between DEA and economics by correctly determining and measuring economic 
efficiency. All theoretical developments are supported by numerical illustrations. 
Chapter 4 builds on the results of Chapter 3 and formalizes the application of 
Data Envelopment Analysis to strategic planning. A new mathematical model, called the 
Comparative Advantage model, is developed that adapts the methodology of data 
envelopment to identify a DMU’s most direct competitors and, hence, derive information 
regarding the DMU’s comparative strengths and weaknesses. The assessment of its 
current competitive environment represents critical information to assist the unit in 
formulating its strategy. 
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An application to regional economics is presented in Chapter 5. It first evaluates 
the efficiency of the economy of states in the U.S. It then identifies, for a particular 
industry, which states are the leaders and what their comparative advantages are. 
Specific recommendations are formulated to improve the competitive position of those 
states found to be inefficient. 
Chapter 6 summarizes all results and suggests directions to further the research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EFFICIENCY: CONCEPTS AND MEASURES 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review and distinguish between the various types 
of efficiency: namely technical or productive efficiency, allocative efficiency, and scale 
efficiency. All discussions are with reference to a production correspondence described 
in Section 2. Technical efficiency is addressed in Section 3 within a Pareto-Koopmans 
framework. Allocative efficiency is introduced in Section 4 and scale efficiency is 
introduced in Section 5. In Section 6 desirable properties of an efficiency measure are 
identified. The section focuses first on input-oriented technical efficiency with inputs as 
the control variables. Existing measures are presented and their relative merits with 
regard to these desirable properties are discussed. A new measure of efficiency is 
introduced and shown to be superior to existing measures in terms of the number of 
properties it satisfies and also with respect to the economic interpretation it affords. The 
results are extended to output-oriented technical efficiency in Section 7, then to global 
technical efficiency in Section 8. Section 9 introduces a measure of allocative efficiency 
that is consistent with the proposed measure of technical efficiency. A summary and 
concluding remarks are presented in Section 10. 
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2.2 Definition of the Production Correspondence 
We consider the situation of a production correspondence where a vector of 
outputs y E Rs+ is produced jointly from a vector of essential1 inputs x E Rm+. All 
inputs are considered variable. Even those that, in economic terms, are thought of as 
fixed, can be thought of as variable by assuming that they are leased for infinitely 
divisible amounts, implying that input values equate input usage. Using standard 
notations we let P(x) denote the output set of x, i.e. the set of output vectors attainable 
from x, and L(y) denote the input set of y, i.e. the set of input vectors x that may be 
substituted for one another to obtain y. Typically [Russell, 1985] the input 
correspondence is assumed to satisfy the following set of properties2 * *: 
(IC1) L(0S) = Rm+. 
(IC2) If y > 0s, then 0“ g L(y). 
(IC3) If x E L(y), then 5x E L(y), V 5 E [l,oo), V y E Rs+. 
(IC4) L(y) is closed, V y E R*+. 
The first property (IC1) states that zero output can always result from any input. 
(IC2), on the other hand, states that something cannot be obtained from nothing. (IC3) 
is a statement of weak disposability of the inputs, i.e. if an input vector is known to 
produce the output vector y, then any input vector which is homothetically larger is 
assumed to produce at least y, and, hence, to belong to the input set of y. (IC4) states 
1 Input i is essential iff y > 0 => X; > 0 
2 u, v E R\ u > v iff Uj > Vj i = 1.t 
u > v iff Uj > Vj i = 1,_,t and u ^ v 
u j> v iff Uj > Vj i = l,...,t 
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that the boundary of the input set is part of the input set and, in particular, that finite 
minimum amounts of inputs are necessary to produce y. Figure 2.1 on page 54 at the 
end of the chapter illustrates the situation of a two-input space where the shaded area 
corresponds to the input set L(y). 
The output correspondence is the inverse correspondence of the input 
correspondence and, hence, can be assumed to satisfy a similar set of properties: 
(OC1) P(0“) = 0s. 
(OC2) P(x) is bounded and closed, V x E Rm+. 
(OC3) If y E P(x) then 0y E P(x) for Q E [0,1]. 
(OC4) P(Xx) 2 P(x) for X > 1. 
The first property states that only the null output can result from zero inputs. 
(OC2) states that only finite amounts of outputs can result from the combination of finite 
amounts of inputs. (OC3) states weak disposability of outputs and (OC4) states that the 
output set of any input vector is contained in the output set of any input vector that is 
homothetically larger. This property implies weak disposability of inputs. Figure 2.2 
on page 54 illustrates the situation of a two-output space where the shaded area 
corresponds to the output set P(x). 
These properties are very general and serve to describe a very broad class of technology 
[Russell, 1985]. Two additional properties which are often encountered in production 
studies deal respectively with the convexity of the production possibility sets and the 
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homotheticity of the production correspondence. Their statement, labelled respectively 
"Convexity" and "Ray Unboundedness" is given below. 
(Convexity) If (xj5 yj) j = l,...,n are such that Xj E L(yj) and yj E P(xj), and 
(ofj) j = l,...,n are positive scalars such that Ej cej = 1, then 
Ej aft € L(Ej oy-j) and Ej 6 P(Ej or,Xj). 
(Ray Unboundedness) If x E L(y) and y E P(x) then kx E L(ky) and ky E 
P(kx) for any k > 0. 
If we consider that economic data on consumption of inputs and production of 
outputs are in fact the representation of average rates of consumption and production 
over time, then it seems reasonable to consider that any convex combinations of observed 
production plans described by (x, y) is also an achievable production plan and therefore 
rightfully belongs to the production possibility set. Each observation is representative 
of a production facility dedicated to a technique so that its operations are characterized 
by steady state rates of production given its scale of operations. A convex combination 
of observations can then be interpreted as a time-sharing leasing agreement where the 
production facilities entering the combination are successively leased for subperiods of 
time over the period of measurement. This convexity property for the production 
possibility sets is hereafter assumed to hold. The second additional property deals with 
the global homotheticity (homogeneity of degree 1) of the production correspondence by 
assuming that any magnification or contraction of an observed production plan (x, y) is 
also a feasible production plan. This latter property is more restrictive regarding the 
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class of technologies to which it applies to and will not be assumed to hold unless 
otherwise stated. 
The input isoquant Iso(y) and output isoquant Iso(x) are defined as: 
Iso(y) = {x G Rm+: x 6 L(y); Ox £ L(y), V 0 G [0,1)} 
Iso(x) = {y G Rs+: y G P(x); 0y £ P(x), V <f> G [l,oo)} 
The input isoquant Iso(y) and output isoquant Iso(x) respectively represent the lower 
boundary of the input set L(y) and the upper boundary of the output set P(x) as illustrated 
on page 54. Having defined L(y), P(x), Iso(y), and Iso(x) we are now ready to introduce 
what an efficient output subset of P(x) is and, similarly, what an efficient input subset 
of L(y) is. Each of these subsets is a direct analytical interpretation of the Pareto- 
Koopmans concept of technical efficiency which is presented in the next section. 
2.3 Technical Efficiency 
Technical efficiency, also referred to as productive efficiency, is exclusive of 
value consideration for the inputs and outputs, and is synonymous with Pareto-Koopmans 
efficiency. A production unit characterized by (x, y) is deemed efficient in the Pareto- 
Koopmans sense if and only if producing more of any of the outputs necessitates more 
of at least one input and a reduction of the consumption of any input would necessarily 
lead to the reduction of at least one output. Analytically, the efficient subsets are defined 
as: 
Eff(y) = {x G Rm+: x G L(y); x' ^ x => x' £ L(y)} 
Eff(x) = jy G R*+: y G P(x); y' ^ y =* y' £ P(x)} 
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The set Eff(y) is the set of minimal input vectors that can be substituted for one another 
to obtain y, and Eff(x) is the set of maximal output vectors attainable from x. The 
relationship between the input set L(y) and its isoquant and efficient subset is given by: 
Eff(y) £ Iso(y) £ L(y) 
Similarly we have the relationship: 
Eff(x) <= Iso(x) Q P(x) 
A production unit (x, y) is Pareto-Koopmans efficient if and only if y E Eff(x) and x 
€E Eff(y). 
Clearly technical efficiency is geared toward the avoidance of waste. The notion 
of waste is related to the concept of strong disposability in economics which states that 
excess levels in resources can be disposed of independently of one another and that, 
similarly, slacks in products can be eliminated independently of one another. This 
concept is different from the concept of weak disposability which only considers radial 
or equiproportionate changes in inputs and outputs. These concepts are illustrated in 
Figure 2.3 on page 55. If the set of piecewise linear segments ABCD is known to 
belong to L(y), then the assumption of weak disposability of inputs implies that all input 
vectors in the shaded area delimited by A^ABCDD* also belong to L(y). The 
assumption of strong disposability of inputs implies that all input vectors in the shaded 
area delimited by aHabCDD'1 also belong to L(y). 
It is not always true that x E Eff(y) «y E Eff(x). This fact is illustrated in 
Figure 2.4 on page 56. In this example x5 E Eff(y,) and x5 E Eff(y2) with y2 > y,, it 
follows: yj (£ Eff(xs) since y2 > and y2 E P(x5). The relation is true under particular 
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conditions. Fare [1983] showed that if inputs and outputs are strongly disposable then 
x E Eff(y) => y E Eff(x) if and only if the input efficiency sets are strictly monotonic 
with respect to inclusion, i.e. ordered output vectors lead to disjoint efficiency sets. 
Mathematically this condition translates into: 
y2 > yi > 0 => Eff(y2) n Eff(y,) = 0 
Similarly the converse relationship, (y E Eff(x) => x E Eff(y)), holds if and only if 
ordered input vectors lead to disjoint efficiency sets: (x2 > x, > 0 => Eff(x2) n Eff(x,) 
= 0). We will hereafter assume that inputs and outputs are strongly disposable3 but 
we do not assume that ordered input or output vectors lead to disjoint efficiency sets. 
Following the Pareto-Koopmans definition of efficiency, the technical efficiency 
of a production unit (y,x), can be decomposed into two components: 
(i) the technical Input efficiency which is concerned with the membership of x in 
Eff(y). 
(ii) the technical Output efficiency which is concerned with the membership of y 
in Eff(x). 
A production unit is technically efficient if it is both input efficient and output efficient. 
If one is only interested in determining whether a production unit is technically efficient 
or not, then it suffices to check that no input can be reduced and still allow the 
production of the given output vector and that, given the available resources, more of any 
output could not have been obtained. However, if one is interested in determining the 
degree of technical inefficiency of a production unit, as summarized by a scalar index, 
3One could argue that strong disposability of inputs is implied by (IC1). 
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then one is confronted with the problem of measurement of inefficiency, or amount of 
waste. Such a concern is highly relevant in selecting, for instance, a criterion on which 
to base resource allocation or in optimizing the expected benefits of limited auditing 
resources by targeting the most inefficient production units. Essentially the measurement 
of inefficiency involves aggregating quantities measured in different units, namely excess 
inputs and slack outputs. Defining a coherent method of aggregation across inputs and 
outputs is therefore central to the measurement of technical inefficiency. Market prices 
naturally come to mind as a convenient common denominator for all inputs and outputs 
which leads us to the concept of allocative efficiency presented in the next section. 
2.4 Allocative Efficiency 
Allocative efficiency is tied to a valuation of the various inputs and outputs. It 
simultaneously requires that the output mix be produced at minimal cost and that, given 
the available input mix, a most valuable output bundle be produced. It follows that 
technical efficiency is prerequisite to allocative efficiency and that the measurement of 
allocative efficiency rests on the availability of prices. Some developments e.g. [Banker 
and Maindiratta, 1988] consider the existence of a unique set of input and output prices 
thereby assuming a situation of a unique perfectly competitive market. However, if the 
operating units are spatially separated, we know that transportation and transaction costs 
allow for distinct local prices for the input and outputs. It follows that multiple input and 
output mixes may be found allocatively efficient. Furthermore if market prices are 
allowed to fluctuate to reflect changing supply and demand conditions, then it becomes 
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reasonable to consider ranges of prices. Allocative efficiency is then contingent upon 
the existence of a set of prices within such acceptable ranges. 
If the inputs and outputs are not traded, i.e. no market pricing occurs, then the 
concept of allocative efficiency can be extended to substitute relative societal values of 
the outputs and resource opportunity costs of the inputs for, respectively, the output and 
input prices. In this case, as well, spatially separated operations may reflect distinct 
environments and, hence, distinct relative valuations. The estimation of these distincts 
valuations, and, eventually, of acceptable ranges for these relative valuations presents 
an added difficulty for measuring allocative efficiency. 
2.5 Scale Efficiency 
The concepts of scale efficiency are intermediate between technical and allocative 
efficiencies. Indeed production theory offers two of definitions in terms of input 
quantities only or in terms of costs necessitating the knowledge of market prices. 
When dealing exclusively with physical units, the scale of operations may be 
measured by either the volume of outputs or by the level of consumption of inputs, 
assuming the transformation process is technically efficient. An obvious difficulty 
arises when multiple outputs are produced and multiple inputs are consumed: How do 
we compare/define the scale of different mixes? Within this context efficiency is related 
to productivity. Banker [1984] introduced the concept of most productive scale size 
(mpss). It is independent of value consideration for the inputs and outputs. Banker’s 
definition states that a production possibility (x,, ys) represents a mpss if and only if all 
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production possibilities (axs, /3ys) are such that a/ & > 1. A production unit operating 
at a mpss is then deemed scale efficient. Hence scale efficiency, defined independently 
of market prices, is evaluated with respect to a given input and output mix. 
The alternate concept of scale efficiency, standard in economics, takes into 
account the relative prices of inputs but assumes that a single output is produced. It 
states that the scale of production, unambiguously defined by the volume of output, is 
efficient if, for that volume of production, the per unit cost of production is minimum. 
A generalization of this cost based concept of scale efficiency to the case of multiple 
outputs has not been dealt with in the literature. A possible generalization is to associate 
scale efficiency with maximum return, that is maximum ratio of revenues to costs, for 
the given input and output mixes. If relative prices of inputs and outputs are fixed then 
a production possibility (xs, ys) can be deemed scale-efficient if and only if all production 
possibilities (axs, j8ys) are such that a/0 > 1. Indeed if n represents the output price 
vector and v represents the input price vector, then we must have: 
nya / yx, > 0/iys / avxs. 
We immediately note that, so defined, the cost version of the concept of scale efficiency 
is equivalent to the physical units version since both versions identify identical sets of 
scale efficient production possibilities. However, if relative prices are allowed to vary, 
as would be the case for quantity discounts, then identification of scale-efficiency 
becomes a non-linear problem. 
22 
It should be apparent that technical inefficiency implies scale and allocative 
inefficiencies. It follows that the measurement of technical inefficiency is essential to 
any efficiency evaluation. Such measurement is developed in the next 3 sections. 
2.6 Measuring Technical Efficiency in the Input Space 
2.6.1 Introduction 
We assume a given technology, i.e. production correspondence, of the type 
introduced in Section 2. This technology is operationalized through various techniques 
characterized by minimal proportions of the various essential inputs over some range of 
outputs. Technical inefficiency4 of a production unit can be thought as consisting of two 
components: 
1) Internal inefficiency. Internal inefficiency is proportional to the excess 
usage of inputs given the production unit’s "own" technique, i.e. keeping 
constant the proportions of inputs characteristic of the operations of the 
unit. This component of inefficiency can be associated with quality where 
the excess usage of inputs corresponds to the amount of rework that has 
to be performed by the producing unit. 
2) External inefficiency. External inefficiency reflects the degree of 
expertise or "know-how" embodied by the production unit’s own 
technique. If the producing unit is operating with a state-of-the-art 
technical inefficiency (resp. efficiency) will be used instead of "input-oriented technical 
inefficiency (resp. efficiency) of producing y" whenever y is considered fixed. 
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technique, i.e. a technique with Pareto-optimal productivity or average 
products characteristics, then its external efficiency score ought to be 
maximal. It follows that external inefficiency is related to the deviations 
of the unit’s input ratios from the minimal input proportions characteristics 
of a "closest" (i.e. most similar) efficient technique. 
These concepts are illustrated in Figure 2.5 on page 57. Both unit A and unit B are 
technically inefficient. However, unit A is only internally inefficient and can gain 
efficiency by eliminating rework in the amount GA. Unit B on the other hand is both 
internally and externally inefficient. To gain internal efficiency it ought to eliminate 
rework in the amount HB. To eliminate external inefficiency unit B ought to adopt a 
new technique, namely E’s technique described by E’s input consumption ratios. 
The measurement of technical efficiency (and, by complementarity, of technical 
efficiency) should, ideally, incorporate both components. There is no a priori unique 
way to combine these two components into a global measure of technical efficiency: it 
can be done either additively or multiplicatively. Neither is there any a priori unique 
way to compute a defined global measure and each of its components. Two possible 
procedures can be: 
(GIE) Compute the global measure, then extract the internal efficiency 
component, then deduce the external efficiency component. 
(IEG) Compute the internal efficiency component first, then the external 
component, then deduce the global technical efficiency score. 
24 
However, it should be apparent that the global efficiency score of an operating unit, once 
a measure has been defined, is dependent upon the selection of an efficient unit to be 
used as referent. The extent to which the procedure affects the selection of the referent 
unit has to be investigated. This is crucial since different procedures, leading to the 
selection of different referent points, may also lead to different efficiency assessments. 
The eventual dependence of the scores on the procedure employed may require the 
identification of the specific and inherent "principles" guiding that procedure. These 
inherent principles then become the criteria for selecting a procedure and its associated 
efficiency assessments. 
It follows that the measurement of technical efficiency requires prior definition 
of: 
i) A metric within the input space. This metric will define the method of 
aggregation across input measures. 
ii) The expression for a global measure. Once defined this measure becomes 
the yardstick of efficiency for all operating units, independently of the 
procedure employed to calculate it. 
It also requires the development of: 
iii) A computational approach that is tractable and consistent with the 
definitions. 
The remainder of this chapter will deal with i) and ii). Chapter 3 will focus on 
iii). The validity of a proposed expression for an efficiency measure may be tested by 
checking whether the measure satisfies some properties deemed desirable. Such 
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properties and their ensuing implications for the definition of an efficiency measure are 
reviewed next. 
2,,6.2 Desirable Properties of an Input-Oriented Measure of Technical Efficiency 
Assuming for now that there exists a measure of technical efficiency, E(x,y), 
defined over L(y), and such that E(x,y) < 1 as customary, Fare and Lovell [1978] 
identified four desirable properties for E(x,y) which, as Russell [1985] showed, can be 
condensed to only three given below: 
(FL1) E(x,y) = l«x 6 Eff(y) 
(FL2) E(0x,y) = 1/0 E(x,y) V 0: 0x E L(y), x E L(y) 
(FL3) If x E L(y), x' E L(y), and x > x', then E(x',y) > E(x,y) 
An interpretation/justification of the above requirements for E(x,y) is offered next: 
(FL1) is a direct interpretation of Koopmans’ definition of input-oriented technical 
efficiency. Note that in practice Eff(y) may not be known a priori requiring the 
specification of a procedure to determine it. 
(FL2) requires that the efficiency measure be homogeneous of degree -1. This 
condition is compatible with the measurement of the internal efficiency component 
introduced earlier. It suggests that the global technical efficiency measure ought to be 
multiplicative in its components so that the (-l)-homogeneity be preserved independently 
of the level of the external efficiency component. 
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(FL3) states the intuitive notion that the more waste the less the efficiency score. 
However, since there is no complete ordering5 available for Rm, the condition is 
restricted to the clear-cut cases where two input vectors can meaningfully be compared 
(i.e. by a consistent extension of the order relation on R) and requires strict monotonicity 
of the efficiency score. 
Another desirable property, often overlooked but of practical significance in empirical 
studies, is that the efficiency measure ought to remain invariant with respect to changes 
in the scales of measurement of the various input and output measures. For ease of 
exposition this property will hereafter be referred to as (UI4) for fourth property dealing 
with units invariance. Russell [1990] refers to this property as the "Commensurability" 
property. 
(UI4) E(Dx,y) = E(x,y) V x E Rm+, V D: (mxm) strictly positive 
diagonal. 
Russell [1985] provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a measure to 
satisfy the first three conditions. He further states that the existence of "a measure 
satisfying these conditions for the broad class of technologies considered in (his) paper 
remains an open question". The only, but apparently crucial, distinctions between the 
class of technologies we are considering and that of Russell [1985] stems from our 
assumptions that all inputs are essential and that the production possibility sets are 
convex. With these additional assumptions we prove the existence of an efficiency 
5 A complete ordering of Rm would require that for any two vectors u, v of Rm we 
have either u > v or v > u. 
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measure satisfying all desirable properties by producing a closed form expression for it 
and verifying its properties. Before we proceed with the proof we review some of the 
existing, and commonly used, efficiency measures, the properties they satisfy, and we 
examine the reasons of their invalidity. The discussion will be supported throughout by 
an example6 of an input set depicted in Figure 2.6 on page 58 at the end of the chapter. 
2.6.3 Existing Input-Oriented Measures of Technical Efficiency 
2,6.3.1 The Debreu-Farrell Measure. The most widely used measure is the one 
traditionally referred to as the Debreu-Farrell measure given by: 
EDF(x,y) = Min {0:0x6 L(y) } = 0DF 
This measure satisfies only (FL2), the (-l)-homogeneity property [Russell, 1985], and 
(UI4), the units-invariance property. The main identified weakness of this measure is 
that the reference input vector (0DFx) is only required to belong to Iso(y) while the 
complete elimination of waste demands that the reference point belong to Eff(y), i.e. 
EDF(x,y) fails (FL1). This fact is illustrated by point R in Figure 2.6 on page 58: 
EDF(R,y) = E Gf Iso(y), G g Eff(y) 
UR 
The Debreu-Farrell measure focuses exclusively on the internal component of technical 
efficiency and fails to address its external component: In the case of point R the external 
efficiency component would acknowledge the presence of slack in input x{ in the amount 
6 This example is adapted from Russell (1985) by requiring that Xj be an essential 
input. 
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FG. Concerning (FL3) it is easily shown that EDF(x,y) is not strictly monotonic in 
inputs. Consider points G and F in Figure 2.6 where G > F and E^G^) = EDp(F,y). 
However, it is of interest to note that EDF(x,y) is nevertheless monotonically decreasing 
in inputs. The proof is provided in Appendix A on page 243. 
2.6.3.2 The Fare-Lovell Measure. Fare and Lovell [1978] introduce an 
alternative measure that they label the Russell measure given by7: 
E (x,y) = Min {-!±- : 6Qx £ L(y), 9. 6 (0,1], i = 
m 
which, they claim, exhibits all desired properties. Let us denote 0FL an m-vector of 
optimal values 0if i = l,...,m. The ith component of this vector, (0FL); represents the 
minimum proportion of input i consumed by the production unit that is necessary to 
produce y given the minimum necessary consumption of other inputs. The main 
advantage of this measure over the Debreu-Farrell measure is that 0FLOx is guaranteed 
to belong to Eff(y), i.e. (FL1) is satisfied, hence guaranteeing complete elimination of 
input waste. Given the identified reference point x* of Eff(y) we can write: 
= 0FLOx = x - e*. 
Hence we have: 
(*FL>. - 
= 1 - 
X; X; 
i = l,...,m 
It follows that alternate expressions for EFL(x,y) are: 
7(0Ox)i = 0j.Xi 
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and 
i m x 
EFL(x,y) = — Y, — = Min 
m— xj 
1 A XjC 
x‘£Eff(y) ( ~ * X« — Xj 1 “ } m i=1 Xj 
i m e* 
EFL(x,y) = 1-— E — 
m m Xj 
We can further note that (0FL); is unitless, invariant to changes in the units of 
measurement of input i. Let us denote: 0" = Max{ (0FL)j, i = l,...,m }. The quantity 
(1 - 0") represents the maximum equiproportionate reduction of all inputs consumed by 
the production unit that would still allow the production of y. 
x* = 0FLOx = 0"x - e" with: 
// 
(0Fl)i = 0"-fL 
A • 
i = l,...,m 
It follows: 
EFL(x,y) = V - ±£ L 
m m Xj 
= 0"(i - IriL) 
m 0"x 
It appears that 0" could tentatively be associated with the internal efficiency 
component and (1 - 1/m I?ni=1 e"/0"Xj) with the external efficiency component. Note that 
the procedure implied in the definition of ^(x^) is a type GIE (Global, Internal, 
External) procedure described earlier where 0" is derived from the computed global 
measure. It follows that, generally, we have: 
*DP * 9" 
For instance in the process of evaluating the technical efficiency of Q in Figure 2.6 on 
page 58 we get: 
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0FLOQ = E 8 and 0DFQ = F 
with: 
e" Max { 
T5F 
m 
~ow Tier | 
us’ov' 
2 
2 
w > 2 
DV 2 
Moreover, Russell [1985] shows that the Fare-Lovell measure fails (FL2), the 
homogeneity condition. This fact is also illustrated by Q in Figure 2.6 on page 58. We 
have: 
Q = 2F, 0flOQ = E and 0flOF = F. 
Hence, EFL(2F,y) = EFL(Q,y) = + < \ 
and EFL(F,y) = 1. 
It follows EFL(2F,y) < 1/2 EpL(F,y). 
Russell [1985] also showed that Ep^y) failed (FL3), the strict monotonicity condition 
but satisfied the weak monotonicity condition: 
x < x' =* EFL(x,y) > EFL(x',y) 
However, his proof rests on the existence of at least one non-essential input. With the 
assumption of essentiality of all inputs EFL(x,y) is strictly monotonic in x: 
8E rather than F is the referent point for Q since: 
l/OW W, ^ 1JJX T5T\ 1 _(- + -) < _(- + —) = _ 
2 UK WE 2 DA XF 2 
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x < x' EFL(x,y) > EFL(x',y) 
The proof of strict monotonicity is provided in Appendix B. Since all ^ i = l,...,m are 
unitless we can conclude that (UI4) is also satisfied. 
It appears that, from a mathematical point of view, the only shortcoming of the 
Fare-Lovell measure, is its failure of the (-l)-homogeneity condition. The Fare-Lovell 
measure corresponds to a worst-case evaluation of the efficiency of the production unit. 
Its driving principle is the extraction of a maximal proportion of slack inputs without 
regard for the original proportions of the inputs. This priciple is reasonable in the case 
of a long-run evaluation where all inputs would become extremely scarce. Selecting a 
most frugal technique would hence be paramount. In the short-run, however, the original 
input proportions are likely to reflect local supply and demand equilibrium conditions 
which influence, if not dictate, the choice of the technique for operations. This point is 
illustrated by Q in Figure 2.6 on page 58. The Fare-Lovell technique compares Q to E 
while a comparison to F would appear more appropriate in the short-run since F and Q 
share the same technique. The Fare-Lovell technique does not systematically identify the 
"closest" (i.e. "most similar") efficient technique to Q. 
2.6.3.3 The Zieschang Measure. In an attempt to correct for the flaws of both 
preceding measures, Zieschang [1984] offered a combination measure given below: 
Ez(x,y) - EDF(x,y).EFL(EDF(x,y)x,y) 
This measure, following the above development is: 
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where: 
i m e * 
M 1 - -E ) m m &DFxj 
0DP = E„F(x,y) = Min {6 : 6x € L(y) } 
1 ® g. i m ^ 
1 - _£_i_ = Minx. ,x* EEff(y), x* =0DFx-e } 
m m 0DFxi ^ i=l ^DFXi 
This measure obviously requires that the Debreu-Farrell component, identifiable as the 
internal efficency component, be computed first, hence requiring an IEG (Internal, 
External, Global) procedure. This measure represents an improvement over the 
preceding two measures. It can be shown to satisfy (FL1), (FL2), and (UI4). However, 
concerning (FL3), the strict monotonicity condition, Zieschang notes, Ez(x,y) "does not 
always decrease in the nonslack inputs". The stated reason is that the rate of decrease 
of EDF(x,y) may be less than the rate of increase of EpL(x,y) as x increases in the non¬ 
slack inputs. A clarification of this statement is obtained by considering R and S in 
Figure 2.6 on page 58. In the case of these two input vectors, Xj is identified as the 
slack input and x2 as the non-slack input. Moving from S to R, x2, the non-slack input, 
increases from B to C. As a result EDF(x,y) decreases: 
EoF(S,y) = H > EDF(R,y) = I?? 
and E^Xjy) increases: EDF(S,y).S = H, EDF(R,y).R = G and 
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c „ , 1 ,W T3T, 
EFL(H,y) = -(— + —) 
2 DZ DT 
. c v 1 ,T3X' TFT 
•= E-<G-r) ■ 2(ot * nf> 
However, it is important to note that the strict monotonicity condition is satisfied in a 2- 
input space. Indeed if we consider points S and R in Figure 2.6, an input consumption 
pattern to the right of R would rate lower than R on the Fare-Lovell component and no 
better than R on the Debreu-Farrell component. Hence if the strict monotonicity 
condition is violated then it will be by a point such as R with respect to S. From the 
preceding developments we have: 
c /c v "Off 1 JJX 75Tv . sjy n. "DU1 JJX "DT. 
Ez(s»y) = — + —) and Ez(R,y) = + __) 
DS 2 JJZ DT DR 2 DY DT 
,,7 , TJZ TJK . • *i i T5Y "DA We note - = - and, similarly, - =- 
DH DS DU DR 
tj r- /c \ OH OZ a r: ro \ OG Hence, EDF(S,y) = = _ and EDF(R,y) = 
OY 
DS DA DR DA 
It follows: 
Ez(S,y) 
1T5Z7DX 
2UK{UZ 
—) and Ez(R,y) 
DT 
lTFY/DY ^ TJTv 
2DA <5Y + DT 
That is: 
Ez(S,y) = 
l,TJX TJZ 
2 UK UK 
) and Ez(R,y) = -( 
1 ,TJX "DY 
2 DA DA 
). 
Violation of the strict monotonicity condition would require E2(S,y) < Ez(R,y) that is, 
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UZ < OY 
which is impossible in a 2-input space. 
Zieschang offers a modification to the above measure in order to ensure strict 
monotonicity for the global measure. The proposed change decreases the weight of the 
external efficiency component in the evaluation of the global efficiency score. The 
choice of weight is somewhat arbitrary and, more importantly, it may alter arbitrarily the 
efficiency ranking of the input vectors. The altered measure is given by: 
Ez(x,y) = O' 
i e 
n(l-J-V-J-)+N 
mtf 0*x; e; 
n +N n+Nmfrfrx/ 
For sufficiently large N we can write, employing e = n/(n+N)m: 
m 
E'(x,y) = 6' - e£-i 
fi 
i=l x. 
From the above expression, we can see that the Zieschang measure, by 
preemptively extracting slacks in accordance with the unit’s own technique, ends up 
identifying an efficient technique that is generally "closer" to that of the unit than the one 
identified by the Fare-Lovell technique. 
The next section offers an economic approach to the measurement of efficiency. 
This approach is worth considering for it leads to an expression for the measure of 
efficiency that satisfies all desirable properties. 
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2.6.4 An Admissible Input-Oriented Efficiency Measure 
We start by defining a metric within the input space. The simplest way is to 
assign a value or efficiency unit price to each input and then, as customary in 
economics, define the efficiency score as the ratio of the minimal total cost of 
producing y to the total cost associated with x. The minimal cost is the "efficiency 
cost" associated with the input vector x* in Eff(y) against which x ought to be evaluated. 
E(x,y) = 
px 
This definition ensures that (FL1) is satisfied. However, p, from economic theory, is 
expected to reflect the implied trade-offs, or implied rates of substitution among inputs, 
and since all efficient input vectors x* generally reflect different rates of substitution, it 
is impossible to find any single p that will be consistent with all x*. Each technically 
efficient input vector x* implies a set of possible price vectors that would identify x* as 
a (the) minimum cost alternative to producing y. This fact is illustrated in Figure 2.7 
on page 59 at the end of the chapter. The price vector Pj > 0 represents a normal to 
the hyperplane defined by x*3 and x*4, p2 similarly represents a normal to the hyperplane 
defined by x*2 and x*3. Any price vector px such that: 
P« = kiPi + KiPj ki> ><2 s 0, k,+kj * 0 
ensures that x*3 represents a minimum cost alternative to producing y. 
It follows that the evaluation of x requires both the identification of x* E Eff(y) 
and the identification of px* such that: 
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P,.x- < p„.xe V x' e Eff(y) 
The identification of x* in Eff(y) obviously assumes that Eff(y) can be determined. 
From the knowledge of Eff(y) we can derive the range of efficiency prices 
compatible with Eff(y). Referring again to Figure 2.7 on page 59, any price vector p 
such that: 
p = kjp1 + le,pL kj,k2> 0, kj+lc, ^ 0 
will identify either a whole facet of Eff(y) (e.g. (x/x2*), (x2*x3*),..), or a unique face of 
Eff(y) (e.g. x2*, x3*,..) as minimium cost options to producing y. The price vectors p1 
and pL are determined as normals to the extreme (i.e. edge) facets of Eff(y). There are 
infinitely many (homothetic of one another) such normals to any facet but they all 
summarize to a unique set of price ratios. We further observe that given the cone of 
efficiency prices defined by p1 and pL, there exists no efficiency price vector that will 
uniquely determine x,* or x4* as the minimum cost option of producing y. Considering 
p such that: 
p = kjp1 - k^ ,kj,k2 > 0, 1^ 5* 0 
as a feasible price vector would allow x,+ to become the unique minimum cost alternative 
to producing y. However, when the technology is not known nor described in closed 
form, input sets have to be derived from observations and hence offer no empirical 
ground on which to bound k2. Without any theoretical nor empirical means to limit k2 
we would, by continuity, have to eventually consider p = (pi,p2) such that pj, the 
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efficiency price of input 2, is null. This extreme situation is not acceptable since the 
efficiency price of any input should equal the value of its marginal product which cannot 
be null in the case of an efficient input vector. Hence, for lack of further empirical or 
theoretical knowledge which would allow the extension of Eff(y) through x,* and x4*, we 
choose to limit the cone of admissible efficiency price vectors to the minimum cone that 
will properly identify Eff(y), i.e. the cone defined by p1 and pL in the case of Figure 2.7. 
Within the cone of weak disposability the proposed efficiency measure coincides 
with the Debreu-Farrell measure. Moreover, within the cone of weak disposability, the 
efficiency prices of the unit being evaluated coincide with the efficiency prices of the 
referent unit in Eff(y). However, the recognition that the relevant efficiency prices are 
those defined by the set of efficient units allows an appropriate definition of the 
efficiency score, namely the ratio of minimal to actual cost at efficiency prices, to be 
extended to units mapping within the areas of strong disposability. Within these areas 
the efficiency score evaluates to strictly less than the Debreu-Farrell measure, and, more 
importantly, the efficiency score so computed satisfies all four desirable properties for 
an efficiency score. 
Definition 2.1: The input efficiency measure for x, E,(x,y) is expressed as: 
where: 
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x* belongs to the efficient set of L(y) and is such that it is representative of a 
production technique that is most similar to that of x in terms of input consumption 
ratios: 
x* = 0*x - e with 0* = Min<, {0: 0x E L(y)} 
and px* is a vector of efficiency prices such that at these prices x* represents a minimum 
cost alternative of producing y. 
Theorem 2.1: Given the class of technologies described by (IC1) - (IC4) and the 
assumption of strong disposability of essential inputs, the input efficiency measure Ej(x,y) 
satisfies all four properties (FL1) - (FL3), (UI4) stated below: 
(FL1) Ej(x,y) = 1 x e Eff(y) 
(FL2) Ej(0x,y) = 1/0 Ej(x,y) V 0: 0x E L(y), x E L(y) 
(FL3) If x E L(y), x' E L(y), and x > x', then E^x^y) > Er(x,y) 
(UI4) Ej(Dx,y) = Ej(x,y) V x E Rm+, V D: (mxm) strictly positive 
diagonal. 
Proof: The proof is supported by Figure 2.8, on page 60 at the end of the chapter, 
which illustrates the case of a 2-dimensional input space. The argument can easily be 
adapted to an m-input space. 
(FL1) is trivially proven. If x E Eff(y) then x* = x and Ej(x,y) = 1. 
Conversely if Ej(x,y) = 1 then px..(x* - x) = 0 with x* - x < 0 and px. > 0. It follows 
x* - x = 0 hence x = x* and x E Eff(y). 
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To prove (FL2), let us first consider x and x' in L(y) such that x = 0'x', x* = 
0*x, x* E Eff(y), and E,(x,y) = 0*. This situation is illustrated by IG, J, and P0 in Figure 
2.8. 
TSF , T5T 
E,ao,y) =0* = —^ and Io = 6J = 
o 
x* = 0* x = 0*0'x' with 0* = Min { 0:0x E L(y)}. It follows (0*0') = Min { 0:0x' E 
L(y)}. Hence, EI(x',y) = 0*0' = 0'E1(x,y), i.e. 1/0' E,(x',y) = E1(0'x',y). 
The second situation corresponds to the case where x does not belong to the cone 
of weak disposability. We can then write x* = 0*x - e or x = 1/0* (x* + e) with x* E 
Eff(y) and 0* = Min { 0:0x E L(y)}. Let px* represent a vector of efficiency prices such 
that at these prices x* represents a minimum cost alternative of producing y, the 
efficiency score of x is then expressed by: 
Ei(x,y) = 
Px*X p*.x 0 
Px.X 1 Pj*e •^(p,.x‘ + Px.e) (1 + ^±l—) 
P„.X 
If we now consider x' in L(y) such that x = 0'x', then we have x* = 0*0'x' - e with 0* 
= Min { 0:00'x' E L(y)}, implying (0*0') = Min { 0:0x' E L(y)}. Hence: 
E,(x',y) = P,.x 
P,.x' 
P,.x 09’ 
r,(P„.x‘ + P,-e) (1 + 
P,-e 
Px.X 
= O'E.Cx.y) 
■) 
i.e. 1/0' Ej(x',y) = E^'x'^) in this situation as well. 
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To prove (FL3), we study the variations of Ej(x,y) as one input is increased. 
Starting at I0 in Figure 2.8 we progressively increase input 1. The input consumption 
is represented by a point moving from I0 to I„ I2, I3, and so on. 
Between IQ and I2 radial reduction of input consumption projects I onto the same facet 
of the efficient set where the same price vector, px* is valid. We then have: 
E,(x,,y) 
P,.*‘ 
P,.xi 
up; 
di; 
and E,(xo,y) 
up" uh; uf; 
or or ur o 1 1 
Increasing input 1 further and beyond I2 leads to a new relevant price vector since 
proportional input reduction projects the inefficient unit to a new facet of Eff(y): E3E4. 
With these prices the inefficiency of I3 evaluates to : 
E^y) 
up; 
ui; 
< 
uh; 
ui; 
E,(x0,y) 
The convexity of the isoquant ensures that the ratio of the cost of the projected efficient 
point to the cost of the inefficient point is strictly decreasing as the consumption of one 
input increases. 
Finally as the input consumption increases further, the area of strong disposability is 
reached (see I4 in Figure 2.8). Proportional input reduction is not sufficient to attain 
efficiency: 
x* = Ox - e or x = 1/0 (x* -f e) 
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As the input consumption increases further 6 remains constant and e absorbs the extra 
consumption. However, provided a unique efficiency price vector associated with x* has 
been identified (a normal to the extreme facet) then we have: 
E,(x,y) = Px«X 
P*.X 
Px.X e 
^(Px.x* + px,e) (i + Px-e 
Px * X 
which shows that the efficiency measure is, in this case as well, strictly decreasing in 
input: as e increases strictly Ej(x,y) decreases strictly. 
Regarding (UI4), as long as the procedure ensures that prices reflect an inverse 
relationship to units of measurement E^y) will be units-invariant. 
Q.E.D. 
The pricing mechanism for slack quantities is critical. The measures, EDF(x,y), 
EpL(x,y), Ez(x,y), either ignored or undervalued excess inputs leading to an 
overestimation of the efficiency score. This shortcoming is the primary reason why these 
three measures do not satisfy either the homogeneity or the strict monotonicity condition 
for an efficiency score. 
The Debreu-Farrell measure can be identified as the internal efficiency component 
and the residual reduction of the input vector as the external component. Hence the 
input-oriented technical efficiency measure is equivalent to the Debreu-Farrell measure 
only over the cone of weak disposability. In all circumstances it is measured by E,(x,y) 
= px*x* / px.x where x* is the referent unit in Eff(y) against which the inefficiency of 
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x is gauged, and where px. is a vector of efficiency prices which allows x* to be 
identified as a minimum cost alternative to producing y. 
2.7 Measuring Technical Efficiency in the Output Space 
2.7.1 Introduction 
By analogy with the input-oriented measure of technical efficiency, the output- 
oriented measure ought to incorporate two components: 
1) Internal efficiency. Internal efficiency is proportional to the shortage of 
outputs given the production unit’s "own" mix, i.e. keeping constant the 
proportions of outputs characteristic of the operations of the production 
unit. This component of efficiency can be associated with productivity. 
2) External efficiency. External efficiency reflects the scheduling expertise 
of the production unit in that it allows the unit to produce an efficient mix. 
External efficiency is inversely proportional to the deviations of the unit’s 
output ratios from the output ratios characteristic of the "closest" efficient 
scheduling/mix. 
2.7.2 Desirable Properties of an Output-Oriented Measure of Technical Efficiency 
Desirable properties for the output-oriented efficiency measure, E0(x,y), can 
similarly be derived from the corresponding properties for the input-oriented measure: 
(OP1) E0(x,y) = Uy 6 Eff(x) 
(OP2) Eo(x,0y) = <t> E0(x,y) V <f>: 0y G P(x), y G P(x) 
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(0P3) If y G P(x), y' E P(x), and y' > y, then Eo(x,y') > E0(x,y) 
(OP4) E0(x,Dy) = E0(x,y) V y E Rs+, V D: (sxs) strictly positive 
diagonal 
(OP1) is a direct interpretation of Koopmans’definition of output-oriented 
technical efficiency. In this case as well Eff(x) may not be known a priori requiring the 
specification of a procedure to identify it. 
(OP2) requires the efficiency measure to be homogeneous of degree 1. This 
condition is compatible with the measurement of the internal efficiency component 
introduced above. It also suggests that the output-oriented technical efficiency measure 
ought to be multiplicative in its components so that (l)-homogeneity be preserved 
independently of the level of the external efficiency component. 
(OP3) requires strict monotonicity of the efficiency score and, finally, (OP4) 
requires that the efficiency score be invariant with respect to changes in the units of 
measurement of outputs. 
2.7.3 An Admissible Output-Oriented Measure of Technical Efficiency 
An output-oriented measure that is worth considering is one easily adapted from 
the admissible input-oriented measure introduced earlier. We define a metric within the 
output space. The simplest way is to assign a value or efficiency price to each output 
and then define the efficiency score as the ratio of the total revenue associated with 
y to the maximal total revenue of producing y. The maximal revenue is the revenue 
associated to the output vector y* in Eff(x) against which y is being evaluated. 
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Definition 2.2: The output efficiency measure for y, E0(x,y) is expressed as: 
where: 
y* belongs to the efficient set of P(x) and is such that it is representative of a 
production technique that is most similar to that of y in terms of output mix: 
y* = 0*y + s with <t>* = Max^ {<£: <j>y G P(x)} 
and p is a vector of efficiency prices such that, at these prices, y* represents a maximum 
revenue alternative of consuming x. 
This definition ensures that (OP1) is satisfied. However, p, from economic theory, is 
expected to reflect the implied tradeoffs, or implied rates of transformation among 
outputs, and since most efficient output vectors y* reflect different rates of 
transformation, it is impossible to find any p that will be consistent with all y*. Each 
technically efficient output vector y* implies a set of possible price vectors that would 
identify y* as a (the) maximum revenue alternative to consuming x. This fact is 
illustrated in Figure 2.9 on page 61 at the end of the chapter. The price vector Pi > 0 
represents a normal to the hyperplane defined by y*2 and y*3, p2 similarly represents a 
normal to the hyperplane defined by y*, and y*2. Any price vector py such that: 
P,. = klPl + KPi kl> K ^ °> kl+k2 * 0 
ensures that y*2 represents a maximum revenue alternative to consuming x. It follows 
that the evaluation of y requires both the identification of y* E Eff(x) and the 
identification of py* such that: 
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Py*y* — Py.ye V ye G Eff(x) 
For the same reasons as in the case of input-oriented technical efficiency we 
choose to limit the cone of admissible efficiency price vectors to the minimum cone that 
will properly identify Eff(x), i.e. the cone defined by p1 and pL in the case of Figure 2.9. 
With efficiency prices restricted to that cone and a development that parallels the case 
of the input-oriented measure, it is easily shown that the proposed output-oriented 
measure of technical efficiency satisfies all four properties (OP1), (OP2), (OP3), and 
(OP4). 
2.8 Measuring Global Technical Efficiency 
The input-oriented efficiency measure focuses exclusively on input waste, and, 
similarly, the output-oriented efficiency measure focuses exclusively on output waste. 
A complete measure of efficiency requires that both subspaces, inputs and outputs, be 
considered so that all waste be accounted for. A logical approach in defining a global 
measure is to combine the definitions of the input-oriented measure and of the output- 
oriented measure. The evaluation of (x,y) requires the identification of (x*,y*) that is 
simultaneously input and output efficient, and of price vectors (px*,py*) such that, at these 
prices, x* is a least cost alternative to producing y* > y, and y* is a maximum revenue 
alternative to consuming x* < x. We then have: 
D X * P . V 
E(x,y) = EI(x,y).E0(x,y) = ——-—- 
PX.X Py.y* 
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It is important to note that x* belongs to the efficiency set of L(y*), not simply L(y), and 
that y* belongs to the efficiency set of P(x*), not simply P(x). The resulting properties 
of this global efficiency measure derive from the properties of its component efficiency 
measures with the added stipulation that some of these properties are contingent upon 
the procedure employed to identify (x*,y*). These properties, summarized by 
statements Efficiency 1 - Efficiency 5, are given below. 
(Efficiency 1) E(x,y) = lox G Eff(y) and y E Eff(x). 
(Efficiency 2) If waste is identified in proportion of current input 
consumption first and if x E L(y), x' E L(y), and x > 
x', then E^x^y) > Ej(x,y) but it is not always true that 
E(x',y) > E(x,y). 
(Efficiency 3) If waste is identified in proportion of current output mix 
first and if y E P(x), y' E P(x), and y' > y, then 
E0(x,y') > E0(x,y) but it is not always true that E(x,y') > 
E(x,y). 
(Efficiency 4) E(0x,y) = 1/0 E(x,y) V 6: Ox E L(y), x E L(y) if waste 
is identified in proportion of current input consumption 
first. 
(Efficiency 5) E(x,0y) = <t> E(x,y) V </>: </>y E P(x), y E P(x) if waste is 
identified in proportion of current output mix first. 
Property Efficiency 1 states that the efficiency score E(x,y) reveals (x,y) to be 
efficient if and only if it is input and output efficient. It suffices to note that both the 
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input component and output component of the efficiency measure are bounded above by 
1, and that efficiency prices are constrained to be strictly positive. It follows that (x,y) 
is identical to the efficient unit against which its efficiency is gauged. Efficiency 2 states 
that even when the strict monotonicity property of the input-oriented efficiency measure 
holds, the global measure may not depict this property. The fact that strict monotonicity 
does not extend to the global measure stems from the fact that the output-oriented 
efficiency measure may reverse the order of the input-oriented score. A situation where 
such a reversal could occur is depicted in Figure 2.10 on page 62 at the end of the 
chapter. In the input space the two input bundles, Ij and I2 are such that Ij < I2 and, 
accordingly E^I^y) = OXj/Ol! > E^y) = OX2/OI2. However, in the output space, 
y belongs to Eff(X2) but y does not belong to Eff(Xj). It follows E0(X!,y) < 1 and 
Eo(X2,y) = 1, so that globally we may have E(I,,y) = EI(I1,y).E0(X1,y) < E(I2,y) = 
EI(I2,y).E0(X2,y). Property Efficiency 3 parallels property Efficiency 2. Property 
Efficiency 4 states that E(x,y) statisfies the homogeneity property regarding input 
consumptions provided the input-oriented component is evaluated first. Since the input 
component of efficiency, which satisfies the homogeneity condition, is assessed first it 
leads to the same efficient input vector, x*, for both (x,y) and (0x,y). The output 
component of efficiency, which is assessed second, will therefore evaluate to the same 
value for both (x,y) and (0x,y), ensuring that the global measure satisfies the 
homogeneity condition. Property Efficiency 5 parallels property Efficiency 4. 
Given the scale of operations defined by x and y the best return or yield 
observable is exhibited by the efficient unit (x*, y*) evaluated at efficiency prices given 
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by (px*, py*). The performance of a production unit characterized by (x,y) is then 
appropriately gauged against a best observed performance. The sources of inefficiency 
can then be attributed to the pattern of input consumption whenever x ^ x* and/or to 
the output mix whenever y ^ y*. The recommendations to an inefficient unit are fully 
contained in the identified efficient unit (x*,y*). 
2.9 Measuring Allocative Efficiency 
The distinction between technical and allocative efficiency is well understood and 
the literature abounds in explanatory illustrations [e.g. Banker and Maindiratta, 1988]. 
As mentioned earlier, allocative efficiency requires technical efficiency. Moreover 
allocative efficiency rests on the existence/availability of prices or valuations for the 
various inputs and outputs that ensure a maximum yield or return for the unit. Namely 
(x,y) is allocatively efficient if and only if there exits (px, py) representative of market 
conditions or societal values such that: 
Py^ > Py3\ for (x y \ technically efficient. 
Px* PxXt 
It follows that if the set of technical efficiency price vectors is contained in the set of 
acceptable market price vectors then technical efficiency implies allocative efficiency. 
However, it is conceivable that some technical efficiency price vector may be 
representative of relative values which are not compatible with the ranges of market or 
societal relative values. This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.11 on page 63 at the end 
of the chapter by unit Ej. If the maximum value of input 1 relative to input 2 is limited 
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to p, which, in this case represent a normal to the facet E2E3 of the technical efficiency 
set, then despite its technical efficiency, is evaluated as allocatively inefficient. All 
techniques spanning the facet E2E3 are cheaper/more economical ways of producing y. 
The technique represented by E! can be construed as obsolete. The "closest" 
allocatively efficient technique is that of E^ 
The evaluation of (x,y) requires the identification of a "closest" (in terms of input 
and output ratios) allocatively efficient technique, (x*,y*), and of acceptable price vectors 
(Px*,Py*) such that, at these prices, x* is a least cost alternative to generating revenue 
py.y* > py.y, and y* is a maximum revenue alternative to spending px*x* < px*x. 
Following the format of the technical efficiency measure, allocative efficiency of (x,y) 
can then be measured by EA(x,y) given by the following expression: 
EA(x,y) 
py.y 
Px*X 
Py.y * 
Px.X* 
Note that for (x,y) technically but not allocatively efficient, the referent allocatively 
efficient unit, (x*,y*), does not satisfy x* < x and y* > y. To attain allocative 
efficiency (x,y) is required to implement some degree of substitution across inputs or 
across outputs. 
Measuring allocative efficiency hence requires the ability, for the procedure, to 
handle some control over the pricing mechanism so that identified efficiency prices be 
compatible with/restricted to the set of market or societal values. 
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2.10 Summary and Conclusions 
Assuming a class of technologies described by (IC1) - (IC4), (Convexity) and 
strong disposability of essential inputs, the evaluation of the technical efficiency of an 
economic unit described by an input consumption vector, x, characteristic of the unit’s 
technique and scale of production, and by an output production vector, y, characteristic 
of the unit’s output mix and productivity, is effected by searching for an efficient unit 
described by (x*, y*) such that: 
i) x* < x, y* > y. 
ii) x* is representative of a technique that is closest to that of x in terms of input 
ratios. 
iii) y* is representative of a product mix that is closest of that of y in terms of 
output ratios. 
iv) There exist efficiency prices px > 0 such that pxx* < pxx for all x in L(y*). 
v) There exist efficiency prices py > 0 such that pyy* > pyy for all y in P(x*). 
The technical efficiency of the production unit (x,y) is then the product of its input 
technical efficiency and its output technical efficiency: 
E(x,y) = E,(x,y).E0(x,y) = 
Px.X* 
Px.x 
py.y 
py*y * 
py.y 
p*.x 
Py.y* 
Px.X* 
The technical efficiency measure satisfies the following set of properties: 
(1) E(x,y) = 1 <=> x € Eff(y) and y E Eff(x). 
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(2) E(Dx,D'y) = E(x,y) V x E Rm+, V D: (mxm) strictly positive diagonal, 
V y E Rs+, V D': (sxs) strictly positive diagonal. 
If waste is preemptively identified across inputs, that is we can write: 
x* = 0*x - e with 0* = Min<, {0: 0x E L(y)}, then 
(3) E,(0x,y) = 1/0 Ej(x,y), Eo(0x,y) = Ec(x,y), E(0x,y) = 1/0 E(x,y) V 0: 
0x E L(y), x E L(y). 
(4) If x E L(y), x' E L(y), and x > x', then Ej(x',y) > E^y) but it is not 
always true that E0(x',y) > E0(x,y) and E(x',y) > E(x,y). 
If waste is preemptively identified across outputs, that is we can write: 
y* = 0*y + s with 0* = Max^, {0: 0y E P(x)}, then 
(5) Eo(x,0y) = 0 E0(x,y), Ej(x,0y) = E^y), E(x,0y) = 0 E(x,y) V 0: 0y 
E P(x), y E P(x). 
(6) If y E P(x), y' E P(x), and y' > y, then Eo(x,y') > E0(x,y) but it is 
not always true that Ej(x,y') > E^y) and E(x,y') > E(x,y). 
Allocative efficiency requires technical efficiency. The evaluation of (x,y) 
requires the identification of a "closest" (in terms of input and output ratios) allocatively 
efficient technique, (x*,y*), and of acceptable price vectors (px*,py*) such that, at these 
prices, x* is a least cost alternative to generating revenue py*y* ^ py*y, and y* is a 
maximum revenue alternative to spending px*x* < px*x. Following the format of the 
technical efficiency measure, allocative efficiency of (x,y) can then be measured by 
EA(x,y) given by the following expression: 
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EA(x,y) = 
py.y 
Py.y* 
Px.X* 
If (x,y) is technically but not allocatively efficient, the referent allocatively efficient unit, 
(x*,y*), does not satisfy x* < x and y* > y. Some degree of substitution across inputs 
or across outputs is then required to attain allocative efficiency. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MEASURING INEFFICIENCY IN PRACTICE 
DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 
3.1 Introduction and DEA Terminology 
The preceding chapter developed a measure to gauge the efficiency (or degree of 
inefficiency) of a production unit characterized by input consumption levels and output 
production levels. The measure is expressed with respect to these levels and with respect 
to the consumption and production levels of a reference unit operating on the frontier of 
feasible achievements. The actual computation of the efficiency score therefore rests on, 
first, the ability to locate the frontier of feasible achievements and, second, on the 
definition of a mechanism to select the referent point on the identified frontier. This 
chapter addresses these two concerns. 
The concept of locating an empirical frontier is at the core of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), a mathematical programming technique developed by Chames, Cooper, 
and Rhodes in 1978 to evaluate the relative performance of decision-making units 
(DMUs). A variety of data envelopment analysis models has appeared in the literature 
as have numerous studies employing the technique [Banker, Chames, Cooper, Swarts, 
Thomas, 1989], [Seiford 1990]. Each of the various models for data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) seeks to determine which of n decision making units (DMUs) determine 
an envelopment surface when considering m inputs and s outputs. The statement of 
these models carries at the outset assumptions regarding the form of the envelopment 
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surface. Units that lie on (determine) the surface are deemed efficient in DEA 
terminology. The assumed form of the envelopment surface bears a direct relationship 
to the set of efficient units. Units that do not lie on the surface are termed inefficient 
and the analysis provides measures of their relative efficiency. The forms of the 
envelopment surface that are most commonly used are presented in section 2. 
For decision making unit 1, xu > 0 denotes the i* input value and yrl > 0 denotes 
the r* output value and x, and y, denote, respectively, the vectors of input and output 
values. A solution to a DEA model for (x,, yx) identifies a point (x*,y*) on the 
envelopment surface in accordance with the evaluation principles implicit in the model. 
The evaluation principles are criteria that guide the determination and measurement of 
efficiency. Within the mathematical programs they define the manner in which projected 
points on the envelopment surface are obtained for DMUs that are inefficient. A variety 
of evaluation principles are introduced in section 3. 
Three of the DEA models that are most often associated with the DEA 
methodology are CCR, BCC and ADD models. The form of the envelopment surface 
for the BCC and the ADD models is exactly the same and different from the one 
underlying the CCR model. This implies that the DMUs determined to be efficient are 
exactly the same in both the BCC and ADD models. However, these two models differ 
in their implicit evaluation principles. Both the CCR and the BCC models obey the same 
evaluation principles. Each of these models is reviewed in section 4. 
A more recent class of models commonly referred to as cone-ratio models 
[Chames et al.,1990] and assurance-region models [Thompson et al., 1986] are 
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introduced in Section 5. These models are intended to bring efficiency evaluations closer 
to economic efficiency ratings. However, to this date, no general formulation and 
economic interpretation of such models has appeared in the literature. Section 5 fulfills 
this need. It develops a new model in the context of production theory that strengthens 
the bridge between DEA and economics. A general formulation is offered that 
underscores the flexibility of this class of models in terms of evaluation principles, and 
their properties and advantages in terms of efficiency measurement. 
The respective behavior of these models is constrasted in section 6 by means of 
a computational illustration based on a synthetic data set figuring four input isoquants in 
a 2 x 2 input-output space. Their performance with respect to the derived efficiency 
scores is given particular emphasis. 
Section 7 summarizes all findings and concludes on the viability of Data 
Envelopment Analysis as a methodology to assess the relative efficiency of decision¬ 
making units. 
3.2 Forms of Data Envelopment 
Acceptable forms of envelopes for the data derive directly from accepted 
properties regarding the production possibility set. If the description of that set rests on 
the observation of empirical data points then the least costly, in terms of number of 
assumptions, is to declare efficient (i.e. envelope-defining) any point that is not 
dominated in at least one measure by any other point. Conversely a rating of 
inefficiency for a point DMU0 implies that there exists another observed point, DMUb 
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that dominates DMU0. That is, DMU, exhibits lower consumption of all inputs and 
higher production of all outputs with strict comparisons in at least one input and/or at 
least one output. In the literature this approach to describe the production possibility set 
is known as the "free disposal hull" (FDH) methodology [Tulkens, 1990]. It leads to an 
envelope that wraps the data very closely and identifies a large number of efficient points 
relative to other envelopment forms. As an illustration let us consider the case where 
observations are limited to the input set L(y) represented in Figure 3.1 on page 117 at 
the end of the chapter. In this situation the points E, F, and U are identified as efficient 
and hence, as envelope-defining observations. Obviously this methodology allows for 
non-convex isoquants which is not in accordance with traditional assumptions of 
economic theory. This approach will not be given any further consideration. 
Building upon the traditionally accepted assumptions of convex input sets and 
convex output sets characterizing substitutions across inputs and across outputs 
respectively, the consideration of, and assumptions regarding, the relationship between 
outputs and inputs for any technique are then sufficient to complete the description of the 
production possibility set and define acceptable forms of envelope for the data. 
The particular feature of the production function that defines the form of the 
envelope is the characterization of retums-to-scale. As mentioned in Peterson [1990] a 
property of ray unboundedness for the production possibility set, that is, as defined in 
Chapter 2, the assumption that any multiple of an observed point belongs to the 
production possibility set as well, is equivalent to the assumption of non-decreasing 
returns to scale for the technique described by the input ratios of the observed point when 
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proportionally larger input vectors are considered, and to the assumption of non¬ 
increasing returns to scale when proportionally smaller input vectors are considered. 
These assumptions, coupled with the empirical knowledge that the general behavior for 
a production technique is to successively exhibit increasing, constant, and decreasing 
returns to scale as inputs increase proportionately, lead to the deduction that the 
assumption of ray unboundedness for the production possibility set is equivalent to the 
assumption of constant returns to scale for the technology. It follows that the exclusion 
of the ray unboundedness property, from the set of properties concerning the production 
technology, acknowledges non-constant returns to scale for the technology, that is the 
possibility of any technique exhibiting variable returns to scale as inputs increase 
proportionately. 
Finally, convexity of the production possibility set is justified by considering that 
economic data on consumption of inputs and production of outputs are in fact the 
representation of average rates of consumption and production over time. Each 
observation is representative of a production facility dedicated to a technique so that its 
operations are characterized by steady state rates of production given its scale of 
operations. A convex combination of observations can then be interpreted as a time¬ 
sharing leasing agreement where the production facilities entering the combination are 
successively leased for subperiods of time over the period of measurement. 
In practice existing DEA models address envelopment surfaces of two types. In 
this exposition, these surfaces are referred to as constant returns-to-scale (CRS) and 
variable returns-to-scale (VRS) surfaces. 
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The CRS envelopment surface consists of hyperplanes in Rm+S which are 
particular facets of the convex polyhedral cone determined by the vectors (Xj,yj), j = 
l,...n, and which are consistent with the postulate of ray unboundedness for the 
production possibility set. This type of envelope is the loosest to the extent that it 
identifies the smallest set of efficient units relative to other envelopment forms. 
The VRS envelopment surface consists of hyperplanes which are particular facets 
of the convex hull of the points (Xj,yj), j = l,...n in Rm+S. This type of envelopment is 
intermediate between the FDH type and the CRS type in terms of the size of the set of 
efficient units. In fact there is a relation of inclusion among the sets of efficient units 
for these three types of envelopes. We have: 
Ecrs Evrs C EpDH 
where E denotes the set of efficient points. 
For each of the above types of surfaces, to determine whether DMU, is on the 
envelopment surface, independently of measuring the unit’s degree of inefficiency if it 
is not, Charnes, Cooper and Thrall [1986] solve a simple linear program that seeks to 
identify a positive linear combination of observed points that dominates DMU, in the 
Pareto-Koopmans sense. In the mathematical statements of the models, the s x n matrix 
of outputs for the n observed data points is denoted Y and the m x n matrix of inputs is 
denoted X. The vector X identifies which units constitute the linear combination and the 
vectors s and e represent respectively the identified output slacks and input excesses. In 
the case of the constant returns-to-scale (CRS) envelopment the following model is 
solved: 
69 
Min Xl 
Y X - s = Y, 
-X X - e = - X, 
X ^ 0, e £ 0, s £ 0 
and, in the case of the VRS envelopment, the following model is solved: 
Min Xj 
Y X - s = Yj 
-X X - e = - Xj 
1 X = 1 
XkO, e^O, S2i0 
The convexity relation explicitly stated in the VRS formulation is masked by the 
ray unboundedness postulate in the CRS formulation. In both cases DMU, is on the 
envelope if and only if s = 0, and e = 0 at optimality, for all optimal solutions. 
3.3 Principles of Evaluation 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Once the form of the envelopment has been prespecified the above models 
unambiguously report on the efficiency status of any DMU, that is they provide an 
answer to the binary question of whether a DMU is efficient or not. When it is 
recognized that a DMU is not efficient the next question that arises is the assessment of 
the unit’s inefficiency. The arguments of Chapter 2 contribute to the answer by 
demonstrating that DMU/s efficiency can be measured by: 
70 
PxX Vy.Vl 
p**xi py,y* 
where (x* = XX,y*= YX) is representative of an efficient DMU and (px*, py.) are 
admissible "efficiency prices", that is prices that identify x* as a minimum cost 
alternative to producing y* and y* as a maximum revenue alternative to consuming x*. 
An inefficient DMU maps in the interior of the production possibility set and measuring 
its degree of efficiency hence necessitates the selection of a reference point on the 
envelope. Obviously infinitely many such reference points are feasible candidates. 
However, reasonable criteria can be introduced that will reduce the set of selectable 
referent points. These criteria summarize to a projection mechanism that, for each 
inefficient DMU, identifies a referent point against which the DMU’s inefficiency is to 
be gauged. This projection mechanism is the embodiment of the evaluation principles 
or criteria. These principles may focus primarily on controlling input consumption or 
primarily on output production, or on avoiding waste without distinction between inputs 
and outputs, they may be defined within a short-term horizon or within a long-term 
horizon, finally they may define explicit tradeoffs across inputs and outputs respectively 
or they may allow for these tradeoffs to be defined endogeneously. The purpose of the 
next subsections is to explore, define, and operationalize evaluation principles, that is 
criteria that will afford the selection of (x*,y*) on the envelope and of (px*, py.) to 
aggregate input and output measures. The identification of (x*,y*) on the envelope to 
serve as reference to evaluate DMU,’s efficiency immediately points to DMUi’s 
weaknesses in the form of revealed excesses in input consumption and deficiencies in 
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output production. These revealed weaknesses can then constitute the core of any 
remedial plan of actions. It follows that each possible projection on the envelope can be 
seen as an optimal response to distinct managerial objectives. 
3.3.2 Orientation of the Evaluation 
The orientation of the evaluation deals with the "quantity” side of managerial 
objectives as opposed to the "pricing" or tradeoff side. It states whether waste is to be 
identified first among inputs, or among outputs, or across all measures without any 
prioritization. 
An input-oriented evaluation seeks (x*,y*), against which the inefficiency of 
(xi,yj) will be gauged, on the envelope so that x* be representative of an efficient 
technique that is "closest" to the technique characterized by the input ratios of x,. 
Equivalently input-orientation seeks a projected point such that the proportional reduction 
in inputs is maximized. The primary concern of management implicit in this orientation 
is that the DMU being evaluated keep operating with its current technique, characterized 
by the actual input ratios, and gain efficiency by maintaining its current levels of outputs 
and decreasing its inputs. 
An output-oriented evaluation seeks a projected point such that the proportional 
augmentation in outputs is maximized. In this situation, the primary objective is to reach 
efficiency by focusing on productivity gains while preserving the current output mix. 
For either orientation, satisfaction of the primary objective may not be sufficient to reach 
the envelopment surface or attain efficiency. Indeed it may happen that, for instance, 
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after the smallest proportional input vector has been identified in the case of an input- 
oriented evaluation, that minimum input vector would allow production of a larger output 
vector than y,. In that case the primary objective alone failed to project DMU, on the 
envelopement surface, and there might still be infinetely many options to reach that 
surface. When that happens, management has to decide on how to reach the envelope, 
that is identify and account for the remaining waste so that the full extent of the unit’s 
inefficiency be gauged. The final choice will come from the stated secondary managerial 
objectives. 
A global orientation for the evaluation does not prioritize the identification of 
waste over input or output measures. Instead it focuses on the "valuation" of the bundle 
of excess inputs and unrealized outputs. For input or ouput orientations the valuation of 
the remaining waste may become the focus of the secondary managerial objectives. This 
concern of "valuation" is addressed in the next subsection. 
3.3.3 Aggregation across Non-Commensurable Measures 
3.3.3.1 Introduction. The manner in which an inefficient unit is projected on the 
envelopement surface depends not only on the orientation of the evaluation but also on 
the aggregation method to account for any remaining waste. This method defines a 
metric within the input and output spaces and is entirely described by the efficiency price 
vectors, (px, py). For instance if (x*, y*) represents the projected point associated with 
the evaluation of (xb y,), given the chosen orientation and aggregation method 
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characterized by (px., py.), then the global waste revealed in DMU,’s operations can be 
accounted by: 
px.(x, - x*) + py.(y* - y,). 
The vectors (px., py.) are the vectors used in computing DMU,’s efficiency and from the 
arguments presented in the preceding chapter, px. ought to be such that px*.x*is minimum 
over L(y*) and py..y* is maximum over P(x*). These vectors obviously play the role 
of prices representative of the relative valuation of inputs and outputs at the point (x*, 
y*)« Depending on the knowledge and constraints of the environment, varying degrees 
of freedom may accompany the determination of (px., py.) in practice. We distinguish 
between two main approaches which may respectively be associated with a short-term 
perspective and a long-term perspective regarding the efficiency evaluations. In the 
short-term prices tend to be sticky (in the economics sense). Some prices may even be 
considered fixed and exogenous. By constrast, in the long-run, relative prices as well 
as the price level tend to be granted more freedom. These perspectives are presented in 
the next subsections. 
U.3.2 Explicit Pricing. This first approach reflects a short-term perspective 
where the evaluation is effected according to preset or fixed "prices" for the excess 
inputs and preset "opportunity costs" for unrealized outputs, that is within a framework 
of a fixed price level. The preset excess input prices can be interpreted as current 
equilibrium prices enforced in a centralized second market for inputs. Similarly the 
preset opportunity costs may represent going offer prices on a centralized market for the 
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various outputs. A multiplicity of pricing schemes has found its way into the DEA 
literature. It is worth noting that the influence of pricing is secondary to that of the 
orientation to the extent that the pricing scheme is effective only if there is waste 
remaining after the proportional input reduction and/or proportional output augmentation. 
Whenever the unit is efficient, or successfully reaches the envelope after maximum 
proportional input reduction or maximum proportional output augmentation, pricing is 
endogenous but constrained to a minimum level defined by the explicit pricing scheme. 
This observation will be further clarified in the next section when we interpret the pricing 
schemes of the most commonly used DEA models. The remainder of this section 
presents the three most common pricing schemes. 
Standard models are such that (pja = 1, i = 1,..., m, when eu > 0, and (py)rl 
== l>r= !>•••) s when srl > 0. They implicitly assume that the marginal worths of each 
unit of the non-zero output slacks and nonzero excess inputs are identical and equal to 
1, independently of the DMU being evaluated and independently of its scale of 
operations. This pricing mechanism implies that a unit of slack of any measure, be it 
input or output, is equated to a unit of waste, and that an objective of the evaluation is 
simply to account for global waste. This pricing mechanism therefore mirrors the 
particular conversion system defined by the scale and units of measurement of the various 
inputs and outputs. For instance, if input 1 measures annual wages in millions of dollars, 
input 2 measures annual salaries in thousands of dollars and input 3 measures the number 
of hours worked in thousands of hours, then whenever there is slack in these inputs, one 
million dollars of annual wages is equivalent to one thousand dollars of annual salaries, 
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and equivalent to one thousand hours of work. It follows that caution should be 
exercised in selecting units of measurement if a standard model is to be used without 
manipulation of the data. To fully "standardize" the model and prevent the aggregation 
of non-commensurable measures some preprocessing of data may be required. Two 
possibilities are discussed below: 
(i) Standardize each input and output measure. The resulting data will be 
unitless and the values of output slacks and excess inputs will capture the 
deviations from efficient levels within and across measures. A minor 
drawback is that the transformed data will exhibit both negative and 
positive values which will require further manipulation before LP-based 
DEA models are used. A more serious drawback stems from the lack of 
justification/interpretation that can be granted to the averages of each 
measure. The average values, themselves, are aggregates of both efficient 
and inefficient observed levels and therefore can only be representative of 
an inefficient theoretical DMU. 
(ii) Prorate each input measure by the minimum observed value and each 
output measure by the maximum observed value. The transformed data 
will be unitless and the slacks will capture the deviations from efficient 
levels within and, relatively, across measures. The drawbacks of 
preprocessing data by standardizing inputs and outputs are completely 
avoided by preprocessing data by prorating. 
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Invariant models are such that (pjy = l/xu, i = 1,..., m, when eil ^ 0, and 
(Py)ri = l/yri> r = 1,..., s when srl > 0. This pricing scheme assumes that the marginal 
values of non-zero output slack and excess input variables are not identical. Moreover 
these prices are DMU specific, reflecting the fact that different techniques demand 
different input and output mixes. Consequently, different relative values are assigned to 
the various inputs and outputs. These prices are consistent with an emphasis on 
proportional reduction of inputs and proportional augmentation of outputs for each DMU. 
Indeed, assuming that waste can be entirely eliminated through proportional input 
reductions, these prices are such that for all inputs i, j, we have: 
— = — i, j = i * j 
x. Xj 
where ^ = x; - x*i5 i = l,...,s represent the revealed excess consumption for each input. 
These prices are then expressing that the marginal value of the last unit of waste is the 
same across all inputs. 
Finally normed models are such that prices are given by the reciprocal 
coordinates of the barycenter of all efficient units, namely: 
(Px)il = 
1 i = l,...,m, when eu > 0 
n«£x« 
jSE 
(Py)„ = 
1 r = 1.s, when srl > 0 
jeE 
where E = {j | DMUj is efficient} and ne is the cardinality of E. These prices possess 
the following characteristics: they are the same for all DMUs, they distinguish between 
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inputs and outputs in terms of relative value. The relative weighting is established by 
retaining information on efficient units only (implying the prior identification of efficient 
units). Possible arguments against this choice of prices deal with their uniqueness across 
DMUs and their artificiality. A unique set of prices applicable to all inefficient DMUs 
ignores the eventual reality of spatially separated markets which allow for different 
supply and demand conditions and equilibria and, hence, for multiple, or ranges of, 
relative prices. The barycenter of efficient points from which the prices are derived 
corresponds to an artificial DMU that is definitely inefficient since it is interior to the 
polytope defined by the efficient units. 
As mentioned above, normed models require knowledge of the envelopment 
surface. It is therefore necessary to first determine the set of efficient units. This is 
done by performing a DEA analysis with any one of the models for the particular form 
of the surface decided upon (CRS or VRS), since efficiency is independent of the chosen 
pricing scheme. Prices for the normed model are then computed from the barycenter of 
the identified efficient units. 
Each of the above pricing schemes can lead to different projected points on the 
envelope. This is expected since each mechanism reflects a different valuation system 
for the identified waste. However, when using any one system, the projected point ought 
to remain the same regardless of the units of measurement of the data. In the case of 
alternate optima the set of projected points should remain the same. This remains true 
with the invariant and the normed models since their valuation systems are invariant to 
units of measurements. It is true for the standard models only when the data are unitless. 
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3.3.3.3 Constrained Implicit Pricing. This second approach reflects a long-term 
perspective where the price level is determined endogeneously in the course of the 
evaluation, and where the evaluation explicitly incorporates recommendations to change 
the technique of production whenever appropriate, i.e. whenever the DMU, using the 
terminology introduced in Chapter 2, is relatively inefficient. These recommendations 
are formulated by means of substitutions across inputs and across outputs, hence allowing 
for strict augmentation of some input consumptions and strict diminution of some output 
productions. It follows that this approach departs from a Pareto-Koopmans evaluation. 
The only constraints on pricing stem from the specification of ranges of price 
ratios defining acceptable tradeoffs across inputs and across outputs respectively. Ranges 
rather than unique price ratios are considered to acknowledge, in this case as well, the 
reality of spatially separated markets with differing supply and demand conditions and 
equilibria. Substitutions, that is recommendations to change technique, will occur 
whenever the current pattern1 of input consumption or output production cannot be 
justified by any acceptable price vector as a cost-minimizing and/or revenue-maximizing 
pattern. The specification of the ranges may derive from historical records, or may be 
imposed by a central authority, or may be arrived at by consensus across all DMUs prior 
to the evaluation. 
1 A pattern is defined by the relative consumptions of inputs and relative productions 
of outputs. 
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We will next review the most commonly used DEA models that operationalize 
combinations of these evaluation principles. 
3.4 Interpretation of Existing Models 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Data Envelopment Analysis models are linear programs which effect relative 
evaluations of the operations of decision-making units. In fact performing data 
envelopment analysis requires the solution of a linear programming model for each 
decision-making unit. The primal models can be characterized as projection models. 
The associated dual models as pricing models. An optimal solution of a primal DEA 
model to evaluate a DMU, DMU,, may include 0, the minimum proportion of x{ allowing 
the production of y,, <£, the maximum multiple of ^ attainable from xb the m-vector e 
which may represent either the total excess input consumption for each input or the 
remaining excesses after the proportional input reduction has been effected, the s-vector 
s which may represent either the total output deficiency for each output or the remaining 
deficiency after the proportional output augmentation has been effected, and the n-vector 
X which indicates which envelope-defining DMUs form the referent point to evaluate 
DMU!. An optimal dual solution includes the m-vector v of input efficiency prices, the 
s-vector \i of output efficiency prices, and, for the VRS envelopments, the variable a>. 
The set of values n, p,(co), are the coefficients of hyperplanes that define the facets of 
the envelopment surface. The interpretation of these solutions derive from the principles 
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of evaluation that are operationalized by the formulation. The next subsections provide 
illustrations and comments on the most commonly used DEA models. 
3.4.2 The CCR Model 
The CCR model assumes a CRS envelopment, it is input-oriented and incorporates 
a standard pricing mechanism where all units of waste remaining after a maximal 
proportional input reduction are priced at a same value, e. In the process of evaluating 
DMU, characterized by (x„y,), an efficient unit given by (XVM, is 
identified and establishes that DMUj could have produced its levels of output and 
additional amounts given by (sr)r = h a by consuming less than its levels of inputs. In 
fact DMU! could have reduced its inputs by (1 - 6) % across the board and by additional 
amounts given by (e^ = j m. 
The solution of the primal program (CCR Primal) given below indicates that 
DM^ is efficient, i.e. determines the frontier, if and only if the efficient production plan 
solution of the program is that of DMU, itself. Mathematically this necessary and 
sufficient condition translates into: 
6 = 1 and s = 0 and e = 0 at optimality. 
In the context of the dual mathematical program of (CCR Primal), called (CCR 
Dual) and given below, the evaluation of DMUj corresponds to the determination of a 
set of virtual prices ((/xr)r = (p^ = ,.J such that the aggregated value of DMU0’s 
inputs be normalized to unity and the aggregated value of DMUj’s outputs be maximized 
without exceeding unity. The dual formulation is more amenable to a geometric 
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characterization of the empirical frontier as a cone through the origin whose facets are 
defined by the intersection of hyperplanes of the form: 
s m 
s/*,y, - £ "ixi = 0 
r=l j=i 
The facets of the empirical frontier are delimited by adjacent/contiguous efficient 
production plans. The prices hence define a normal to a facet of the empirical frontier. 
m 
M«w e e (£s,+ £ ei) 
r=l i=l 
St 
< 
£ynx, - sr = yri 
j=l 
£xijxi - ei =0 
j=i 
> 0 
sr > 0 
ej > 0 
r = l,...,s 
i = l,...,m 
j = 
r = l,...,s 
i = l,...,m 
(CCR Primal) 
MaV, z = £^y,i 
m 
£"ixu = 1 
i=l 
s m 
£/*, y. - E "ixij 
< 0 j = lv ..,n 
r=l i=l 
Mr 
> e r=l,. .. ,s 
> e i-1,. ..,m 
(CCR Dual) 
The role of e deserves further comment. It represents a non-Archimedean 
quantity, that is a number whose magnitude is smaller than that of any data of the 
problem and is introduced to ensure that the proportional reduction of inputs is the 
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primary goal in the search for an efficient production plan. If the model CCR primal 
is solved with a prespecified value for e, the chosen value bears a direct impact on the 
shape and size of the cone of efficiency prices. If we accept the solution of CCR Dual 
as admissible efficiency prices, that is accept (v, n) as (px, py) then we are lead to derive: 
E(x,y) = —-HIl = z = e - 6 (Is + le) = $ - e 
"XI /*y‘ 
An often used "selling" point for this model is that it provides a best case evaluation for 
all DMUs since the efficiency score is equal to the dual objective function value which 
is maximized at optimality. However, we recognize the modified Zieschang measure of 
efficiency and are reminded of the caveats of that measure, namely that does not satisfy 
the strict monotonicity property. It follows that any ranking of DMUs derived from the 
selection of an arbitrary value for e is a priori debatable. This reservation is confirmed 
by the open controversy in the literature on the use and role of e [Boyd and Fare, 1984], 
[Charnes and Cooper, 1984]. 
When e is considered as a modelling construct, a two-phase approach is taken to 
solve the program. The first phase corresponds to the minimization of 0, that is the 
extremal proportional reduction of inputs. The second phase proceeds to select the 
efficient production plan on the frontier against which DMU, is evaluated. Hence from 
a computational point of view two sets of linear programs are solved for each DMU. 
They are respectively (Phase I Primal, Phase I Dual) and (Phase II Primal, Phase II 
Dual) given below. 
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e Min 
0,\,s,e 
Ey.ixj-S. = y„ r 
j=i 
-Exsxj - ei = o i 
j=i 
^ > 0 j 
sr > 0 r 
ej > 0 i 
s 
MaV, zi= E Mryr, 
r=l 
m 
E "ixa = 1 
i=l 
Em, E"ixij s 0 j=i.n 
i=l 
fiT > 0 r=l,...,s 
vx > 0 i=l,...,m 
Min 
A,s,e 
s 
(E 
E y„x, -s, = y,> 
j=i 
- Exiixi - ei ■ -rxn 
j=i 
X. > 0 
sr > 0 
e4 > 0 
r = 
i = 
j = 
r = 1.s 
i = 
(Phase I Primal) 
(Phase I Dual) 
(Phasell Primal) 
84 
m 
r=l i=l  
s m 
(Phase II Dual) 
st * 
The efficiency score is then expressed as: 
Is + le 
yx 
We recognize the efficiency score i (iota) introduced by Ali et al. [1992]. When the 
inefficient unit maps within the cone of weak disposability we recover the Debreu-Farrell 
measure 0 since s = 0 and e = 0. When the unit maps within an area of strong 
disposability the efficiency score is further reduced from 0 to account for any remaining 
slack output and excess input. 
Other caveats of the model stem from the dependence of the evaluation on units 
of measurement of the data, and more importantly from the possible occurrence of prices 
implying relative values across inputs and across outputs that are beyond any reasonable 
justification. However, if CRS envelopment appears reasonable, if the data is presented 
in units that are conform to common usage then the model represents an excellent means 
to assess the implied relative values of inputs and outputs for the various operating units. 
Such knowledge is relevant to decide on the allocation of a limited supply of some input 
or the requisition of some output. 
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The output-oriented version of the model is given by: 
Max <t>X s,e <t> + « (Esr 
r=l 
+ 
m 
Ee.) 
St 
Hr, ~ EVnX1 + Sr = 0 r = l,...,s 
i=l 
n 
Ex«xi+ ei = xil i = l,...,m 
j=l 
xi ^ 0 j = 
Sr ^ 0 r = 1,_,s 
ei ^ 0 i = l,...,m 
(CCR0 Primal) 
The envelopement surface is to be reached by stretching the output vector 
proportionately first, and then according to the pricing of any remaining output slack and 
input excesses explicit in the objective function. The same comments as in the case of 
an input orientation apply to e. If the program is considered a one-phase program and 
if we accept the solution of CCR Dual as admissible efficiency prices, that is accept (v, 
n) as (px, Py) then we are lead to derive: 
E(X|,y,) =  -1—— = —— 
0 + e(ls+le) 0 + e 
If a two-phase procedure is used, corresponding to a preemptive proportional output 
augmentation, then at optimality of the second phase we have: 
Is + le= -0;ty, + wc, => fty, = ■![«, - (Is +le)] 
0 
with still: 
ny * - vx * = 0 
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It follows: 
E(x„y,) = J2LL.J¥l = 1(1 - il + le) 
vx\ fiy * <t> vxx 
We note that the expression of the efficiency score in the case of two-phase solution of 
the output oriented version of the CCR model is different from o (omicron) introduced 
by Ali et al. [1992] as a counterpart to t. 
3.4.3 The BCC Model 
A first extension to the CCR model was offered by Banker, Chames, and Cooper 
[1984]. It represents a generalization to the extent that their model rests on a reduced 
number of postulates for the production possibility set by eliminating the ray 
unboundedness postulate. The BCC model assumes a VRS envelopment, it is input- 
oriented and incorporates a standard pricing mechanism where all units of waste 
remaining after a maximal proportional input reduction are priced at a same value, e. 
The same interpretation as for (CCR Primal) applies with the added stipulation that the 
efficient production plan sought in the evaluation, in accordance with the type of 
envelopment, be a convex combination of known feasible production plans instead of a 
positive linear one. The set of dual programs to determine the new envelope or 
empirical frontier are (BCC Primal) and (BCC Dual) given below. 
The characterization of efficiency is still made via the necessary and sufficient 
condition that 6=1 and s = 0 and e = 0 at optimality. 
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(BCC Primal) 
m 
Min»,x,,e e -£ (Es<+ E ei) 
r=l i=l 
St « 
6x:, - 
st 
r=l 
E y^xi - sr = yrt j=i 
n 
r = 1,_,s 
Exiixi - ei =0 j=i 
n 
Exi =i j=i 
i = l,...,m 
Xj > 0 
• 
J = l,...,n 
sr > 0 r = 1,_,s 
e. > 0 i = l,...,m 
s 
Max V1 a v. 
r=l 
m 
E "ixii i=l 
m 
= 1 
y„ - E "ixij - i=l 
< 0 j=l,...,n 
Mr > e r=l,...,s 
Vi > e i=l,...,m 
(BCC Dual) 
co, unrestricted 
The additional variable, cob in (BCC Dual) has been associated with the 
characterization of retums-to-scale prevailing in the interior of the facet defined by the 
efficient production plan against which DMU, is compared. Following Banker and 
Thrall’s definition [1990], retums-to-scale at (x*, y*) on the envelope are said to be 
increasing if [(l+5)x*, (l+5)y*] maps on the frontier for 5 > 0 but not for 6 < 0, 5 
small. They are said to be constant if [(1+S)x*, (1+S)y*] belongs to the production 
possibility set for 5 > 0 and for 6 < 0, 5 small, and they are said to be decreasing if 
[(l+5)x*, (l+5)y*] for 5 < 0 but not for S > 0, 8 small. This particular 
characterization of retums-to-scale is captured by co,. If there exists a solution to (BCC 
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Dual) such that o>, < 0 (respectively = 0, > 0) then increasing (respectively constant, 
decreasing) retums-to-scale prevail. 
From an economic/accounting point of view w, can be attributed a profit related 
interpretation. Indeed it seems natural to assimilate ny to a revenue fucntion and vx to 
a cost fucntion. Regarding vx, if variable costs are the only costs accounted for, then 
the difference ny* - vx* is a gross profit function equal to the net profit plus the fixed 
costs of operations. If vx accounts for the total costs of operations then fiy* - vx* 
directly expresses net profit. In either situation we have: 
fiy* - vx* — -co. 
It follows that -co, represents either the maximum gross profit or net profit attainable by 
any DMU given input and output prices, v and ft, and given the scale of operations of 
DMU,. 
Since the model was first introduced it has been customary to use as an efficiency 
score for DMU, the following expression: 
Wi + = £ _ e 
*x, 
The motivation for such a practice may be traced to the fact that the score exhibits the 
following properties: 
i) The score is maximized since it evaluates to the objective function value 
of the dual program. It hence helps "sell" the analysis by guaranteeing 
each DMU a best case evaluation. 
ii) The score is strictly between 0 and 1. 
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iii) The score is equal to 1 if and only if DMU, is efficient. 
However, the same caveats as for the CCR model apply regarding the non-Archimedean 
€. When the model is solved as a two-phase program, where the second phase identifies 
the referent point on the envelope and the associated efficiency price vectors, the above 
efficiency score, equivalent in this case as well to i, may become negative. More 
importantly the above score does not have any economic interpretation/justification as 
E(x,y) = vx*/px{ . py/fiy* universally does. 
Moreover it is worth noting that there is no simple relationship linking the 
efficiency score E(x,y) to the objective function of the BCC model. Indeed at optimality 
the following relationships obtain: 
vx{ = 1 
= 0 - e (Is + le) - w, 
/iy* = vx* - co, 
It follows: 
E(x„y.) = yx‘ = A -*>i- e (Is "-le) = 9 - a, - e 
11 pxi A»y* j <*i j 
vx* vxm 
Again because of the non-Archimedean quantity the monotonicity properties of the 
efficiency measure are hindered. The acceptance of the conclusions of the evaluation on 
the part of the DMUs has to stem from an understanding and acceptance of the evaluation 
principles: form of the envelope, orientation and pricing mechanism. In the case of a 
two-phase approach different relationships obtain at optimality, namely: 
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It follows: 
My, = 6 vxl - co, - (Is + le) 
jty* = vx* - aj, 
vx * = Ovxy - le 
E(x„y,) = 
vx vx - Is - CO, e 
-i^x* + le) VX - 0), 1 + le 
VX 
(1 - 
Is 
vx - 0), 
3.4.4 The ADD Model 
A third model, referred to as the ADD model and developed by Charnes, Cooper, 
Golany, Seiford, and Stutz [1985], rests on the same set of postulates as the BCC model 
but distinguishes itself from the previous two models by departing from the preemptive 
proportional inputs reduction. The ADD model assumes a VRS envelopment, it 
follows a global orientation seeking to identify waste across all measures without 
prioritization between inputs and outputs. The projection to the envelope is entirely 
driven by the pricing mechanism reflected in the primal objective function. In the case 
of the original ADD model stated below, we recognize a standard pricing mechanism, 
namely p^ = 1 if ^ > 0 and pyr = 1 if sr > 0, warranting the usual caution with regard 
to units of measurement of the data. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency are s = 0 and e = 0 at 
optimality. 
91 
(ADD Primal) 
Min 
X,s,c 
s 
- ( £Sr 
m 
ei ) 
f r=l i=i 
m 
E^xi - Sr = yri r = 1,... ,s 
j=i 
Q 
- Yx.x 
^ >j j “ ei = ~xii 
i = l,...,m 
St j=i 
n 
Exi = i 
j=i 
> 0 j = l,...,n 
m 
Max At, £M,yrl - I>ixii+ ", 
r=l i=l 
St 
s m 
E/t,yd - + ", s 0 j = (ADD Dual) 
r=l i=l 
fJLT > 1 T = 1, ,S 
vj > 1 i = 
co, unrestricted 
To the extent that the principles of evaluation of the ADD model are looser than 
those underlying the BCC model, that is the ADD model does not impose an input 
orientation, one could expect the ADD model to lead to worse efficiency evaluation since 
it has the freedom to reach the envelope where the revealed bundle of waste will be the 
largest in terms of total number of wasted units of the various measures. However, this 
is not necessarily the case since the efficiency score takes into account the efficiency 
prices of all measures and these generally evaluate to different relative values for 
different projected points. This emphasizes the fact that the explicit pricing 
mechanisms, be they standard, invariant, or normed, apply exclusively to the identified 
excess input consumptions and slack output productions. The pricing of all measures 
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reflecting envelope levels is, on the other hand, completely endogenous. This complete 
freedom may itself lead to extremal/abnormal valuations. It may indeed happen that 
these efficiency prices bear no relations to the price level implied by "waste" prices, and 
more importantly, their relative values may reflect absurd rates of substitution across 
inputs and across outputs. This drawback, common to all explicit pricing mechanisms, 
is widely acknowledged in the literature (e.g. Roll, Cook, and Golany [1991], Wong and 
Beasley [1990]). In the next section a new class of DEA models is developed. These 
models are aimed at bringing more control over the pricing mechanism and circumvent 
the drawbacks mentioned above. 
3.5 From Envelopment to Frontier Analysis 
3.5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to develop models that correctly determine 
efficiency evaluations and reflect realistic economic tradeoffs across inputs and outputs. 
This concern is relevant to bring efficiency evaluations closer to economic efficiency 
ratings which should warrant sounder recommendations to inefficient operating units. 
The developed models can be thought of as extensions of original DEA models in the 
vein of previous work by Chames, Cooper, Huang, and Sun [1990], and by Thompson, 
Singleton, Thrall, and Smith [1986], who respectively introduced cone-ratio models and 
assurance regions to prevent unreasonable evaluations in terms of disproportionate 
«•> 
efficiency prices. Recent work by Chames, et al. [1991] presents elaborate theorems 
establishing the equivalence of both lines of research. However, to this date, no general 
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formulation and economic interpretation of such model has appeared in the literature. 
Satisfying this need will strengthen the bridge between DEA and economics. In the next 
subsections we develop a new model in the context of production theory, justify its 
mathematical properties, and show how its solution values elegantly yield the efficiency 
score. 
3.5.2 The Frontier Model 
Any DEA model approximates the envelope of the production possibility set by 
a set of facets defined by empirical observations. Each identified facet implies ranges 
of values for rates of substitution across inputs and across outputs. Production theory 
refers to these rates as marginal rates of technical substitution (MRTS) and marginal rates 
of product transformation (MRPT) where, respectively, MRTSy , is the rate at which 
input i is substituted for input j while still producing the same levels of outputs and 
keeping other inputs constant, and MRPTkl represents the rate at which output k must be 
sacrificed to obtain more of output 1 while keeping the consumption of all inputs and the 
level of all other outputs constant. 
MRTS.. = 
1J 
m constant, y constant 
MTPT, s constant, x constant 
Assuming a technology characterized by variable returns to scale, each facet can be 
described analytically by an expression of the form: 
with 
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s m 
Y M,yr - Y ,,ixi+ « = o 
r = 1 i = 1 
X; < Xj < X. i = 
Xi — yr — yi- r = 
The ranges on the inputs and outputs serve to identify the scales (i.e. levels) of 
operations at which the techniques described by the facet are efficient. It follows that 
across a facet the rates of substitution are constant and are easily derived from the 
analytical expression of the facet. 
MRTSjj = - i, j = l,...,m i < j 
MRPTkl = Hi k, 1 = k < 1 
Mi 
If one is concerned exclusively with technical efficiency then engineering and best 
practice knowledge may be extensive enough to set bounds on the rates of substitution, 
that is constants are known: 
r« r rkl r —’ AijJ 1kl 
such that, given the existing technology, we must have: 
rij < MRTS.. < if 
— y y 
r^ < MRPTkl < r^ 
If one is concerned with allocative efficiency and prices or societal valuations are known 
for inputs and outputs, then production theory stipulates that profit maximization in 
perfectly competitive input markets require that the MRTS for every pair of inputs, 
holding the levels of all outputs and all other inputs constant, must equal the ratio of their 
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prices, and the MRPT for every pair of outputs, holding the levels of all inputs and all 
other outputs constant, must equal the ratio of their prices. To acknowledge, again, the 
possibility of spatially separated (perfectly competitive) markets or societal environments, 
profit or utility maximization, typical of efficient operations, requires that the MRTSs 
and MRPTs belong to preset ranges of admissible price ratios. It follows that in both 
cases of technical or allocative efficiency, realistic assessments may be obtained by 
restricting explicitly the ranges of efficiency price ratios, v-Jv•, i,j = l,...,m, i 5* j, and 
jLtk//n,, k,l = 1, ...,s, k ^ 1. This will still allow an endogenous determination of prices, 
which completely avoids fixing a price level arbitrarily or imposing a priori rates of 
substitution across inputs and across outputs. 
For any two inputs i, j, and any two outputs k, 1, lower and upper bounds for 
their respective rates of substitution can be estimated/predefined that translate into the 
following constraints on input and output prices: 
ill < 
vx 
< fjj i, j = 1,—,m 
1^1 < 
/he < *kl 1 - 
Ah 
i < j 
k < 1 
These conditions can easily be converted into linear constraints on the efficiency 
prices to be estimated: 
-v. + r>j < 0 v. - r[.v. < 0 i, j = l,...,m i < j 
-/xk + r^/q <0 jLtk - rj^/q <0 k, 1 = l,...,s k < 1 
Such constraints summarize to a global matrix format: 
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vR. < 0 /tRo < 0 
where Rj and R0 are respectively m x 2(m2) and s x 2(s2). These constraints are added to 
the dual model and translate into the inclusion of substitution variables, summarized by 
the 2(“2) vector ai5 and the 2(*2) vector <rQ, in the primal formulation. 
At the core of the evaluation is still the identification of waste in the form of 
excessive inputs consumption and unrealized outputs. The amount of waste is to be 
measured by 6 which characterizes the extent of proportional input reduction from a 
unit s current levels, and by <f> which characterizes the extent of proportional output 
augmentation from the unit’s current levels. The emphasis on proportional changes 
allows a unit to be evaluated with respect to most similar efficient units in terms of 
production technique and output mix. 
The formulations of the Frontier model presented next assume a VRS 
envelopment since the referent unit is required to be a convex combination of frontier 
defining units; they effect a globally oriented evaluation by not giving priority to the 
input reduction (minimizing 6) or to the output augmentation (maximizing 0 , i.e. 
minimizing -<£), and they implement an implicit pricing mechanism constrained by R{ and 
R0. The interpretation and illustration of the workings of the programs follow their 
statement. 
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St 
l.X 
(Frontier Primal) 
= 1 
0 > 1 
-e > -l 
x > o 
<*i ^ o 
st « 
Max w, + R - C 
/iY - vX + Wj < 0 
vxx - C < 1 
- *iy, + R < -1 
pR, < 0 
mro < 0 
R, C > 0 
H, j>, co, unrestricted 
(Frontier Dual) 
In the primal formulation the role the substitution variables, a{ and <r0, play is 
critical to the evaluation process. After a proportional reduction of input consumption 
has been effected, they allow the conversion, i.e. substitution, of any remaining excess 
input in such a way that the reduced input vector is "brought" back into the cone spanned 
by the efficient units given the set of price ratios. Note that, given the price ratios, this 
cone becomes the cone of weak disposability. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3.2 
on page 118 at the end of the chapter. Proportional input reductions for unit L (with 
respect to L’s input ratios) in the amount E'L/OL is followed by substitutions to reach 
E on the frontier. Alternately, the evaluation may be interpreted as identifying an input 
reduction (with respect to L’s input ratios) in the amount ML/OL. This reduction leads 
to point M which is inefficient with respect to its consumption of input 2. By 
substituting out its excess input 2 following the tradeoffs implied by p, unit M is 
transformed into unit N which can withstand further proportional (with respect to N’s 
input ratios) reduction until point E on the frontier is reached. These new proportions 
command efficiency prices which are bound by the tradeoff constraints for all measures 
that required substitution. It follows that input inefficiency can entirely be gauged by the 
extent of proportional input reduction: ML/OL + EN/ON. A third interpretation 
considers that the substitution is effected first and brings L to L' in the cone of weak 
disposability where subsequent proportional input reduction (with respect to L'’s input 
ratios) brings the unit to E. All these paths to reach the frontier evaluate to the same 
degree of input inefficiency since we have: 1 - 0 = E'L/OL = ML/OL + EN/ON = 
NL'/ON. Similarly on the output side, the substitution variables will point to 
modifications in the output mix that will allow output deficiency to be entirely gauged 
by the extent of feasible proportional augmentation given the new mix. 
In the dual program R - C represents the profit level attained by DMU, being 
evaluated given the identified input and output prices v, and \i. This statement will be 
proved later in the study of the mathematical properties of the model. For all units -co, 
represents the largest profit level attainable given the identified optimal input and output 
prices v, and fi since we have -u, > ny - vx for all DMUs characterized by (x,y). The 
dual objective function can then be rewritten as: 
Max R - C - (-wd = - Min (-w,) - (R - C) 
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The right-hand side expression emphasizes the purpose of the dual program, namely the 
identification of an optimal set of prices (v, \l) such that the comparative/relative 
disadvantage of DMU, is minimized. Indeed the profit function *iy - px allows the 
measurement of a unit’s achievement once a set of prices (p, n) is determined. The 
comparative disadvantage of a unit, for set of prices (p, fi), can then be gauged by the 
difference between the achievement of the unit being evaluated and the maximum 
observed achievement across all units operating at a scale close to that of the unit being 
evaluated. It follows that the dual program effects a best case evaluation of DMU,. The 
identified optimal prices minimize the unit’s comparative disadvantage. It is worth 
emphasizing that the maximum attained profit is not necessarily positive, i.e., w, is 
unrestricted in sign and that profit maximization is not a stated objective of the model. 
The workings of the pricing mechanism are illustrated next. Restricting ourselves 
to the input space for ease and clarity of the exposition, we examine the evaluation 
process applied to three inefficient DMUs: I,, I2, and I3 represented in Figure 3.3 on 
page 119 at the end of the chapter. I, is inefficient in input 2 but efficient in input 1. 
The pricing most favorable to I, is the one that will maximize the value of input 1 and 
minimize the cost of consuming input 2 given that the total input consumption costs 1 and 
that the relative value of input 1 with respect to input 2, p,/p2, is bounded upward by 
some predefined value. The identified set of prices to evaluate I, will be homothetic of 
pA. The relevant efficient facet against which I, will be compared is EF. All points 
along that facet lead to a same cost which is the smallest observable cost given pA. The 
comparative disadvantage of I, is measured by the difference in cost which evaluates to: 
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a _ OE _ OF 
1 = df; = 
From a cost point of view it follows that all points on the facet EF are suitable reference 
points to evaluate V With respect to any other facet the difference in cost, hence, the 
comparative disadvantage, would be larger. From an input consumption point of view, 
however, E is the "best" reference point since it is the one that minimizes the change 
from Vs operations characterized by Vs input consumption ratio. 
12 is inefficient with respect to both inputs. Comparative disadvantage will be 
minimized with prices homothetic of pg identifying the facet FG as the reference facet 
to evaluate I2’s inefficiency. Along that facet J is identified as the optimum reference 
point since it is the only point sharing I2’s technique characterized by I2’s input 
consumption ratios. It follows that no input substitution is required in accordance with 
relative prices strictly within allowed limits. 
13 is also inefficient with respect to both inputs but with the added particularity 
that an infinity of price vectors would lead to the same minimum comparative 
disadvantage (all vectors which are positive combinations of pg and pc with the added 
condition that the "cost" of I3 is 1). However, it is important to note that the referent 
point is unique despite the multiplicity of prices. 
The evaluation of any inefficient unit summarizes to one of the above three 
situations. It follows that in any case the recommendations to an inefficient unit are 
unambiguous and fully contained in the unique identified referent point. 
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The study of the mathematical properties of the Frontier model is effected by 
expressing and manipulating the complementary slackness conditions. These conditions 
allow the derivation of some important results regarding the behavior of the model. In 
particular it will be shown that at optimality the efficiency prices are strictly positive, 
hence all problems stemming from the stipulation of e in earlier models are 
circumvented. All sources of inefficiency are identified and priced implicitly with the 
total cost of inefficiency summarized by 6 and <f>. This implies that there is no need for 
extraneous slack and excess variables in the formulation, i.e. s = 0 and e = 0, always, 
at optimality. The proof of these results requires a slight modification of the formulation 
of the frontier model to incorporate explicit slack and excess variables. These modified 
formulations (Frontier Primal-0 and Frontier Dual-0) are given below with their 
corresponding complementary slackness conditions. 
st 
Min, x 6 - (j> 0,<p,K,ai,aa 
<t>y,+ YX + R„a0 - s = 
0xt- XX + R. <Tj - e = 
l.X 
0 > 
-6 > 
X > 
0 
0 
1 
1 
-1 
0 
0 
(Frontier Primal-0) 
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St 
(Frontier Dual-0) 
Max,..,,.R,c *>. + R - C 
fiY - vX + co, < 0 
j>x, - C < 1 
- /ty, + R < -1 
pRj < 0 
a*R0 £ o 
At, *>, R, C > 0 
oj, unrestricted 
The complementary slackness conditions follow: 
-0A*y, + /ty* + mR0^0 - a*s = o (l) 
flyx, - yx* + |/R. a. - ve = 0 (2) 
R(0 - 1) = 0 (3) 
C (1 -6) = 0 (4) 
0(Aiy, - (1 + R)) = 0 (5) 
0(1 + C - *x,) = 0 (6) 
X(AtY - pX + co,) =0 (7) 
mR0^0 = 0 (8) 
vR. a. = 0 (9) 
Lemma 3.1: At optimality of the primal and dual Frontier programs, the output 
efficiency price vector, n, is strictly positive. 
Proof: Since (J> is constrained from below by 1, condition (5) coupled with the 
non-negativity constraint on R ensures that the total output value of unit 1 (Aty^ is 
bounded from below by 1, implying that at least one output efficiency price is strictly 
positive. The ratio constraints on the output efficiency prices then ensure that all output 
efficiency prices are strictly positive, for if at least one such price is negative then all are 
by cascading through the ratio constraints. 
Q.E.D. 
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Lemma 3.2: At optimality of the primal and dual Frontier programs, the input efficiency 
price vector, v, is strictly positive. 
Proof: Similarly, since 6 is strictly positive at optimality (9 = 0 would mean that outputs 
can be generated out of nothing!), condition (6) coupled with the non-negativity 
constraint on C ensures that the total input value of unit 1 is bounded from below 
by 1, implying that at least one input efficiency price is strictly positive. The ratio 
constraints on the input efficiency prices then ensure that all input efficiency prices are 
strictly positive, for if at least one such price is negative then all are by cascading 
through the ratio constraints. 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3.1: At optimality of the Frontier programs, the vectors of excess input 
consumption, e, and of output slacks, s, are null: 
e = 0 and s = 0 at optimality. 
Proof: Conditions (3) and (4) show that whenever unit 1 is output inefficient then its 
output bundle is valued at 1 (R = 0), and whenever the unit is input inefficient then its 
input bundle is valued at the lower bound value of 1 (C = 0). It follows that, at 
optimality, if the output bundle is valued at strictly more than 1 then the unit is output 
efficient, and similarly, if the input bundle is valued at strictly more than 1 then the unit 
is input efficient. 
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The proof rests on the equation: 
-<t> + 6 = (1 - <t>)ny{ + (0 - l)i»x, - /is - ve (10) 
derived from the equality of the primal and dual objective function values at optimality: 
0 - (f> = ajj + R- C 
by first substituting -(/*y* - px*) for o>,, as allowed by conditions (7), and ny, - j/x, for 
R - C according to conditions (5) and (6) after noting that 0 and 0 are strictly positive, 
leading to: 
0 - <t> = ~(jiy* - vx*) + ny, - px, 
The transition to (10) derives from conditions (1), (2), (8), and (9) by extracting from 
these equations equivalent expressions for ny* and px*. 
Four situations can occur, namely: 0 = 0 = 1, 6 = 1 and (f> > 1, 0 < 1 and <f> = 1, 
and lastly, 6 < 1 and </> > 1. 
If 6 = 4> = 1, then we have: - jis - ve = 0. From Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 \i > 0 and v 
> 0, hence we must have s = 0 and e = 0. 
If 6 — 1 and 0 > 1, then we have /ty, = 1 and therefore (10) reduces to: 
- </> + 1 = (1 - 4>) 1 + (1 - \)vx{ - /is - pe 
implying - fis - ve = 0. Hence s = 0 and e = 0. 
If 6 < 1 and 0 = 1, then we have wq = 1 and therefore: 
-1 + 6 = (1 - l)/*y, + (6 - 1)1 - ns - pe 
also implying - /is - pe = 0. Hence s = 0 and e = 0. 
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If 9 < 1 and 0 > 1, then we have /*y, = 1 and yx, = 1 and therefore: 
-0 + 0 = (1 - <t>) 1 + (0 - 1)1 - /is - ve 
implying as well - fis - ve = 0. Hence s = 0 and e = 0. 
It follows that in all four situations we have s = 0 and e = 0. 
Corollary 3.1: 
0 - 0 = (0 - l)yx, + (1 - <f>)ny, at optimality 
Q.E.D. 
These results allow the objective of the global orientation to be interpreted as the 
maximization of the global waste value since at optimality we can write: 
x* = 0x, + RjCTj 
y' = H, + R.Oo 
It follows: 
vx* = 6 vx{ + J'Rjffj = Ovx{ 
/*y* = </>M y, + ^Vo= ^Myi 
The global waste is then valued at: 
(1 - 0>x, + (<l> - IVy, = 0-0 
which is maximized since, by referring to the objective of the primal program we have: 
Max 0 - 0 = - Min 0-0 
The global orientation therefore corresponds to a conservative efficiency 
evaluation from the point of view of the primal formulation. 
106 
An input-orientation can easily be implemented by considering a two-phase 
solution of the model. The proportional input reduction is maximized, i.e. 6 is 
minimized in the first phase. In the second phase the following pair of dual programs 
are solved: 
Min 
4>,\oi,ao 
0 - 4> 
<t> y,+ YX + R 0a0 = 0 
6x{- XX + R; = 0 
l.X = 1 
<t> > 1 
-e = -0* 
X > 0 
<ro, a. > 0 
(Frontier,^ Primal) 
Max 
/*>*'>“,> R>c 
Wj + r - ce * 
st • 
/xY - vX +o), < 0 
vxx - C < 1 
- py, + R < -1 
I^R; < 0 
V- R„ s 0 
R > 0 
fi, v, C, co, unrestricted 
(Frontiertopura Dual) 
If the tradeoff constraints expressed by R; and R0 are consistent with the VRS 
envelope identified using any of the BCC or ADD models, then all efficient units remain 
efficient and the pricing of inefficient units is consistent with the pricing of their 
associated efficient units. If the ranges of ratios are made more restrictive, then the 
efficient set may be reduced. In particular the efficient units which may have been rated 
efficient simply because of a minimum consumption of one input relative to other units 
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may now be identified as inefficient. In practice, state of the art technology, on one 
hand, may allow the definition of "technical" tradeoffs leading to an evaluation of 
technical efficiency. Conditions of supply and demand on the other hand may define 
different ranges of acceptable tradeoffs for the various inputs and outputs. A second 
analysis, based on ranges which are intersections of technical and economic ranges, will 
provide an evaluation of economic/allocative efficiency. 
3.5.3 Computation of the Efficiency Score 
The efficiency score can easily be computed from the optimal solution values. 
Its expression emphasizes once more that the evaluation is not geared toward making a 
unit look its best, nor its worst, for minimizing 0 - $ does not necessarily imply that 
E(x,y) is minimized as well. 
At optimality, as mentioned earlier, we have: 
x * = 0x, + Rjffj 
y • = <*>y, + R0<ro 
with: ^ 
vx* = Ovxl + = 0PX, 
/ty* = <t>n y, + /iR0<r0 = 4>/«y, 
hence: 
E(x,y) = 
vx * Ml 0 
3.6 Computational Illustration 
The exposition in this section is supported throughout by a numerical example. 
All data related to this example are summarized in Table 3.1 on page 120 at the end of 
the chapter and illustrate a production possibility set described by four isoquants in a 2- 
input x 2-output space. These isoquants are representative of a VRS type-envelopment 
since isoquants associated with proportional output vectors are not homothetic of one 
another. For instance unit E3, which belongs to isoquant (1,1), consumes inputs in the 
amounts (3,3.4) while unit H2, which belongs to isoquant (2,2), only consumes inputs 
in the amounts (6,3.6), less than double the amount consumed by E3. The assumption 
of a CRS-type envelopment would lead to a reduced set of efficient units and different 
isoquants, but the results developed below for the VRS envelopment would apply. 
A first set of analyses focuses on explicit pricing mechanisms, standard pricing, 
invariant pricing, and normed pricing respectively. The set of efficient units remains the 
same and includes: E, through E10 belonging to isoquant (1,1), Fx through F6 belonging 
to isoquant (1,2), Gi through G6 belonging to isoquant (2,1), and Hj through H4 
belonging to isoquant (2,2). The output to these analyses presents the revealed waste for 
each measure, the corresponding efficiency prices, the proportional output augmentation 
or input reduction, or aggregated waste, as well as the resulting input efficiency score, 
output efficiency score, and global efficiency score. This information is summarized for 
all inefficient units in Table 3.2 through Table 3.10 on pages 121 through 129 at the end 
of the chapter, with output-oriented analyses gathered in Table 3.2 through Table 3.4, 
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input-oriented analyses gathered in Table 3.5 through Table 3.7, and analyses based on 
a global orientation gathered in Table 3.8 through Table 3.10. 
Lemma 3.3: For a given orientation, the selection of an efficient unit on the envelope 
against which a unit’s inefficiency will be gauged depends on the pricing mechanism. 
Proof: The importance of the pricing mechanism is illustrated by I8 which, in the case 
of an output-orientation, is projected to different points on the envelopment surface 
depending on which pricing mechanism is used. The obtained results are summarized 
in Table 3.11 on page 130 at the end of the chapter. 
All projections correspond to a same proportional augmentation of outputs (<£ = 
2.8571) but the final recommendations to eliminate waste differ drastically and justifiably 
according to the relative pricing implied by the various pricing mechanisms. 
Lemma 3.4 For a same form of envelopment and a given pricing mechanism different 
orientations lead to different projected points. 
Proof This fact is clearly illustrated by tables 3.2, 3.5, and 3.8, respectively on page 
121, 124, and 127, which, for a same (standard) pricing mechanism, exhibit different 
amount of identified waste for all DMUs but one (Ij) across the three orientations. 
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Lemma 3.5 All input-oriented (respectively output-oriented) evaluations lead to the same 
value of the maximum proportional input reduction (respectively output augmentation) 
for any DMU independently of the explicit pricing mechanism and we have: 
9 = Ej(x,y) iff e = 0 i- = Eo(x,y) iff s = 0 
<P 
Proof The proportional input reduction (output augmentation) preempts the pricing of 
excess input s and slack outputs. It is therefore independent of the pricing mechanism. 
In input-oriented evaluations: x*= 0x - e. It follows: 
Hence 
E,(x,y) 
vx * _ 6vx - ve = q _ ve 
vx vx vx 
E,(x,y) = 6 e = 0 and e > 0 =» E,(x,y) < 6 
Similarly for output-oriented evaluations we have: 
y* = 4>y + s 
E0(x,y) = ^ ^ 
1 
My 
E0(x,y) = l^s=0ands>0=> E0(x,y) < 1 
<f> 0 
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Lemma 3.6 Given an orientation and a same projected point, the efficiency score may 
differ across pricing mechanisms if and only if excess input consumption or output slacks 
are present after the proportional change consistent with the orientation has been effected. 
Proof Let us consider the case of an input orientation and represent the pricing 
mechanism by (px, py). We have: 
E(x,y) = L_6(P’e * P>S) - 
1 -_"L 
vx * 
If e = 0 and s = 0 then x*= Ox, vx*= Ovx{ = 0. It follows E(x,y) = 0. 
The case where e ^ 0 or s 5* 0 is illustrated by I5 in the case of an input orientation. 
The values of the identified waste and the corresponding efficiency prices using 
respectively the invariant and the normed pricing mechanisms, are summarized in Table 
3.12 on page 130. We note that for both mechanisms the same relative input prices are 
revealed (vjv2 = 0.40). However, the explicit component of the pricing mechanism 
comes into effect with the existence of output slack and is responsible for the difference 
in the efficiency score. 
More important than the discrepancy in the computed efficiency score is the 
discrepancy in the categorization of the inefficient units based on their efficiency score, 
once again emphasizing the criticality of the selected pricing mechanism. For instance 
if we consider 9 categories with catogory I grouping DMUs which exhibit score of 0.95 
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and above, category II for scores between 0.85 and 0.95, category III for scores between 
0.75 and 0.85, and so on, down to category IX grouping DMUs which exhibit scores 
strictly lower than 0.25, then, in the case of the invariant pricing mechanism, the 
obtained scores, given in Table 3.6 on page 125, allow the assignment of I15 to category 
I, of units I, and I2 to category II, of I10 and I12 to category III, of In to category IV, of 
I3, Ii3> Ii4 in category V, and of I4,15,1$, I7, Ig, and I9 to category VIII. However, in the 
case of the normed pricing mechanism, the obtained scores, given in Table 3.7 on page 
126, lead to a different categorization of I, which would drop to category III, and of I5, 
I6,18, and I9 which would jump to category VII. If bonuses are to be awarded based on 
categories units 1 will lobby for the invariant pricing mechanism while units 5, 6, 8, and 
9 will favor the normed pricing mechanism. 
It is of interest to see how different orientations affect the efficiency scores, 
namely the input-oriented efficiency score, Ej(x,y), the output-oriented efficiency score, 
E0(x,y), the global efficiency score, E(x,y). 
Lemma 3.7 Given a pricing mechanism, i) E^y) is the smallest for the input 
orientation, ii) E0(x,y) is the smallest for the output orientation, but iii) E(x,y) is not 
necessarily the smallest over the global orientation. 
Proof i) and ii) are trivial from the formulation of the objective function of the primal 
program for respectively the input and output orientations. 
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iii) is evidenced by the efficiency scores of I10 when considering a normed pricing 
mechanism. These scores are summarized in Table 3.13 on page 130. 
A second set of analyses focuses on constrained implicit pricing mechanisms. 
Three sets of price ranges were considered deriving respectively from the observed price 
ratios associated with the efficient units under the standard, invariant, and normed price 
mechanisms. For each orientation and price mechanism, the observed ranges across 
efficient units are summarized in Table 3.14 on page 131. 
The selected ranges cover the observed ranges across orientations for each price 
mechanism and are summarized in Table 3.15 on page 131. 
For each set of price ranges: S, N, and I, the partition of efficient and inefficient 
units remains the same. The recommendations to the inefficient units in terms of input 
reduction and substitutions, output augmentation and substitutions, the derived efficiency 
prices, price ratios, and efficiency scores are summarized in Tables 3.16 through 3.18 
on pages 132 through 134 at the end of the chapter. 
We observe that the recommendations in the case of range set S differ drastically 
from those in the case of sets N and I. The recommendations in the case of set N are 
the same as those for set I. The obvious explanation is that the allowed output price ratio 
of set S are very forgiving regarding the valuation of output waste, making input waste 
more valuable by comparison, hence directing/orienting the search for waste toward the 
inputs. The output price ratio ranges are much closer in the case of sets N and I and, 
accordingly, we observe more commonality in the identified sources of inefficiency, i.e., 
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the waste, in Table 3.17. In fact in all but two cases (In and I14) the projected points are 
the same and, as expected, both exceptions involve substitutions which are forced by the 
limit price ratios: Different limit ratios imply different extent of required substitutions. 
The role of the limit price ratios is further emphasized by observing that, despite 
same projected points, the efficiency scores differ reflecting different tradeoffs for the 
input and output measures. The tighter the range of allowed price ratios the lower the 
efficiency score of units requiring substitution. 
3.7 Conclusions 
Once the form of the envelopment surface is specified, DEA models gauge the 
efficiency of DMUs by implementing evaluation procedures which differ in terms of 
embedded economic principles and implicit managerial objectives. In particular in the 
process of identifying excessive input consumption and deficient output production, DEA 
models may focus primarily on controlling input consumption or primarily on output 
production, or on avoiding waste without distinction between inputs and outputs. The 
accounting of the identified waste is effected via a pricing mechanism that offers various 
degrees of flexibility regarding the relative tradeoffs for the inputs and outputs the 
estimated prices imply. 
The Frontier model offers numerous advantages over the earlier DEA models. 
In particular pricing is consistently effected across all units and completely avoids 
unrealistic implicit tradeoff values across inputs and across inputs. More importantly, 
the recommendations to inefficient units are fully contained in the unique identified 
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referent point on the frontier. There is therefore no ambiguity left in the results of the 
evaluation of inefficent units once the objectives of the evaluation are clearly stated: find 
the closest technique and production schedule (respectively characterized by input 
consumption ratios and output mix ratios) such that comparative disadvantage (measured 
by the discrepancy between attained and maximum attainable profit) is minimized. In 
so doing relative prices are identified for inputs and outputs which are compatible with 
predefined acceptable ranges for such relative prices. These prices maximize the value 
of total identified waste, namely the sum of savings that can be obtained with regard to 
input consumption and of unrealized revenues stemming from inefficient output mix and 
deficient throughtput. 
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Table 3.1 DataSet 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
El LOO 7.00 1.00 1.00 
E2 2.00 4.60 1.00 1.00 
E3 3.00 3.40 1.00 1.00 
E4 5.00 2.40 1.00 1.00 
E5 7.00 1.60 1.00 1.00 
E6 10.00 1.20 1.00 1.00 
E7 12.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
E8 1.74 5.22 1.00 1.00 
E9 3.27 3.27 1.00 1.00 
E10 5.21 2.32 1.00 1.00 
FI 2.00 8.00 1.00 2.00 
F2 3.00 6.00 1.00 2.00 
F3 4.00 4.40 1.00 2.00 
F4 6.00 2.80 1.00 2.00 
F5 9.00 2.40 1.00 2.00 
F6 13.00 2.20 1.00 2.00 
G1 2.40 8.00 2.00 1.00 
G2 2.80 5.40 2.00 1.00 
G3 4.40 3.80 2.00 1.00 
G4 7.00 2.80 2.00 1.00 
G5 10.20 2.00 2.00 1.00 
G6 14.00 1.80 2.00 1.00 
HI 4.40 5.00 2.00 2.00 
H2 6.00 3.60 2.00 2.00 
H3 8.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 
H4 11.00 2.80 2.00 2.00 
11 1.00 9.00 1.00 1.00 
12 2.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 
13 9.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 
14 9.00 4.00 .50 .50 
15 9.00 4.00 .40 .80 
16 9.00 4.00 .80 .40 
17 5.00 5.00 .50 .50 
18 5.00 5.00 .70 .40 
19 5.00 5.00 .40 .70 
110 6.00 4.00 1.20 1.40 
Ill 18.00 1.20 .90 1.00 
112 6.00 2.88 1.00 1.00 
113 8.00 3.84 1.00 1.00 
114 3.00 8.00 1.00 1.00 
115 4.70 3.13 1.20 1.40 
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Table 3.2 Evaluation of Inefficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Output Orientation/ Standard Pricing 
TOTAL WASTE 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.23 
13 3.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
14 3.46 0.00 1.50 1.50 
15 4.50 0.00 0.60 1.20 
16 4.80 0.00 1.20 0.60 
17 0.60 0.00 1.50 1.50 
18 1.63 0.00 1.30 0.74 
19 0.60 0.00 1.60 1.30 
110 0.77 0.00 0.51 0.60 
Ill 5.92 0.00 0.13 0.15 
112 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.55 
113 2.27 0.00 1.00 1.00 
114 0.00 1.09 0.68 0.68 
115 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 
EFFICIENCY PRICES 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 2.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 
12 2.40 1.00 2.72 3.40 
13 1.00 1.14 1.86 1.37 
14 1.00 1.14 1.86 1.37 
15 1.00 1.25 1.00 2.25 
16 1.00 1.00 1.80 1.20 
17 1.00 1.14 1.86 1.37 
18 1.00 1.00 1.80 1.20 
19 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
110 1.00 1.14 1.09 2.14 
Ill 1.00 20.00 10.00 25.00 
112 1.00 2.50 2.00 2.00 
113 1.00 1.14 1.86 1.37 
114 6.50 1.00 12.60 10.00 
115 1.00 2.00 1.60 1.80 
DMU <t> Ei to E 
It 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.82 
12 1.23 1.00 0.81 0.81 
13 2.00 0.75 0.50 0.37 
14 4.00 0.75 0.25 0.19 
15 2.50 0.68 0.40 0.27 
16 2.50 0.63 0.40 0.25 
17 4.00 0.94 0.25 0.24 
18 2.86 0.84 0.35 0.29 
19 2.86 0.94 0.30 0.28 
110 1.43 0.93 0.70 0.65 
Ill 1.15 0.86 0.87 0.75 
112 1.55 1.00 0.65 0.65 
113 2.00 0.82 0.50 0.41 
114 1.68 0.96 0.59 0.57 
115 1.03 1.00 0.97 0.97 
121 
Table 3.3 Evaluation of Inefficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Output Orientation/ Invariant Pricing 
TOTAL WASTE 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.23 
13 3.00 0.40 1.00 1.00 
14 3.00 0.40 1.50 1.50 
15 3.00 0.40 1.60 1.20 
16 3.00 0.40 1.20 1.60 
17 0.60 0.00 1.50 1.50 
18 0.60 0.00 1.30 1.60 
19 0.60 0.00 1.60 1.30 
110 0.00 0.40 0.80 0.60 
Ill 5.92 0.00 0.13 0.15 
112 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.55 
113 2.00 0.24 1.00 1.00 
114 0.00 1.09 0.68 0.68 
115 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 
EFFICIENCY PRICES 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 1.00 0.11 1.00 1.00 
12 0.88 0.37 1.00 1.25 
13 0.11 0.25 1.00 1.00 
14 0.11 0.25 2.00 2.00 
15 0.11 0.25 2.50 1.25 
16 0.11 0.25 1.25 2.50 
17 0.20 0.23 2.00 2.00 
18 0.20 0.23 1.43 2.50 
19 0.20 0.23 2.50 1.43 
110 0.17 0.25 0.83 0.71 
Ill 0.06 2.04 1.11 2.50 
112 0.50 1.25 1.00 1.00 
113 0.13 0.26 1.00 1.00 
114 0.81 0.13 1.58 1.25 
115 0.52 1.04 0.83 0.94 
DMU <t> E, E 
11 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.89 
12 1.23 1.00 0.81 0.81 
13 2.00 0.78 0.50 0.39 
14 4.00 0.78 0.25 0.20 
15 2.50 0.78 0.27 0.21 
16 2.50 0.78 0.27 0.21 
17 4.00 0.94 0.25 0.24 
18 2.86 0.94 0.25 0.24 
19 2.86 0.94 0.25 0.24 
no 1.43 0.95 0.65 0.61 
Ill 1.15 0.90 0.87 0.79 
112 1.55 1.00 0.65 0.65 
113 2.00 0.84 0.50 0.42 
114 1.68 0.96 0.59 0.57 
MS 1.03 1.00 0.97 0.97 
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Table 3.4 Evaluation of Inefficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Output Orientation/ Normed Pricing 
Normed Prices (Pxl = 0.1652, P^ = 0.2708, Pyl = 0.7220, Py2 = 0.7220) 
TOTAL WASTE 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.23 
13 3.00 0.40 1.00 1.00 
14 3.00 0.40 1.50 1.50 
15 3.00 0.40 1.60 1.20 
16 3.00 0.40 1.20 1.60 
17 0.00 0.53 1.50 1.50 
18 0.00 0.53 1.30 1.60 
19 0.00 0.53 1.60 1.30 
no 0.00 0.40 0.80 0.60 
Ill 5.92 0.00 0.13 0.15 
112 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.55 
113 2.00 0.24 1.00 1.00 
114 0.00 1.09 0.68 0.68 
115 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 
EFFICIENCY PRICES 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.65 0.27 0.72 0.72 
12 0.65 0.27 0.74 0.92 
13 0.17 0.27 0.72 0.72 
14 0.17 0.27 0.72 0.72 
15 0.17 0.27 0.72 0.72 
16 0.17 0.27 0.72 0.72 
17 0.24 0.27 0.72 0.72 
18 0.24 0.27 0.72 0.72 
19 0.24 0.27 0.72 0.72 
110 0.17 0.27 0.72 0.72 
Ill 0.17 3.30 1.65 4.13 
112 0.36 0.90 0.72 0.72 
113 0.17 0.27 0.72 0.72 
114 1.76 0.27 3.41 2.70 
115 0.45 0.90 0.72 0.81 
DMU <t> E> K E 
11 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.82 
12 1.23 1.00 0.81 0.81 
13 2.00 0.77 0.50 0.38 
14 4.00 0.77 0.25 0.19 
15 2.50 0.77 0.30 0.23 
16 2.50 0.77 0.30 0.23 
17 4.00 0.94 0.25 0.24 
18 2.86 0.94 0.28 0.26 
19 2.86 0.94 0.28 0.26 
110 1.43 0.95 0.65 0.62 
Ill 1.15 0.86 0.87 0.75 
112 1.55 1.00 0.65 0.65 
113 2.00 0.83 0.50 0.42 
114 1.68 0.96 0.59 0.57 
115 1.03 1.00 0.97 0.97 
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Table 3.5 Evaluation of Inefficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Input Orientation/ Standard Pricing 
TOTAL WASTE 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.26 0.78 0.00 0.00 
13 3.79 1.68 0.00 0.00 
14 3.79 1.68 0.50 0.50 
15 3.79 1.68 0.60 0.20 
16 3.79 1.68 0.20 0.60 
17 1.73 1.73 0.50 0.50 
18 1.73 1.73 0.30 0.60 
19 1.73 1.73 0.60 0.30 
110 1.35 0.90 0.00 0.00 
Ill 6.00 0.20 0.10 0.00 
112 1.00 0.48 0.00 0.00 
113 3.00 1.44 0.00 0.00 
114 1.15 3.05 0.00 0.00 
115 0.05 0.34 0.00 0.00 
EFFICIENCY PRICES 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 2.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 
12 2.40 1.00 1.00 3.40 
13 1.00 2.50 1.00 1.00 
14 1.00 2.50 1.00 1.00 
15 1.00 2.50 1.00 1.00 
16 1.00 2.50 1.00 1.00 
17 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 
18 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 
19 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 
110 1.00 2.00 1.60 1.80 
Ill 1.00 10.00 1.00 1.00 
112 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 
113 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 
114 2.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 
115 1.00 2.00 1.60 1.80 
DMU e Ei Eo E 
11 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.82 
12 0.87 0.87 1.00 0.87 
13 0.58 0.58 1.00 0.58 
14 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.29 
15 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.35 
16 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.35 
17 0.65 0.65 0.50 0.33 
18 0.65 0.65 0.55 0.36 
19 0.65 0.65 0.55 0.36 
110 0.77 0.77 1.00 0.77 
Ill 0.83 0.83 0.95 0.70 
112 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.83 
113 0.63 0.63 1.00 0.63 
114 0.62 0.62 1.00 0.62 
115 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 
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Table 3.6 Evaluation of Inefficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Input Orientation/ Invariant Pricing 
TOTAL WASTE 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.26 0.78 0.00 0.00 
13 3.79 1.68 0.00 0.00 
14 3.79 1.68 0.50 0.50 
15 3.79 1.68 0.60 0.20 
16 3.79 1.68 0.20 0.60 
17 1.73 1.73 0.50 0.50 
18 1.73 1.73 0.30 0.60 
19 1.73 1.73 0.60 0.30 
no 1.35 0.90 0.00 0.00 
in 6.00 0.20 0.10 0.00 
112 1.00 0.48 0.00 0.00 
113 3.00 1.44 0.00 0.00 
114 1.15 3.05 0.00 0.00 
115 0.05 0.34 0.00 0.00 
EFFICIENCY PRICES 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 1.00 0.11 1.00 1.00 
12 0.88 0.37 1.00 1.25 
13 0.50 1.25 1.00 1.00 
14 1.00 2.50 2.00 2.00 
15 0.94 2.34 2.50 1.25 
16 1.25 3.13 1.25 2.50 
17 1.18 2.35 2.00 2.00 
18 1.39 2.78 1.43 2.50 
19 1.16 2.31 2.50 1.43 
110 0.52 1.04 0.83 0.94 
Ill 0.06 1.25 1.11 1.00 
112 0.59 1.18 1.00 1.00 
113 0.59 1.18 1.00 1.00 
114 0.88 0.37 1.00 1.00 
115 0.52 1.04 0.83 0.94 
DMU 6 Ei E 
11 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.89 
12 0.87 0.87 1.00 0.87 
13 0.58 0.58 1.00 0.58 
14 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.29 
15 0.58 0.58 0.53 0.31 
16 0.58 0.58 0.53 0.31 
17 0.65 0.65 0.50 0.33 
18 0.65 0.65 0.51 0.33 
19 0.65 0.65 0.51 0.33 
no 0.77 0.77 1.00 0.77 
Ill 0.83 0.77 0.95 0.73 
112 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.83 
113 0.63 0.63 1.00 0.63 
114 0.62 0.62 1.00 0.62 
115 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 
125 
Table 3.7 Evaluation of Inefficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Input Orientation/ Normed Pricing 
Prices = (Pxl = 0.1652, P^ = 0.2708, Pyl = 0.7220, Py2 = 0.7220) 
TOTAL WASTE 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.26 0.78 0.00 0.00 
13 3.79 1.68 0.00 0.00 
14 3.79 1.68 0.50 0.50 
15 3.79 1.68 0.60 0.20 
16 3.79 1.68 0.20 0.60 
17 1.73 1.73 0.50 0.50 
18 1.73 1.73 0.30 0.60 
19 1.73 1.73 0.60 0.30 
110 1.35 0.90 0.00 0.00 
Ill 6.00 0.20 0.10 0.00 
112 1.00 0.48 0.00 0.00 
113 3.00 1.44 0.00 0.00 
114 1.15 3.05 0.00 0.00 
115 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 
EFFICIENCY PRICES 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.65 0.27 0.72 0.72 
12 0.65 0.27 0.72 0.92 
13 0.36 0.90 0.72 0.72 
14 0.36 0.90 0.72 0.72 
15 0.36 0.90 0.72 0.72 
16 0.36 0.90 0.72 0.72 
17 0.42 0.85 0.72 0.72 
18 0.42 0.85 0.72 0.72 
19 0.42 0.85 0.72 0.72 
no 0.45 0.90 0.72 0.82 
Ill 0.17 1.65 0.72 0.72 
112 0.42 0.85 0.72 0.72 
113 0.42 0.85 0.72 0.72 
114 0.65 0.27 0.72 0.72 
115 0.45 0.90 0.72 0.82 
DMU 6 E, E 
11 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.82 
12 0.87 0.87 1.00 0.87 
13 0.58 0.58 1.00 0.58 
14 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.29 
15 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.35 
16 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.35 
17 0.65 0.65 0.50 0.33 
18 0.65 0.65 0.55 0.36 
19 0.65 0.65 0.55 0.36 
no 0.77 0.77 1.00 0.77 
Ill 0.83 0.73 0.95 0.70 
112 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.83 
113 0.63 0.63 1.00 0.63 
114 0.62 0.62 1.00 0.62 
115 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 
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Table 3.8 Evaluation of Inefficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Global Orientation/ Standard Pricing 
TOTAL WASTE 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.00 1.40 0.00 0.00 
13 6.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 
14 6.00 0.60 0.50 0.50 
15 6.00 0.60 0.60 0.20 
16 6.00 0.60 0.20 0.60 
17 2.00 1.60 0.50 0.50 
18 2.00 1.60 0.30 0.60 
19 2.00 1.60 0.60 0.30 
110 2.47 0.00 0.13 0.00 
Ill 8.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 
112 1.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 
113 5.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 
114 0.00 4.60 0.00 0.00 
115 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EFFICIENCY PRICES 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 2.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 
12 2.38 1.00 2.70 3.40 
13 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
14 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
15 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
16 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
17 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
18 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
19 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
110 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
Ill 1.00 7.50 1.00 1.00 
112 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 
113 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
114 1.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 
115 1.00 2.00 1.60 1.80 
DMU P,e + Pys Ei Eo E 
11 2.00 0.82 1.00 0.82 
12 1.40 0.87 1.00 0.87 
13 6.60 0.49 1.00 0.49 
14 7.60 0.49 0.50 0.25 
15 7.40 0.49 0.60 0.30 
16 7.40 0.49 0.60 0.30 
17 4.60 0.64 0.50 0.32 
18 4.50 0.64 0.55 0.35 
19 4.50 0.64 0.55 0.35 
no 2.60 0.75 0.97 0.73 
Ill 8.10 0.70 0.95 0.67 
112 1.96 0.83 1.00 0.83 
113 5.44 0.54 1.00 0.54 
114 4.60 0.60 1.00 0.60 
115 0.12 0.99 1.00 0.99 
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Table 3.9 Evaluation of Inefficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Global Orientation/ Invariant Pricing 
TOTAL WASTE 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.00 
13 3.00 0.40 1.00 1.00 
14 3.00 0.40 1.50 1.50 
15 3.00 0.40 1.60 1.20 
16 3.00 0.40 1.20 1.60 
17 0.60 0.00 1.50 1.50 
18 0.60 0.00 1.30 1.60 
19 0.60 0.00 1.60 1.30 
110 0.00 0.40 0.80 0.60 
Ill 5.50 0.00 0.35 0.00 
112 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.55 
113 2.00 0.24 1.00 1.00 
114 0.00 1.25 0.42 1.00 
115 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 
EFFICIENCY PRICES 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 1.00 0.11 1.00 1.00 
12 0.88 0.37 1.00 1.25 
13 0.11 0.25 1.00 1.00 
14 0.11 0.25 2.00 2.00 
15 0.11 0.25 2.50 1.25 
16 0.11 0.25 1.25 2.50 
17 0.20 0.20 2.00 2.00 
18 0.20 0.23 1.43 2.50 
19 0.20 0.23 2.50 1.43 
110 0.22 0.25 0.83 0.71 
Ill 0.06 1.25 1.11 1.08 
112 0.50 1.25 1.00 1.00 
113 0.13 0.26 1.00 1.00 
114 0.57 0.13 1.00 1.00 
115 0.52 1.04 0.83 0.94 
DMU P,e + Pys E, E 
11 0.22 0.89 1.00 0.89 
12 0.52 1.00 0.81 0.81 
13 2.43 0.78 0.50 0.39 
14 6.43 0.78 0.25 0.20 
15 5.93 0.78 0.27 0.21 
16 5.93 0.78 0.27 0.21 
17 6.12 0.94 0.25 0.24 
18 5.98 0.94 0.25 0.24 
19 5.98 0.94 0.25 0.24 
110 1.20 0.96 0.65 0.62 
Ill 0.69 0.88 0.84 0.74 
112 1.10 1.00 0.65 0.65 
113 2.31 0.84 0.50 0.42 
114 1.57 0.94 0.59 0.55 
115 0.06 1.00 0.97 0.97 
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Table 3.10 Evaluation of Inefficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Global Orientation/ Normed Pricing 
Prices = Pxl = 0.1652, P^ = 0.2708, Pyl = 0.7220, Py2 = 0.7220) 
TOTAL WASTE 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.00 1.40 0.00 0.00 
13 3.00 0.40 1.00 1.00 
14 3.00 0.40 1.50 1.50 
15 3.00 0.40 1.60 1.20 
16 3.00 0.40 1.20 1.60 
17 0.00 0.53 1.50 1.50 
18 0.00 0.53 1.30 1.60 
19 0.00 0.53 1.60 1.30 
no 0.00 0.40 0.80 0.60 
Ill 8.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 
112 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.55 
113 2.00 0.24 1.00 1.00 
114 0.00 2.65 1.00 0.13 
115 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 
EFFICIENCY PRICES 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.65 0.27 0.72 0.72 
12 0.65 0.27 0.74 0.92 
13 0.17 0.27 0.72 0.72 
14 0.17 0.27 0.72 0.72 
15 0.17 0.27 0.72 0.72 
16 0.17 0.27 0.72 0.72 
17 0.24 0.27 0.72 0.72 
18 0.24 0.27 0.72 0.72 
19 0.24 0.27 0.72 0.72 
110 0.24 0.27 0.72 0.72 
Ill 0.17 1.24 0.72 0.72 
112 0.36 0.90 0.72 0.72 
113 0.17 0.27 0.72 0.72 
114 0.52 0.27 0.72 0.72 
115 0.45 0.90 0.72 0.81 
DMU P,e + P,s E, E* E 
11 0.54 0.82 1.00 0.82 
12 0.38 0.87 1.00 0.87 
13 2.05 0.77 0.50 0.38 
14 2.77 0.77 0.25 0.19 
15 2.63 0.77 0.30 0.23 
16 2.63 0.77 0.30 0.23 
17 2.31 0.94 0.25 0.24 
18 2.24 0.94 0.28 0.26 
19 2.24 0.94 0.28 0.26 
no 1.12 0.96 0.65 0.62 
Ill 1.39 0.70 0.95 0.67 
112 0.79 1.00 0.65 0.65 
113 1.84 0.83 0.50 0.42 
114 1.53 0.81 0.64 0.52 
115 0.05 1.00 0.97 0.97 
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Table 3.11 Effect of Pricing Mechanism 
VRS/Output-Oriented Input 1 Input 2 Output 1 Output 2 
18 DATA 5.000 5.000 .700 .400 
Standard Pricing WASTE 1.629 0.000 1.300 .743 
PRICE 1.000 1.000 1.800 1.200 
Invariant Pricing WASTE 0.600 0.000 1.300 1.600 
PRICE 0.200 0.229 1.429 2.500 
Normed Pricing WASTE 0.000 0.525 1.300 1.600 
PRICE 0.237 0.237 0.722 0.722 
Table 3.12 Effect of Excess Inputs or Output Slacks on the Efficiency Score 
Input Orient.(Ij) Input 1 Input 2 Output 1 Output 2 E 
WASTE 3.789 1.684 0.600 0.200 
INVARIANT PRICES 0.937 2.344 2.500 1.250 0.309 
NORMED PRICES 0.361 0.902 0.722 0.722 0.347 
Table 3.13 Effect of the Orientation on the Efficiency Scores 
Normed Pricing (Iio) E, E0 E 
Output-Oriented 0.948 0.650 0.616 
Input-Oriented 0.774 1.000 0.774 
Global Orientation 0.957 0.650 0.623 
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Table 3.14 Price Ratio Ranges Across Orientations 
Input Price Ratio Range 
Output Price Ratio Range 
ORIENTATION 
INPUT OUTPUT GLOBAL 
STANDARD 0.05 - 6.50 0.05 - 6.50 0.05 - 6.50 
0.04- 17.2 0.04- 17.2 0.04- 17.2 
NORMED 0.05 - 6.50 0.05 - 6.50 0.05 - 6.50 
0.17-3.94 0.17-3.94 0.17-3.94 
INVARIANT 0.04 - 7.00 0.04 - 7.00 0.04 - 7.00 
0.41 - 2.70 0.41 -2.89 0.41 - 2.40 
Table 3.15 Selected Price Ratio Ranges 
Price Ratio Ranges 'A Mi A 
S 0.05 - 6.50 0.04 - 17.2 
N 0.05 - 6.50 0.17-3.94 
I 0.04 - 7.00 0.41 -2.89 
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Table 3.16 VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Efficiency Prices 
S Range INPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.05 - 6.50] OUTPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.04 - 17.20] 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.42 0.06 0.65 0.35 
12 0.39 0.16 0.44 0.56 
13 0.04 0.15 0.93 0.07 
14 0.04 0.15 0.12 1.88 
15 0.03 0.19 0.09 1.21 
16 0.05 0.15 1.21 0.07 
17 0.09 0.11 1.87 0.13 
18 0.10 0.10 1.36 0.12 
19 0.09 0.11 0.09 1.38 
110 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.64 
Ill 0.03 0.59 0.29 0.74 
112 0.25 0.63 0.50 0.50 
113 0.05 0.16 0.13 0.87 
114 0.29 0.04 0.56 0.44 
115 0.23 0.45 0.36 0.41 
N Range INPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.05 - 6.50] OUTPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.17 - 3.94] 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.42 0.06 0.65 0.35 
12 0.39 0.16 0.44 0.56 
13 0.04 0.15 0.80 0.20 
14 0.04 0.15 0.29 1.71 
15 0.04 0.15 0.20 1.15 
16 0.04 0.15 1.11 0.28 
17 0.09 0.11 1.60 0.40 
18 0.09 0.11 1.25 0.32 
19 0.09 0.11 0.22 1.30 
110 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.62 
Ill 0.03 0.59 0.29 0.74 
112 0.25 0.63 0.50 0.50 
113 0.05 0.16 0.15 0.85 
114 0.29 0.04 0.56 0.44 
115 0.23 0.45 0.36 0.41 
I Range INPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.04 - 7.00] OUTPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.41 - 2.89] 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.44 0.06 0.68 0.33 
12 0.39 0.16 0.44 0.56 
13 0.04 0.15 0.74 0.26 
14 0.04 0.15 1.49 0.51 
15 0.04 0.15 0.43 1.04 
16 0.04 0.15 1.07 0.37 
17 0.09 0.11 1.49 0.51 
18 0.09 0.11 1.19 0.41 
19 0.09 0.11 0.47 1.16 
no 0.09 0.11 0.22 0.53 
Ill 0.02 0.59 0.30 0.73 
112 0.25 0.63 0.50 0.50 
113 0.05 0.16 0.74 0.26 
114 0.28 0.04 0.56 0.44 
115 0.23 0.45 0.36 0.41 
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Table 3.17 VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Total Waste and Substitutions 
S Range INPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.05 - 6.50] OUTPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.04 - 17.20] 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.23 
13 1.75 0.78 1.00 1.00 
14 1.75 0.78 1.50 1.50 
15 2.77 1.23 0.60 1.20 
16 2.25 1.00 1.20 0.85 
17 0.28 0.28 1.50 1.50 
18 0.81 0.81 1.30 0.74 
19 0.71 0.71 0.74 1.30 
110 0.43 0.29 0.51 0.60 
Ill 6.59 -0.33 0.29 0.32 
112 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.55 
113 1.07 0.52 1.00 1.00 
114 -0.32 2.08 0.73 0.73 
115 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 
N Range INPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.05 - 6.50] OUTPUT PRICE RATIC )S: [0.17-3.94] 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.23 
13 1.75 0.78 1.00 1.00 
14 1.75 0.78 1.50 1.50 
15 1.75 0.78 1.60 1.20 
16 1.75 0.78 1.20 1.60 
17 0.28 0.28 1.50 1.50 
18 0.28 0.28 1.30 1.60 
19 0.28 0.28 1.60 1.30 
110 0.26 0.17 0.80 0.60 
Ill 6.59 -0.33 0.29 0.32 
112 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.55 
113 1.08 0.52 1.00 1.00 
114 -0.32 2.08 0.73 0.73 
115 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 
I Range INPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.04 - 7.00] OUTPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.41 - 2.89] 
DMU INPUT 1 INPUT 2 OUTPUT 1 OUTPUT 2 
11 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.23 
13 1.75 0.78 1.00 1.00 
14 1.75 0.78 1.50 1.50 
15 1.75 0.78 1.60 1.20 
16 1.75 0.78 1.20 1.60 
17 0.28 0.28 1.50 1.50 
18 0.28 0.28 1.30 1.60 
19 0.28 0.28 1.60 1.30 
110 0.26 0.17 0.80 0.60 
Ill 6.03 -0.24 0.26 0.29 
112 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.55 
113 1.08 0.52 1.00 1.00 
114 -0.19 1.36 0.73 0.73 
115 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.04 
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Table 3.18 VRS Envelopment/Frontier Model 
Efficiency Price Ratios & Efficiency Scores 
S Range INPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.05 - 6.50] OUTPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.04 - 17.20] 
DMU vjv1 e <t> E 
11 6.50 1.87 0.87 1.00 0.87 
12 2.40 0.80 1.00 1.23 0.81 
13 0.30 12.40 0.81 2.00 0.40 
14 0.30 0.06 0.81 4.00 0.20 
15 0.13 0.07 0.69 2.50 0.28 
16 0.32 17.20 0.75 2.52 0.30 
17 0.88 14.63 0.94 4.00 0.24 
18 1.00 11.33 0.84 2.86 0.29 
19 0.80 0.06 0.86 2.86 0.30 
no 0.80 0.14 0.93 1.43 0.65 
in 0.05 0.40 1.00 1.32 0.76 
112 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.55 0.65 
113 0.30 0.15 0.87 2.00 0.43 
114 6.50 1.26 1.00 1.73 0.58 
115 0.50 0.89 1.00 1.03 0.97 
N Range INPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.05-6.50] OUTPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.17-3.94] 
DMU «'1/*>2 M1V2 e <t> E 
11 6.50 1.87 0.87 1.00 0.87 
12 2.40 0.80 1.00 1.23 0.81 
13 0.30 3.94 0.81 2.00 0.40 
14 0.30 0.17 0.81 4.00 0.20 
15 0.30 0.17 0.81 2.70 0.30 
16 0.30 3.94 0.81 2.78 0.29 
17 0.88 3.94 0.94 4.00 0.24 
18 0.88 3.94 0.94 3.13 0.30 
19 0.88 0.17 0.94 3.05 0.31 
no 0.88 0.17 0.96 1.46 0.66 
in 0.05 0.40 1.00 1.32 0.76 
112 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.55 0.65 
113 0.30 0.17 0.87 2.00 0.43 
114 6.50 1.26 1.00 1.73 0.58 
115 0.50 0.89 1.00 1.03 0.97 
I Range INPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.04-7.00] OUTPUT PRICE RATIOS: [0.41-2.89] 
DMU V"2 V-Jth 6 E 
11 7.00 2.08 0.88 1.00 0.88 
12 2.40 0.80 1.00 1.23 0.81 
13 0.30 2.89 0.81 2.00 0.40 
14 0.30 2.89 0.81 4.00 0.20 
15 0.30 0.41 0.81 2.93 0.28 
16 0.30 2.89 0.81 2.87 0.28 
17 0.88 2.89 0.94 4.00 0.24 
18 0.88 2.89 0.94 3.21 0.29 
19 0.88 0.41 0.94 3.26 0.29 
no 0.88 0.41 0.96 1.49 0.64 
Ill 0.04 0.42 1.00 1.29 0.78 
112 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.55 0.65 
113 0.30 2.89 0.87 2.00 0.43 
114 7.00 1.25 1.00 1.73 0.58 
115 0.50 0.89 1.00 1.03 0.97 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXTENSION TO STRATEGIC PLANNING 
4.1 Introduction 
The frontier model introduced in the preceding chapter determines whether an 
economic unit is efficient or not and, in the case that it is not, proceeds to identify 
sources and extent of inefficiencies. The inefficiencies are with respect to an empirically 
determined frontier of feasible achievements, and with respect to evaluation principles 
which embody managerial objectives and tradeoff information. However, in the case that 
the unit is efficient, no waste in terms of inefficient input consumption or unrealized 
production is uncovered, and only congratulations may be delivered to the unit with the 
implied message: "Keep doing whatever it is that you are doing". It seems reasonable 
to ask whether more constructive advice could be provided to help that unit in sustaining 
efficiency. The goal of sustaining efficiency is falsely innocuous for it requires constant 
analysis and active planning since it is unlikely that the frontier of feasible achievements 
remain static. The mere fact of operating on the frontier implies that the unit enjoys 
some comparative advantage, relative to all other units, from which its efficiency derives. 
Therefore it is important for an efficient unit to identify who its current competitors, that 
may threaten its efficiency, are. It is equally important to identify the sources of the 
unit’s comparative advantage and the extent of its comparative advantage, that is whether 
it represents a comfortable cushion against competitors attacks or a precarious condition 
warranting undivided managerial attention. Finally the assessment of its current 
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competitive environment should allow the efficient unit to define its future strategy in 
terms of choice of technique of production, choice of output mix, and level of operations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an analytical tool that will provide an 
efficient unit with an assessment of its current competitive environment and with critical 
information to assist the unit in formulating its strategy. Section 2 develops the notion 
of comparative advantage and its implication to strategy and introduces notation and 
definitions. A new mathematical program, referred to as the Comparative Advantage 
model, is developed in Section 3 and its use in assessing the competitive environment is 
discussed. Section 4 presents a computational illustration using a synthetic data set. A 
summary and conclusions are stated in Section 5. 
4.2 Comparative Advantage and Strategies 
Each decision-making unit is characterized, as before, by an m-vector x of input 
consumption levels, and by an s-vector y of produced outputs. Using, for instance, the 
Frontier model developed in the preceding chapter, the set of efficient units is identified, 
that is the set of units that define the empirical frontier of feasible achievements. This 
frontier is described by a set of facets whose analytical expressions, assuming a variable 
returns to scale technology, are given by hyperplanes of the form: 
s m 
E Mty, - E "ixi + " = 0 
r = 1 i = 1 
For each such hyperplane, the Frontier model identifies efficiency price vectors, and 
v, from which the marginal rates of technical substitution (MRTSs) and marginal rates 
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of product transformation (MRPTs)1, characteristic of the techniques described by the 
facet, can be derived. These prices define tradeoffs across inputs and across outputs that 
allow an efficient unit to maintain its efficient status as long as substitutions, effected 
according to these tradeoffs, keep the unit within the facet where these tradeoffs are 
valid. Alternatively a facet of the frontier may be assimilated to an isoprofit surface such 
that, at these efficiency prices, the efficient units on the facet are the only units to exhibit 
no comparative disadvantage relative to any other unit in terms of profit achievement. 
All efficient units on the facet achieve the maximum observed profit level given by - w. 
Because the methodology to estimate the frontier is based on a finite set of observations 
(x,y), some efficient units belong to several facets which raises the question of choice 
among the multiple admissible sets of tradeoffs for these efficient units (one set of 
tradeoffs per facet). This situation is illustrated in Figure 4.1 on page 155 at the end of 
the chapter where we restrict ourselves to a 2-dimensional isoquant. The set of 
observations is given by {E1? E^ E3, E4, F, G, H}. The frontier is defined by 3 facets 
delimited by El5 E2, E3, and E4. All efficient points which are interior to a facet, such 
as F, G, or H face a unique input tradeoff implied respectively by the efficiency price 
vectors pa, pb, and pc which coincide with normals to the 3 identified facets. Efficient 
points E2 and E3, on the other hand, face multiple options. In the case of Ej, any input 
1 
MRTSjj = m, 1 ^ j 
MRPT, 
kl 
dy.. 
—- y. x constant k, 1 = 1 
dyk J 
s, k ^ 1 
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tradeoff associated with a positive linear combination of pa and p,, (any input tradeoff 
associated with a positive linear combination of Pb and pc in the case of E3) would allow 
E2 to maintain its efficiency. The choice of any of these admissible tradeoffs may be so 
as to satisfy a particular managerial objective. The formulation of one such managerial 
objective derives from the primary concern for maintaining efficiency and is examined 
in the following developments. 
Assuming for now that outputs are fixed and that decisions are restricted to the 
2-input space pictured in Figure 4.1, a situation of competition among the decision¬ 
making units would require, as a condition for their survival as efficient units, that these 
units differentiate themselves from one another in terms of input mix and technique, and 
that they operate at minimum cost. The measurement of cost necessitates the 
identification of input prices which themselves imply particular tradeoffs across inputs. 
Moreover this cost function can serve to gauge the degree of differentiation of a unit by 
evaluating the cost incurred by all other observed efficient units. The minimum cost 
difference between the unit and all other efficient units becomes the distinguishing feature 
of the unit and gauges the unit’s comparative advantage. It follows that the selection of 
particular tradeoffs across inputs for an efficient unit can be guided by the legitimate 
desire of the unit to maximize its comparative advantage. Referring to Figure 4.1, unit 
E2 would select a price vector which is a strictly positive linear combination of pa and 
pb so that the minimum of the cost differences, between E? and F, and between E? and 
G (F and G are the observed efficient units tahat are closest to E2), is maximized. At 
prices given by pa, E^ would exhibit minimum cost but so would F and any unit mapping 
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on the facet EjEj, and, hence, E^’s comparative advantage would be zero. Similarly, at 
prices given by Pb, Ez would still exhibit minimum cost but so would G and E3. At any 
prices "between" pa and Pb E2 will be the unique observed efficient unit exhibiting 
minimum cost and therefore will be guaranteed a strictly positive comparative advantage. 
It is worth noting that the process of identifying optimal tradeoffs that will maximize a 
unit’s comparative advantage also identifies the unit’s closest competitors, i.e. the 
efficient units that limit the extent of the unit’s comparative advantage. In the case of 
E2 in Figure 4.1, the closest competitors can easily be identified as F and G. 
The situation where inputs are fixed and decisions are restricted to an s- 
dimensional output space is parallel to that where outputs are fixed and decisions are 
restricted to the input space as illustrated in Figure 4.1. In this situation competition 
among the decision-making units would require, as a condition for their survival as 
efficient units, that these units differentiate themselves from one another in terms of 
output mix, and that they generate as much revenue as possible. The measurement of 
revenue necessitates the identification of output prices which themselves imply particular 
tradeoffs across outputs. This revenue function is analogous to the cost function in the 
input space and can serve to gauge the degree of differentiation of a unit by evaluating 
the revenue generated by all other observed efficient units. The minimum revenue 
difference between the unit and all other efficient units becomes the distinguishing feature 
of the unit, and, in the context of the output space, gauges the unit’s comparative 
advantage. It follows that the selection of particular tradeoffs across outputs for an 
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efficient unit can be guided by the legitimate desire of the unit to maximize its 
comparative advantage. 
Finally the global and general situation, where decisions are to be made with 
respect to both inputs and outputs, can be dealt with logically by assimilating comparative 
advantage with the minimum difference between an efficient unit’s profit and the profit 
of its closest competitors. As mentioned earlier, after assessing the current competitive 
environment, that is after having identified frontier-defining units, an efficient unit faces 
the task of defining its future strategy in terms of choice of technique of production, 
choice of output mix, and level of operations. The level of outputs is traditionally 
determined exogenously by demand conditions and it seems reasonable to assume that, 
over the medium term, a range of fluctuations in the output levels can be efficiently 
accommodated at the current scale of operations. It follows that if we assume that no 
unit is planning a change in the scale of their operations then a unit’s strategy is 
described by its choice of technique of production, and by its choice of output mix. As 
before, the technique is entirely described by its input ratios. That technique is to be 
implemented efficiently and ought to be economically efficient as well (i.e. a minimum 
cost technique). Similarly on the output side, the output mix is to reflect technical and 
economic (i.e. maximum revenue) efficiency as well. It is fair to assume that given its 
current level and technique of operations, an efficient unit is concerned with 
adapting/repositioning itself to maximize its relative profit, that is maximize its 
comparative advantage measured by the difference between the unit’s profit and the profit 
of its closest competitors. The analysis therefore hinges on the determination of prices 
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for the various inputs and outputs to allow the computation of profit and of comparative 
advantage. Conditions may be imposed on these prices in accordance with the 
restrictions that may apply to the tradeoffs that the prices imply across inputs and across 
outputs (since the tradeoffs are given by the ratios of prices). For instance the MRTSs 
and MRPTs may be bound by specific values defined by state-of-the-art technology 
and/or societal valuations. It is also conceivable that a unit might want to impose further 
constraints on the tradeoffs that would be representative of the unit’s preferences 
regarding choice of technique and output mix. 
A unit’s strategy can hence be further described by the tradeoffs across inputs and 
across outputs that the unit should abide by in defining its new positioning to guarantee 
a maximum comparative advantage over its closest competitors. The exact positioning 
will be defined by the extent of substitutions across inputs and across outputs, from the 
current proportions, that the unit elects to carry through following the identified optimal 
tradeoffs. These concepts are illustrated in Figure 4.2 on page 156 at the end of the 
chapter where we again restrict ourselves to the situation of a 2-input isoquant for ease 
and clarity of exposition. 
The frontier is defined by the observed efficient units E1? Ej, E3, and E4. Unit 
2 may have identified s, for instance, as representative of its strategic tradeoff. Units 
Ej and E3 are identified as Ej’s closest competitors and, at prices described by s, the 
difference in cost between Ej and E2, and between Ej and E3 are identical. Assuming 
unit E2 has the opportunity to substitute input 1 for input 2 following the tradeoff implied 
by s, then unit E2 ought to take advantage of the opportunity and change its input mix 
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up to the point, E'2, where unit E3 becomes dominated and ceases to be efficient. 
Beyond that point the competitive environment is changed and a new assessment is 
warranted. Units Ej and E4 represent particular cases to the extent that these units are 
not entirely "surrounded” by observed efficient units as E2 is by Ej and E3. This concept 
is defined next. 
Definition 4.1: An efficient unit E0 is said to be surrounded in the input space if 
at least one other efficient unit can be found, in any input direction, that consumes more 
of that input and less of some others than Eq, and generates at least the same revenue as 
E0. Similarly an efficient unit P0 is said to be surrounded in the output space if at least 
one other efficient unit can be found, in any output direction, that produces less of that 
output and more of some others than Po. and incurs no more cost than P0. In the global 
input and output space, a unit is surrounded if it surrounded both in the input space and 
in the output space. 
Definition 4.2: A border unit is a unit which is not surrounded. 
Border units can be pictured as sitting on/ defining the edge of the frontier. 
These border units, such as Ej or E4 in Figure 4.2, are likely to identify limit tradeoffs 
as strategic tradeoffs. Indeed these units appear as novices or opposites of specialists in 
the directions where they are not surrounded. For instance, at their scale of operations, 
they consume the most of one input or produce the least of one output. It should hence 
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be the inclination of these units to attribute as low a relative value as possible to these 
inputs or outputs. This situation is illustrated in Figure 4.3 on page 157 at the end of 
the chapter. Assuming that limit strategic tradeoffs, Sj and sL, are in effect, the border 
unit E, will identify ^ as its strategic tradeoff. This tradeoff is the only one among the 
admissible tradeoffs that minimizes the drawbacks of Ej’s lack of expertise regarding the 
consumption of input 2. That is the cost advantage of Ej over E2 is maximized when 
input prices are homothetic to s,. 
The identification of "strategic" tradeoffs is at the core of the analysis. From its 
current mode of operations, that is technique of production described by input ratios and 
its current output mix, an efficient unit competes with all other identified efficient units 
to maintain a comparative advantage. The extent of comparative advantage can be 
measured by the additional profit that the unit was able to achieve in comparison with 
all other observed efficient units. A closer look at the origins of this extra profit will 
provide valuable information as to the sources of comparative advantage and, hence, help 
a unit discern its strengths and weaknesses. The extra profit may result from lower cost 
operations or higher revenues or both. In the situation where lower costs are present the 
unit’s technique is a source of its comparative advantage. The differential in cost 
between the unit and its closest competitors has a quantity equivalent in terms of 
additional proportion of inputs the unit’s competitors would consume if they were to act 
in total cooperation and attempt to replicate the unit’s technique. This extra porportion 
gauges the unit’s comparative advantage in the input space and offers a basis to compare 
the extent of comparative advantage, in the input space, across efficient units. This 
143 
perspective is illustrated in Figure 4.4, on page 158 at the end of the chapter, in the case 
of a cost advantage. In evaluating E2 we observe that all other efficient units in total 
cooperation cannot replicate IVs operations efficiently. Their best performance is given 
by the input consumption pattern depicted by R which corresponds to a minimum 
proportional augmentation: 
* = 1 
oe; 
of input consumption from IVs input consumption pattern. It follows that E2’s technique 
is a source of comparative advantage for IV Similarly, any revenue differential between 
the unit and its closest competitors has a quantity equivalent in terms of proportion of the 
output bundle the unit’s competitors would fail to turn out if they were to act in total 
cooperation to replicate the unit’s output mix. 
The procedure developed to identify a unit’s closest competitors, its strategic 
tradeoffs, sources and extent of comparative advantage is contained in a pair of dual 
mathematical programs, named the Comparative Advantage model, whose formulations 
are presented in the next section. 
4.3 Maximization of Comparative Advantage 
In the global inputs-outputs space a unit, DMU,, seeks to identify strategic 
tradeoffs among inputs and among outputs that will enable it to maintain its efficient 
status. These tradeoffs derive from input and output prices, denoted respectively by the 
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m-vector v and the s-vector /i, which are to estimated as well. As in the case of the 
Frontier model, tradeoffs which imply disproportionate valuations of inputs or outputs, 
or which are not reflective of realistic supply and demand conditions, are not admissible. 
It follows that price ratios representative of tradeoffs among inputs and among outputs 
have to evaluate within preset lower and upper bounds. These conditions on price ratios 
can easily be converted into linear constraints on the efficiency prices to be estimated. 
Such constraints summarize to a global matrix format: 
pR. < 0 /*Ro < 0 
where Rj and R0 are respectively m x 2(m2) and s x 2(s2). Moreover these prices ought 
to allow DMUj to maximize its comparative advantage measured by the difference 
between DMUj’s profit and the highest profit attained by all other efficient units. 
All efficient units are described by their m-vector x of input consumption levels 
and their s-vector y of output levels. Assuming n efficient units have been identified 
(using the Frontier model for instance) and that unit 1 described by (x,, y,) seeks to 
evaluate its comparative advantage, all other efficient units will cooperate to the best of 
their abilities to at least replicate DMU,’s operations. Such a coalition is represented by 
a convex combination of the operations of the n-1 efficient units. The achievement of 
this coalition will be measured by 0, the extent of proportional input augmentation from 
DMU,’s levels it consumes, and by 0, the extent of proportional output reduction from 
DMUj’s levels it produces. The direction of the differences stems from the fact that 
DMUj is an efficient unit and is therefore not dominated by any other efficient unit. The 
coalition can only map beneath or at the same level as DMU, in the output space, and 
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above or at the same level in the input space. Moreover, the emphasis on proportional 
differences from DMU,’s levels allows DMUj to gauge its sources of comparative 
advantage in terms of production technique and output mix. DMU,’s comparative 
advantage can be attributed to its technique whenever 6 > 1 and/or to its output mix 
whenever </> < 1 at optimality. Finally the search for a minimum 6 and/or maximum 
<f> across all possible coalitions ought to allow the identification of DMUj’s closest, i.e. 
most threatening, competitors in terms of production technique and output mix. 
As in the case of efficiency determination, identifying comparative advantage 
requires the solution of a pair of dual programs for each efficient unit. The formulations 
of the Comparative Advantage model, given below, effect a global assessment since they 
do not prioritize between the input space and the ouput space regarding the minimization 
of 6 or the maximization of </>. The coalition of closest competitors is represented by 
(X'X, Y'A) with IX = 1, and where X", and Y' are m x (n-1) and s x (n-1) matrices 
respectively, representative of the operations of the n-1 other efficient units2. The 
programs implement an implicit pricing mechanism represented by Rj and R0. These 
constraints require the inclusion of substitution variables, summarized by the 2(m2)-vector 
<7j, and the 2(s2)-vector a0 in the primal formulation. The role of these substitution 
variables will be illustrated later. 
The assessment of DMU,’s comparative advantage is carried out by solving the 
following pair of dual models, (C-A Primal), and (C-A Dual). 
2 Removing the DMU being assessed from the reference set is done by Adolphson, Comia, 
and Walters, Lovell, Walters, and Wood, and also by Andersen and Petersen. 
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St 
(C-A Primal) 
Min, . 6 - <f> 
- <t>y,+ Y"X + R0a0 = 0 
6Xj- XX + Rj <rs = 0 
1.X = 1 
-0 > -1 
e > i 
X, ff0, ff; > 0 
Max 
A*Y - vX 
vx 
+ CJj < 
+ C < 
Mi + R ^ 
j»R. < 
R, C, n, v > 
oj, unrestricted 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
(C-A Dual) 
In the primal formulation, the constraints that bound 6 below by 1 and <f> above 
by 1, force the unit being assessed to "face" its competitors by looking upward in the 
input space and by looking downward in the output space. These constraints are matched 
with dual variables, C and R respectively, which are related to the cost and revenue 
levels of the unit being assessed. Their exact role as well as the behavior of the model 
can be further explained by expressing and manipulating the complementary slackness 
conditions whose statement follows. 
R(1 - <t>) = 0 (1) 
C(« - 1) = 0 (2) 
\inY- - p\' + a) = 0 (3) 
0[(1 - C) - i-x,)] = 0 (4) 
yi - (1 - R)] = 0 (5) 
'Vi = 0 (6) 
= 0 (7) 
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Since 0 and <f> are strictly positive (6 is constrained from below by 1 and 4> = 0 
would mean that no output was generated from non-zero inputs, which is clearly 
inefficient), conditions (4) and (5) indicate that the cost of unit l’s operations evaluates 
to 1-C and that its revenue evaluates to 1-R. It follows that DMU,’s profit is given by: 
A*y, -"X, = (1 - R) - (1 - C) = -(R - C) 
Condition (3), on the other hand, stipulates that any other efficient unit which is part of 
the coalition against DMU,, that is any unit i such that \ ^ 0, allows the coalition, 
defined by (x*,y*) = (X'X,Y*X), to reach a maximum profit level given by: 
A*y* - vx* = -co, 
It follows that the maximum comparative advantage for DMU, is attained when the 
tradeoffs across inputs and across outputs implied by v and \i are such that oi, - (R - C) 
is maximized which is precisely the objective of the dual program. 
Conditions (6) and (7) show that whenever the tradeoffs evaluate within the 
admissible ranges then the substitution variables are null. It follows that these 
substitution variables take on non-zero values whenever a border unit is assessed, hence 
serving to identify border units. The border components of the unit have to be 
substituted out to allow comparison with the other efficient units. This situation is 
illustrated in Figure 4.5 on page 159 at the end of the chapter. In the process of 
evaluating E, in this 2-input space, limit strategic tradeoffs implied by s, are identified 
as those that maximize E/s comparative advantage since they maximize the difference 
in cost between E, and its closest competitor, E2. Ej’s comparative advantage is 
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measured by 0 = OE'2/OE! > 1. However, E'2 is not an observed efficient unit nor 
does it correspond to a convex combination of other efficient units. E'2, therefore, 
cannot play the role of closest competitor to Ej. The closest competitor is E2 which 
derives from E'2 through substitution of input 2 (E/s border component) for input 1 
according to the tradeoff implied by s,. At prices given by s„ E'2 and E2 incur the same 
cost. Hence the comparative advantage of Ej with respect to E'2, and with respect to E2, 
is the same. 
Border units when assessed can also be recognized by directly examining the 
discrepancies between the unit’s and the identified competitor’s achievements. These 
discrepancies are given by (xt - X X, Y'A - y,). It follows that whenever a component of 
x, - XX evaluates to a strictly positive value, then unit 1 is revealed to be a border unit 
in that component. Whenever the component evaluates to a negative number unit 1 
consumes less of the corresponding input than the oalition of its closest competitors. 
Similarly, whenever a component of Y'X - y, evaluates to a strictly positive value, unit 
1 is revealed to be a border unit in that component, and whenever the discrepancy 
evaluates to a negative value, unit 1 is producing more of that output than the coalition 
of its closest competitors. It follows that negative discrepancies, in both the input space 
and output space, represent an advantage for the unit. The relative criticality of each 
input and of each output can be assessed by the ratios ^(x^ - (X'A)i)/vxlf regarding the 
inputs, and by the ratios ^r((Y'A)r - yir)/^? regarding the outputs. The lower the value 
(in algebraic sense) the better for unit 1. 
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The behavior of the model regarding the identification of strategic prices from 
which the strategic tradeoffs are derived is examined next. 
Lemma 4.1: At optimality of the primal and dual Comparative Advantage programs, 
the strategic input price vector, v, is strictly positive if the unit being assessed has a 
strictly positive comparative advantage in inputs. 
Proof: The result is ensured by complementary slackness conditions (2) and (4). Since 
a comparative advantage in inputs is indicated by 9 > 1, condition (2) requires C = 0 
and therefore px, = 1 from condition (4). This strictly positive cost implies that at least 
one input efficiency price is strictly positive. Cascading through the ratio constraints on 
the input efficiency prices then ensure that all input efficiency prices are strictly positive. 
Lemma 4.2: At optimality of the primal and dual Comparative Advantage programs, 
the strategic output price vector, n, is strictly positive if the unit being assessed has a 
strictly positive comparative advantage in outputs. 
Proof: The result is ensured by complementary slackness conditions (1) and (5). Since 
a comparative advantage in outputs is indicated by 4> < l and </> < 0 is infeasible, 
condition (1) requires R = 0 and therefore /iy, = 1 from condition (5). This strictly 
positive revenue implies that at least one output efficiency price is strictly positive. 
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Cascading through the ratio constraints on the output efficiency prices then ensure that 
all output efficiency prices are strictly positive. 
Whenever 0 — 1 at optimality the efficient unit being assessed lacks any 
comparative advantage in inputs. The unit’s cost of operations is matched by that of its 
closest competitor. In particular it means that there are no strategic prices (hence no 
tradeoffs) that will create a strictly positive comparative advantage in inputs. That is we 
have: 
x, = X'X hence v\x = vX'\ for all v. 
This indicates that the unit maps in the interior of facet of the frontier. The solution of 
the dual program could show v = 0 at optimality. In this situation, innovation, in terms 
of a new technique or of the same technique with more productive inputs, is the only 
recourse if an efficient unit is to gain a comparative advantage in the input space. A 
similar situation obtain in the output space whenever <£ = 1 at optimality. In that case 
the dual program could show n = 0 at optimality. 
4.4 Computational Illustration 
The Comparative Advantage model is applied to a data set composed of twenty 
six efficient units, representative of 4 isoquants in a 2-input-2-output space. The data set 
is given in Table 4.1 on page 160 at the end of the chapter. These units are found 
* 
efficient when evaluated using the Frontier model and assuming a VRS envelopment, a 
global orientation and constrained implicit pricing with allowable price ratio constrained 
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to [0.05 - 6.50] regarding vxlv2, and to [0.17 - 3.94] regarding jq//42. The analysis of 
comparative advantage is effected under the same assumptions regarding the form of the 
envelopment, the orientation, and the pricing mechanism. The results are gathered in 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3, respectively on page 161 and 162 at the end of the chapter. Table 
4.2 lists the evaluated strategic prices and the discrepencies with the closest competitor. 
Table 4.3 gives the input measure of comparative advantage 6, its output equivalent, <£, 
the strategic tradeoffs corresponding to the evaluated prices given in Table 4.2, and, 
finally, lists, for each unit, which observed efficient units attain the profit level that is 
closest to that of the unit at the evaluated stratagic prices. 
All units but five (E8, £9, E10, F6 G1) exhibit either a comparative advantage with 
respect to input consumption (indicated by 6 > 1) or a comparative advantage with 
respect to output mix (indicated by </> < 1). Unit E10 appears to be in the most 
precarious situation with no comparative advantage and as many as 5 competitors. 
Border units can be identified by looking at the discrepancies in inputs and outputs 
between the unit and its closest competitor, that is the unit which represents the coalition 
of all other efficient units. Such border units are characterized by strictly positive 
discrepancies in their border components. For instance Ej in Table 4.2 shows a positive 
discrepancy in input 2, E7 in input 1. From the data set given in Table 4.1 we can verify 
that Et consumes more of input 1 than any other efficient unit in its isoquant. Similarly 
E; consumes more of input 2 than any other efficient unit in its isoquant. 
If we examine the particular case of H2 belonging to isoquant (2,2) and 
consuming 6 units of input 1 and 3.6 units of input 2, the analysis identifies G3 from 
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isoquant (2,1) and HI and H3 from isoquant (2,2) as H2’s most threatening competitors. 
H2 has a comparative advantage with respect to technique and consumption of inputs 
since 9 evaluates to 1.074 > 1, but does not have any comparative advantage with 
respect to output mix and production since 0 = 1. H2 is not a border unit since it 
consumes strictly less inputs than the coalition of its closest competitors (0.442 units of 
input 1 and 0.265 units of input 2). The input strategic tradeoff vxlv2 is estimated at 
0.556 with vx — 0.08 and v2 = 0.1443. The overall cost advantage of H2 evaluates to 
7.35% of H2’s cost (- 100 x $[\m - (XX^/px^) with 3.54% attributable to the unit’s 
consumption of input 1 (- 100 x fljx^ - (XX)]^x^) and 3.82% attributable to the 
consumption of input 2 (- 100 x 02[xm - (XX)]2/i'XH2). It follows that its pattern of 
consumption of input 2 represents H2’s relative strength. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The Comparative Advantage model offers valuable information to efficient units 
to help them maun tain their efficiency and eventually sharpen their competitive edge. It 
allows an efficient unit to identify who its current competitors are that may threaten its 
efficiency by means of similar low cost operations or high revenue output mixes. It also 
allows the extent of the unit’s comparative advantage to be gauged providing the unit 
with a means to control the progress and success of its strategy -defined in terms of 
choice of technique of production (described by its input ratios) and its choice of output 
3 These input prices include some rounding error since vxm evaluates to 0.9984 and should 
evaluate to 1 whenever a unit is found to have a comparative advantagewith respect to inputs, 
i.e. such that 6 > 1. 
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mix. Finally, central to the formulation of a strategy are the identification of strategic 
prices which define tradeoffs across inputs and across outputs. The Comparative 
Advantage model by evaluating such strategic prices allows the derivation of these 
tradeoffs. An efficient unit can maintain its efficient status and protect its comaprative 
advantage as long as substitutions, effected according to these tradeoffs, keep the unit 
within the facet where these tradeoffs are valid. 
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Table 4.1 DataSet 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Output 1 Output 2 
El 1.00 7.00 1.00 1.00 
E2 2.00 4.60 1.00 1.00 
E3 3.00 3.40 1.00 1.00 
E4 5.00 2.40 1.00 1.00 
E5 7.00 1.60 1.00 1.00 
E6 10.00 1.20 1.00 1.00 
E7 12.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
E8 1.74 5.22 1.00 1.00 
E9 3.27 3.27 1.00 1.00 
E10 5.21 2.32 1.00 1.00 
FI 2.00 8.00 1.00 2.00 
F2 3.00 6.00 1.00 2.00 
F3 4.00 4.40 1.00 2.00 
F4 6.00 2.80 1.00 2.00 
F5 9.00 2.40 1.00 2.00 
F6 13.00 2.20 1.00 2.00 
G1 2.40 8.00 2.00 1.00 
G2 2.80 5.40 2.00 1.00 
G3 4.40 3.80 2.00 1.00 
G4 7.00 2.80 2.00 1.00 
G5 10.20 2.00 2.00 1.00 
G6 14.00 1.80 2.00 1.00 
HI 4.40 5.00 2.00 2.00 
H2 6.00 3.60 2.00 2.00 
H3 8.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 
H4 11.00 2.80 2.00 2.00 
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Table 4.2 Strategic Tradeoffs and Differences from Competitors 
PRICES Discrepancies With Competitor 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Output 1 Output 2 Input 1 Input 2 Output 1 Output 2 
El 0.481 0.074 0.000 0.000 -0.741 1.778 0.000 0.000 
E2 0.193 0.133 0.000 0.000 -0.066 -0.152 0.000 0.000 
E3 0.161 0.152 0.000 0.000 -0.067 -0.076 0.000 0.000 
E4 0.101 0.206 0.224 0.057 -0.019 -0.009 0.000 0.000 
E5 0.072 0.310 0.000 0.000 -0.648 -0.148 0.000 0.000 
E6 0.050 0.417 0.000 0.000 -0.167 -0.020 0.000 0.000 
E7 0.031 0.625 0.000 0.000 2.000 -0.200 0.000 0.000 
E8 0.255 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
E9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
E10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FI 0.250 0.038 0.078 0.461 -0.250 1.625 0.000 -0.375 
F2 0.158 0.088 0.051 0.298 -0.053 -0.105 0.000 0.000 
F3 0.123 0.115 0.051 0.300 -0.246 -0.271 0.686 0.000 
F4 0.068 0.212 0.052 0.305 -0.708 -0.330 0.000 -0.117 
F5 0.027 0.315 0.069 0.405 -0.405 -0.108 0.000 0.000 
F6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.000 -0.200 0.000 0.000 
G1 0.275 0.042 0.444 0.113 -0.400 2.600 0.000 0.000 
G2 0.186 0.089 0.376 0.095 -0.437 -0.843 0.000 0.000 
G3 0.103 0.144 0.268 0.068 -0.295 -0.255 -0.148 0.583 
G4 0.061 0.204 0.277 0.070 -0.223 -0.089 -0.202 0.798 
G5 0.041 0.289 0.347 0.088 -1.012 -0.198 0.000 0.000 
G6 0.020 0.400 0.364 0.092 3.800 -0.200 0.000 0.000 
HI 0.080 0.012 0.266 0.234 0.000 0.000 -0.222 -0.222 
H2 0.080 0.144 0.327 0.173 -0.442 -0.265 0.000 0.000 
H3 0.037 0.234 0.283 0.217 -0.523 -0.196 0.000 0.000 
H4 0.014 0.278 0.250 0.250 2.889 -0.144 -0.028 -0.028 
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Table 4.3 Comparative Advantage Analysis 
DMU e <t> vjv2 M1V2 Competitors 
El 1.225 1.000 6.500 0.000 E8 
E2 1.033 1.000 1.447 0.000 E3,E8 
E3 1.022 1.000 1.053 0.000 E2,E9 
E4 1.004 1.000 0.489 3.940 E9,E10,G3 
E5 1.093 1.000 0.233 0.000 E6,E10 
E6 1.017 1.000 0.120 0.000 E5,E7 
E7 1.063 1.000 0.500 0.000 E6 
E8 1.000 1.000 2.400 0.000 E1,E2 
E9 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 E2,E3,E4 
E10 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 E4,E5,E9,G3,H2 
FI 1.000 0.827 6.500 0.170 E1,F2 
F2 1.018 1.000 1.800 0.170 E2,F1,F3 
F3 1.062 1.000 1.067 0.170 E3,F2,F4 
F4 1.118 1.000 0.319 0.170 E5,F5,H2 
F5 1.045 1.000 0.086 0.170 E7,F4,F6 
F6 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 E7,F5,H4 
G1 1.000 1.000 6.500 3.940 G2 
G2 1.156 1.000 2.100 3.940 E2,G1,G3 
G3 1.067 1.000 0.710 3.940 E3,G2,H2 
G4 1.032 1.000 0.300 3.940 E5,H2,H3 
G5 1.099 1.000 0.143 3.940 E4,G4,G6 
G6 1.004 1.000 0.050 3.940 E7,G5 
HI 1.000 0.889 6.500 1.137 F1,G1,G2,H2 
H2 1.074 1.000 0.556 1.889 G3,H1,H3 
H3 1.065 1.000 0.160 1.306 G5,H2,H4 
H4 1.000 0.986 0.050 1.000 E7,G6,H3 
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CHAPTER 5 
DETERMINATION OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE FOR THE 
ECONOMY OF STATES IN THE U.S.A. 
5.1 Introduction 
Expansion of market boundaries of U.S. companies coupled with the elimination 
of trade barriers underscore the growing reality of global economic competition. The 
ever increasing volume and importance of international exchanges are evidenced by 
monthly reports of national merchandise deficit, the recent US-Canadian Trade 
Agreement and the formation of the European Economic Community. As tariffs, quotas, 
voluntary export restraints, and most other protectionist measures (often proven 
inefficient and counterproductive [Cline, 1989], [Lawrence, 1989]) are gradually 
repealed, it becomes imperative that American firms sharpen their competitive edge with 
respect to foreign market penetration. 
Active participation by state governments in the revitalization of their industry 
base is necessary because achieving competitiveness is not merely the responsibility of 
a firm. The vitality of firms is inherently tied to that of the state which can offer many 
forms of assistance and incentives to foster economic activity. Despite recent attention 
given to export development by policy makers, no concentrated effort at the assessment 
of a state’s performance regarding international trade, nor identification of its areas of 
comparative advantage vis-a-vis other states has been made. Before corrective or 
prescriptive policies can be devised it is necessary to (i) assess a state’s overall economic 
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performance compared to other states; and (ii) assess any industry’s performance in a 
state with respect to the same industry in other states. Such assessment requires 
simultaneous consideration of multiple measures (criteria) such as volume shipments, 
value-added, profits, etc. 
Measures such as percentage change in employment, and percentage change in 
output [Plaut and Pluta, 1983], [Wasylenko and McGuire, 1985], [Erickson, 1989] reflect 
a state’s ability to maintain and foster conditions enabling economic growth and 
development. Their levels are determined by a complex set of interactions between laws, 
regulations, institutional structure, industrial organization, and resource endowments and 
allocations. A state’s endowments of natural resources influence the composition of its 
industry mix. However, it is the composition of its workforce with respect to skills, 
education, and allocation across industries which ultimately determines a state’s overall 
success and wealth. 
Manufacturing activities are the most important of industrial activities in terms 
of contribution to GNP (Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1989)1. Measures of 
consumption of labor, capital, material inputs and measures of contribution of value- 
added, products shipments and overall profits allow a perspective of a state’s manufactur¬ 
ing base. It is these same measures which gauge the performance of a specific industry 
across states. A leading industry in a state, in terms of activity and share of labor 
demand, may not operate efficiently when compared to the same industry in other states. 
1 Manufacturing is one of 10 industrial activities as defined by the Standard Industrial 
Classification. 
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As such, a subsidiary industry may prove more competitive and a better candidate for 
growth and development. 
Classical econometric techniques do not adequately address efficient frontier 
determination in the case of multiple dependent measures. In application, prespecified 
functional forms (Cobb-Douglas, translog, or constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
function) are introduced to study particular economic effects such as scale or factor 
substitution [Fuss et. al., 1978]. However, the implicit and explicit assumptions 
underlying the function and their ensuing implications regarding relations among the 
estiminated parameters are not simultaneously compatible with the empirical data 
[Dryhmes, 1990]. Data envelopment analysis, on the other hand, offers flexibility in the 
sense of less maintained hypotheses to address efficient frontier determination. 
This chapter presents two levels of analysis, using data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), to determine comparative advantage for the economy of the states of the US. 
Section 2 introduces the methodology used in the analysis. Mathematical programs 
comprising the methodology are given in Appendices C-E. Section 3 details the two 
levels of analysis: the first level assesses a state’s overall economic performance 
compared to other states. Comparative-statics analysis across states provides the basis 
for comparative assessment of yearly achievement measures such as per capita income, 
output per capita, growth in total value-added and employment. A state can then 
critically evaluate its allocation of current stocks of capital and labor, the adequacy of 
labor supply, and its potential to generate value-added. The second level allows 
evaluation of an industry in a state with respect to the same industry in other states. 
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Such analysis identifies sources of inefficiency, such as inadequate levels of shipments, 
for the industry. Efficiency, here, refers to a simultaneous maximization of measures 
such as volume of shipments, value-added, and profits, and minimization of measures 
such as labor, wages, salaries, and material inputs. Section 4 reports the results of 
analysis using Census of Manufactures data for 1982 and 1987. Conclusions are drawn 
in Section 5. 
5.2 Methodology 
As mentioned earlier classical econometric techniques do not adequately address 
efficient frontier determination in the case of multiple dependent measures. Other 
techniques such as shift-share analysis only aim at estimating average behaviors. Data 
Envelopment analysis offers a different approach by aiming at the identification of 
extreme behaviors. 
Since the seminal paper by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes [1978], a variety of data 
envelopment analysis models has appeared in the literature as have numerous studies 
employing the technique [Banker, Charnes, Cooper, Swarts, Thomas, 1989], [Seiford, 
1990]. Each of the various models for data envelopment analysis (DEA) seeks to 
determine which of n decision-making units (DMUs) determine an envelopment surface 
when considering m inputs and s outputs. Each DMU i = l,...,n is then characterized 
by the m-vector X; denoting its input values, and by the s-vector yi denoting its output 
values. Units that lie on (determine) the surface are deemed efficient in the DEA 
terminology. The statement of the models for DEA carries at the outset assumptions 
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regarding the form of the envelopment surface. The assumed form of the envelopment 
bears a direct relationship to the set of efficient units. This study considers a VRS-type 
envelopment surface. This type assumes that the envelope consists of hyperplanes which 
are particular facets of the convex hull of the points (x^yj), i = l,...,n. Units that do 
not lie on the surface are deemed inefficient and the analysis provides measures of their 
relative inefficiency. The inefficiencies stem from the identification of excessive input 
levels and deficient output levels. These excess inputs and slack outputs represent waste 
that bar the DMU from attaining efficiency, i.e. map on the envelopment surface. 
A solution to a DEA model for a DMU identifies a point on the envelope in 
accordance with evaluation principles implicit in the model. Within the mathematical 
programs these pinciples define the manner in which projected points on the envelope are 
obtained for a DMU that is inefficient. This projection mechanism requires the 
specification of 2 components: the orientation and the pricing mechanism. The 
orientation refers to a prioritization for the search of waste across measures. An 
evaluation may be input-oriented if waste is to be identified among inputs first, or it may 
be output-oriented if waste is to be identified among outputs first, or it may follow a 
global orientation in which case the pricing mechanism directs the projection. The 
pricing mechanism identifies relative values (efficiency prices) for the various measures 
and allows the aggregation of non-commensurable inputs and outputs. The pricing 
mechanism may itself be defined in various ways. Following the taxonomy introduced 
in Chapter 3 we distinguish between two classes of pricing mechanisms: explicit pricing 
mechanism and constrained implicit pricing mechanisms. An explicit pricing mechanism 
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attributes explicit values to the measures for which waste has been identified but it allows 
free determination of prices when no waste is present. Models known in the literature 
as CCR [Charnes, Cooper, Rhodes, 1978], BCC [Banker, Charnes, Cooper, 1979], ADD 
[Charnes, Cooper, Golany, Seiford, Stutz, 1981] follow such a pricing mechanism. A 
constrained implicit pricing mechanism recognizes that price ratios across measures 
represent tradeoffs across measures and that these tradeoffs are constrained to some 
acceptable ranges, either by market conditions or by societal valuations. Consequently 
this mechanism allows prices to be determined freely across measures subject to the 
condition that they evaluate to permissible tradeoffs. Models kown as the cone-ratio 
model [Charnes, Cooper, Huang, and Sun, 1990], the assurance region models 
[Thompson, Singleton, Thrall,and Smith, 1986], the Frontier model developed in Chapter 
3 follow these pricing principles. 
Common to most mathematical models for DEA is the assumption that a DMU’s 
current input ratios and output ratios are characteristic of the economic environment and 
supply and demand conditions in which the DMU operates2. It follows that waste is to 
be eliminated proportionately across all input and across all output measures. Given an 
orientation and pricing mechanism, the evaluation of a DMU leads to the identification 
of a projected point on the envelope (x*,y*), and of a set of price vectors (px*,py+) such 
that, at these prices, the value of global waste is minimized. A mathematical statement 
of global waste valuation is given by: 
2 An exception is the additive model which follows a global orientation and an explicit 
pricing mechanism. 
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Px.(x - X*) + py.(y* - y). 
Further the efficient point (x*,y*) is such that no other efficient unit would exhibit a 
higher profit level. Profit is defined as the difference between the aggregated values of 
outputs, hereafter called revenues, and the aggregated values of inputs, hereafter referred 
to as costs. Mathematically there is no efficient unit (x',y') such that: 
(p,.y* - px.x*) - (Pj.y' - p5,xO < 0. 
Which leads to: 
Px, (xx - x * ) + py, (y * - yO < 0. 
This latter condition expresses that, at prices (px*,py*), x* represents a minimum 
cost alternative to producing y*, and y* represents a maximum revenue alternative to 
consuming x*. 
The efficiency, or degree of inefficiency of the DMU is then gauged by a global 
score E(x,y) which is the product of an input efficiency score Ej(x,y), and of an output 
efficiency score E0(x,y) as defined in Chapter 2. Input efficiency is measured by the 
ratio of the minimal cost of producing y*, px*x*, to the cost associated with x. That is: 
Px*X 
Output efficiency is measured by the ratio of revenue associated with y to the maximal 
revenue attainable from x*. That is: 
E0(x,y) 
py,y 
py.y * 
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When a constrained implicit pricing mechanism is used E,(x,y) evaluates to the 
global proportional input reduction, 6, that would render the DMU input-efficient, that 
is E^y) = 6. Similarly, E0(x,y) evaluates to the reciprocal of the global proportional 
output augmentation, <j>, that would render the DMU output-efficient, that is E0(x,y) = 
1 /<t>. This study employs the Frontier model developed in Chapter 2 and summarized in 
Appendix D, which yields both 6, and 4>- 
The Frontier model is concerned mainly with gauging inefficiency and identifying 
sources of inefficiency. However, whenever a DMU is found efficient the evaluation 
summarizes to an identified price vector reflecting feasible tradeoffs across measures that 
are sufficient to ensure efficiency. It is fair to assume that given its current level and 
technique of operations, an efficient unit is concerned with adapting/repositioning itself 
so as to maximize its comparative advantage measured, in this situation, by its relative 
profit, that is the difference between its profit and the profit of its closest competitors 
among other efficient units. This task involves the identification of the unit’s closest 
competitors and of a set of price vectors (px, py) reflecting admissible tradeoffs across 
inputs and across outputs. If a closest competitor is characterized by (x*, y*), then the 
quantity: 
is maximized. That is, 
(pyy - P„x) - (pyy * - P„x *) 
py(y - y *) + p,(x * - x) 
is maximized. 
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The tradeoffs implicit in the identified prices (px, py) can then guide the unit (x,y) 
in its plans for expansion or contraction. This study employs the Comparative Advantage 
model developed in Chapter 4 and summarized in Appendix E which yields, for each 
efficient DMU, a list of identified closest competitors, the identified set of price vectors, 
values of discrepancies between the unit’s and the competitor’s levels for all measures. 
The model summarizes these discrepancies to a global score which is the product of an 
input score, 6, and of an output score, </>. The input score 6 represents the minimum 
proportional augmentation from the DMU’s input levels that would match the 
competitor’s input levels. It follows that whenever 6 > 1, it can be inferred that the 
DMU’s technique is a source of its comparative advantage. Similarly, the output score 
</> represents the minimum proportional reduction from the DMU’s output levels that 
would match the competitors levels. Hence, whenever </> < 1 it can be inferred that the 
DMU’s current output mix is a source of its comparative advantage. 
5.3 Proposed Analyses 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis provides yearly estimates of population levels 
and income information for various states. The Bureau of Census conducts "censuses 
of manufactures" every five years. The proposed analyses use such available data for 
1982 and 1987 on the manufacturing activity of all states and the District of Columbia. 
The relevant measures (definition of inputs and outputs) for each level of analysis vary 
and are discussed in the following two subsections. 
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5.3.1 Overall Economic Performance 
To evaluate a state’s overall economic performance, each state represents a 
decision making unit. The measures which focus on the share and strength of the 
manufacturing base of each state are classified as input or output measures for the 
purpose of this analysis. The output measures are: 
i) Per Capita Income (Output 1). Per capita income is an obvious indicator of 
the wealth of a state. It is usually associated with high per capita disposable 
income, hence high levels of consumption which stimulate all economic activities. 
ii) Value Added per Employee (Output 2). This output measures relates to the 
productivity of the global manufacturing base. 
iii) Ratio of Manufacturing Employment to Total Population (Output 3). The 
extent to which the manufacturing sector contributes to sustaining the state’s 
population can be measured by the proportion of the population it employs. The 
higher this proportion, the higher the chances of the state to gain significantly 
from increased export activity. 
iv) Average Level of New Capital Expenditures per Manufacturing Establish¬ 
ment (Output 4). This ratio reflects the commitment to keep abreast of 
technological advancements and the degree of involvement in medium to long¬ 
term planning. It shows how actively the firms invest in their future instead of 
merely reacting to current economic conditions. 
v) Ratio of Total Number of Manufacturing Establishments to Total 
Population (Output 5). This ratio depicts the average level of concentration 
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across all manufacturing industries. A relatively high ratio can be indicative of 
smaller establishments which are traditionally seen as more flexible to adapt to 
fluctuating demand conditions, or it can be indicative of a very diversified and 
competitive manufacturing base counting a relatively large number of establish¬ 
ments. Conversely, a relatively small ratio can reflect a pattern of larger and/or 
fewer establishments benefiting from economies of scale and having successfully 
overcome entry barriers of the sunk capital cost type. 
The input variables consist of two trend variables and two cost related measures: 
i) Percentage Loss in Manufacturing Employment (Input 1). 
ii) Percentage Decline in Total Manufacturing Value-Added (Input 2). 
iii) Hourly Wages (Input 3). 
iv) Ratio of Cost of Material Inputs to the Total Dollar Value of Shipments 
(Input 4). 
The trend variables emphasize that while most states are concerned with managing 
growth, other states strive to prevent shrinkage of their manufacturing base. The 
percentages are calculated over a five-year period and reflect the expansion path of a 
state. Negative values for these variables indicate growth. The hourly wages are 
computed from a total wages paid to production workers up through the line-supervisor 
level. 
The first step of the analysis is to identify which states define the envelope, i.e. 
exhibit a DEA-efficient behavior. This is accomplished by solving the invariant additive 
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model which assumes a VRS envelope, a global orientation and an invariant pricing 
mechanism. The model is given in Appendix C. The global orientation rather than an 
input or output orientation is more appropriate for an expost evaluation of performance 
and whenever the input and output measures are not directly controllable variables. The 
invariant pricing mechanism is the one tailored to each unit by considering that the 
"inefficiency valuation" of each measure for a DMU is given by the reciprocal of the 
value of that measure for that DMU. It is easily implemented in the absence of further 
information regarding the tradeoff values for the various measures. The model has been 
solved to identify the efficient units in 1982 and 1987. A comparison across the years 
will show how dynamic the economy was over that time period and to which extent 
economic strength and vitality tend to be localized geographically or to shift. After the 
identification of envelope-defining units, the ranges of efficiency price ratios over these 
units can be derived. These price ratios represent evaluated tradeoffs across measures 
that are consistent with the efficient rating of the envelope-defining units. 
The second step of the analysis is then concerned with identifying sources of 
inefficiency and measuring the degree of inefficiency of DMUs mapping beneath the 
envelope. This is accomplished for both 1982 and 1987 by solving the Frontier model 
with pricing constrained by the ranges of efficiency price ratios of the units found 
efficient in the first step. These ranges will hereafter be referred to as Limit-Price- 
Ratios. These Limit-Price-Ratios are likely to preserve the efficient rating of the units 
found efficient in the first step of the analysis. Comparing the results over both years 
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1982 and 1987 for selected units will show their relative progress or recess and illustrate 
whether any industrial policy recommendation can emerge from such analysis. 
It is essential to stress that the evaluation process does not lend "absolute" results. 
The results depend on the accepted and stated ranges that constrain the relative values 
of efficiency prices estimated by the frontier model. This important point is illustrated 
by conducting the evaluation anew with a different set of constraints on price ratio 
ranges. Using the second set of price ratio ranges further emphasizes that the price ratio 
constraints can serve to "reward" some behaviors or measure the tendency of units to 
efficiently exhibit that behavior. The second set, considered for both years 1982 and 
1987 is derived from the ranges of ratios of input consumption levels and ouput 
production levels respectively over the DEA-efficient units. That is the range for input 
price ratios vjvp \(v-Jfor all inputs i, j, i is given by: 
(-) . = Min{ ^ : DMUk is DEA-efficient} 
”i xki 
(—) = Max{ — : DMUk is DEA-efficient} 
"j xki 
Similarly the range for output price ratios ^t//zu, [WMu).nin> W/OmaxL for all outputs, t, 
u, t 5^ u is given by: 
( -U = Min{ 
MU 
(—),„ax = MaX{ 
Mu 
Ykt 
yku 
Ykt 
Yku 
DMUk is DEA-efficient} 
DMUk is DEA-efficient} 
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These ranges will hereafter be referred to as Limit-Value-Ratios ranges. There is no 
theoretical justification from an economics point-of-view for the selection of these 
boundaries on the efficiency price ratios. However, from a practical point-of-view, they 
are easily computed and consistent with the intuitive notion that an efficient unit ought 
to consume more of the cheaper inputs and produce more of the more valuable outputs. 
The set of efficient units under these Limit-Value-Ratio constraints is expected to be 
different from the original efficient set. In this case as well, industrial policy 
recommendations to inefficient units will be sought and constrasted with those stemming 
from the evaluation under the Limit-Price-Ratio ranges. 
5.3.2 Efficiency of an Industry Across States 
This level of analysis aims at identifying the states in which an industry group is 
efficient. Note that this does not imply that the industry is preeminent in that state. An 
industry group corresponds to the 3-digit level classification in the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC)3. In this analysis a decision making unit represents an industry 
group in a particular state. The number of decision making units is determined by the 
number of states where the particular industry is active. This analysis, then, provides 
a comparative assessment of industry performance across states in terms of market share 
3SIC distinguishes between 20 manufacturing major groups, each identified by a 2-digit code. 
The 2-digit major groups are themselves combinations of several industry groups each identified 
by a 3-digit code. These industry groups are the aggregate of several industries (identified by 
a 4-digit SIC code). In the manufacturing division, classification at the 3-digit level is based on 
process. The Standard Industrial Classification in the Manufacturing Division is given in 
Appendix F. 
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as indicated by total shipments and profitability, and in terms of operating efficiency as 
indicated by labor, and material input utilization. 
The output variables are: 
i) Total Shipments (Output 1). Shipments refer to the dollar valuation of the 
shipments (receivable net selling values f.o.b.) and therefore represents the 
aggregated revenues of an industry. This variable is traditionally employed as a 
proxy for market share. 
ii) Value-Added (Output 2). Value-added is the difference between shipments 
and the cost of material inputs. It represents the amounts of additional labor and 
know-how embodied in the shipments. According to the Bureau of the Census, 
"Value-added is considered to be the best value measure available for comparing 
the relative economic importance of manufacturing among industries and 
geographic areas." 
iii) Profits (Output 3). Profits is the share of value-added returning to the owners 
of capital after labor is full compensated (wages and salaries). Profit maximiza¬ 
tion is a classical assumption of production theory. 
The input measures stem from the assumption of cost minimization. They are: 
i) Cost of Material Inputs (Input 1). These consist of direct charges to the 
production process and include energy and freight charges. 
ii) Wages (Input 2). These are the total wages paid to production workers up 
through the line-supervisor level. 
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iii) Salaries (Input 3). This measure represents non-production wages and 
salaries. 
iv) Hours (Input 4). This measure represents the total number of hours worked 
by production workers up through the line-supervisor level. 
v) Workers (Input 5). This measure represents the total number of production 
workers up through line-supervisor level. 
vi) Overhead (Input 6). This measure represents the total number of non¬ 
production workers. 
Capital costs are not included in the model due to the difficulty in defining and 
measuring such a variable. Indeed beside the differences in productivity associated with 
various vintages of capital there is a general lack of data concerning the levels of 
utilization of the existing stocks of plant and equipment. We may also note that given 
the short-term irreversibility of capital investment, labor is left as the adjustable input. 
The procedure of this second analysis follows that of the overall economic 
performance analysis. We start by identifying the states which operate on the envelope 
for an industry by solving the invariant-additive model for each state reporting activities 
in that industry in 1982. We then proceed to identify sources of inefficiency and 
measure the degree of inefficiency of units mapping beneath the envelope using the 
Frontier model with the Limit-Value-Ratio constraints. Finally the issue of recommenda¬ 
tions to efficient units will be addressed by solving the Comparative Advantage model 
in the case of the Limit-Value-Ratio constraints. 
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5.4 Interpretation of Results 
Both levels of analysis proposed in the previous section were performed4 using 
the data tabulated in Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 respectively on pages 195, 196, and 197 
at the end of the chapter. The comparative economic performance of the states was 
performed using 1982 and 1987 data given in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The values of the 
variables tabulated are derived from data compiled by the Bureau of Census and the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Regarding the first level of analysis Input 1 depicts the decrease in manufacturing 
employment (from 1977 to 1982 in Table 5.1 and from 1982 to 1987 in Table 5.2) in a 
state and is stated as a percentage. Input 2 represents similarly the percentage decrease 
in value added per manufacturing employee. Input 3 (hourly wages) is expressed in 
dollars per hour are Input 4 (cost ratio) is in tenths. Output 1 (income per capita) is 
reported in dollars, Output 2 (value-added per manufacturing sector employee) is in 
thousands of dollars per employee, Output 3 (ratio of total population employed in the 
manufacturing sector) is a percentage, Output 4 (new capital expenditures per 
manufacturing establishment) is reported in hundreds of thousands of dollars and are 
averages across all establishments, and Output 5 (number of establishments per capita) 
is per 100,000 people. In order to perform the analysis the data sets have been 
transformed so that all measures are expressed by positive numbers of similar magnitude. 
The transformed data sets are shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, respectively on page 198 and 
4 All data envelopment analysis were performed using IDEAS [Ali, 1991] on a COMPUA- 
DD 286-12 personal computer equipped with a math co-processor. 
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199. In particular Input 1 and Input 2 were translated by 100 in 1982 and by 50 in 1987, 
then scaled by 100 in 1982 and 10 in 1987. It follows that values less than 1 for Input 
1 and Input 2 in 1982, and less than 5 in 1987, represent growth. Input 4 is scaled by 
10 so that the cost ratio becomes unitless. Output 1 and Output 2 are converted into tens 
of thousands of dollars per capita and tens of thousands of dollars per manufacturing 
employee respectively. Definitions and units of measurement of all measures are 
summarized in Table 5.6 on page 200. 
The results of the analyses are discussed in subsection 5.4.1. 
The second level of analysis concerns the comparative assessment of an industry 
group performance across states. The analysis is illustrated by focusing on the Electronic 
Components and Accessories (SIC367) group, which, in, 1982, represented the growing 
area oh high technology. This analysis is performed using 1982 data. The data is given 
in Table 5.3 on page 197. Each of the six variables, profits, shipments, value-added, 
cost of material, wages, and salaries, is reported in millions of dollars. The number of 
hours is in millions, the number of production and non-production workers are in 
thousands. Definition of all measures are summarized in Table 5.7 on page 201. 
The Electronic Components and Accessories (SIC367) is analyzed in subsection 
5.4.2. 
5.4.1 Overall Economic Performance of States 
Table 5.8 on page 202 lists the states found efficient in 1982 and those found 
efficient in 1987 when considering a VRS envelopment, a global orientation and an 
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invariant pricing mechanism for the evaluation. In 1982 25 of the 51 states were 
efficient and defining the envelope5. The 10 states which changed from a classification 
of efficient in 1982 to inefficient in 1987 are marked by f. The 9 states which exhibited 
the reverse phenomenon are marked with an asterisk. 
The input price ratios resulting from the evaluation of these efficient units are 
reported in Table 5.11 on page 205 and in Table 5.12 on page 206 for 1982 and 1987 
respectively. The associated output price ratios are reported in Table 5.13 on page 207 
and in Table 5.14 on page 208. The observed ranges for these ratios are given in Table 
5.15 page 209. The disparity of the ranges across measures and across years is quite 
wide and offers valuable information regarding the span of behaviors exhibited by the 
envelope-defining units. 
For instance the minimum tradeoff between Output 1 (per capita income) and 
Output 3 (participation of population to manufacturing labor force) went from 0.155 to 
1.438 between 1982 and 1987. This change can be interpreted as a sign that Output 3 
is losing ground as a potential source of efficiency, that is as a source of strength relative 
to Output 1. The relative (with respect to other output measures) decline of Output 3’s 
effectiveness as a source of efficiency is confirmed by the sliding of the ranges of ratios 
and toward lower values between 1982 and 1987 and the leap toward higher 
values of yu.2/^3. This phenomenon is easily justified by the strong average decline in 
manufacturing employment through this time period. On the input side the growing 
5 Tables 5.9 and 5.10 on page 203 and 204 report the revealed waste (excess inputs and 
output slacks) for each state for 1982 and 1987 respectively. States with zero waste are 
efficient. 
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importance of retaining the manufacturing employment base is illustrated by the relative 
prices of Input 1 (percentage decrease in manufacturing employment) which reach 
extremely high values in 1987. 
Given these observed ranges of relative prices, the identification of sources of 
inefficiency and measurement of global inefficiency is effected for all states by solving 
the Frontier model. Tables 5.16 and 5.17 on pages 210 and 211 report the total 
identified waste and substitutions recommended to inefficient units in 1982 and 1987 
respectively. Tables 5.18 and 5.19, on pages 212 and 213, display the efficiency prices 
resulting from the evaluation for both years, Tables 5.20 and 5.21, on pages 214 and 
215, report the corresponding output price ratios and, finally Table 5.22 and 5.23, on 
pages 216 and 217, show the input price ratios and efficiency scores of all units for 1982 
and 1987. 
In Tables 5.16 and 5.17, which report the amount of identified waste and 
recommended substitutions, substitutions appear as negative numbers. For instance in 
Table 5.16 Nevada in 1982 would have been better off by sacrificing, i.e. substituting 
out 0.019 of Output 2 ($190 per employee of value-added) but boosting Output 3, 4, and 
5 which exhibit slack values of 0.293, 1.858, and 0.033 respectively. This is confirmed 
on the input side where a higher level of Input 2 (percentage decrease in value-added per 
employee) would be preferable along with lower levels of Input 1, 3, and 4 as indicated 
by a substitution value of -0.007 for Input 2 and excess input values of 0.112, 0.064, and 
0.198 for Input 1, 3, and 4 respectively. General inferences across all states about each 
measure can be made by examining total idenfied waste and recommended substitutions. 
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For example, the relatively large excesses for Input 1 (decline in manufacturing employ¬ 
ment) across states in 1982 reflect large inter-state migrations of the manufacturing labor 
force over the preceding 5-year period. In 1987, the excesses for Input 2 (value- 
added/employee), which does not show a marked effect in 1982, indicate a new emphasis 
on productivity. By 1987, the distribution of the labor force had stabilized geographical¬ 
ly and the discriminating factor for productivity had shifted to value-added. 
As expected, since the Limit-Price-Ratio ranges were obtained from the additive 
invariant model, the sets of efficient units for 1982 and 1987 are very similar to those 
identified under the invariant pricing evaluation. In fact we observe that all states that 
were on the envelope under the invariant pricing evaluation, with the exception of 
Indiana in 1982, are still found efficient under the Frontier model constrained by the 
Limit-Price-Ratio ranges. However, we note that, for these efficient units, the identified 
price vectors report different tradeoffs from those identified under the invariant pricing 
evaluation. For instance Texas, which is efficient in 1982, exhibits maximum price 
ratios for and \xxl\i3 (82.67 and 199.87 respectively) under the invariant pricing 
mechanism (Table 5.13) but sees these ratios drop to a minimum and low value of 0.011 
and 0.308 repectively when evaluated with the Frontier model (Table 5.20). This 
illustrates that multiple price vectors, representative of different tradeoffs are feasible for 
efficient units. Hence, caution must be exercised in interpreting these revealed relative 
prices. Returning to the case of Texas in 1982, 3 output price ratios were evaluated at 
a bound: lower bound for \\iJn2, upper bound for /x2//x3 and for \j,2!\xs suggesting that 
Output 2 was a relative strength of Texas. Output 2 (value-added per employee) for 
183 
Texas in 1982 represents the 5th highest value over all states confirming the inference. 
However, alternate price vectors could have been identified by the model that would not 
have made this strength so apparent by not showing any price ratio related to Output 2 
at a bound. It follows that revealed for efficient units strengths should not be considered 
exhaustive. 
To illustrate the inferences which may be drawn about a specific state from Tables 
5.16 through 5.23 (pages 210-217), we focus on Texas, Michigan, Washington, and 
Pennsylvania. 
In 1982 Texas was efficient. The pattern of output price ratios reveals t0 
be minimum and ju2/^3 and /*2/^5 to be maximum in accordance with a high level of 
Output 2 relative to other states (the level of Output 2, value-added per employee, in 
Texas in 1982 is the fifth largest across all states). The pattern of input price ratios 
indicates a low efficiency price for Input 4 (cost ratio) and a high efficiency price for 
Input 3 (hourly wages) relative to other inputs. These prices reflect that Texas’ 
manufacturing operations in 1982 were characterized by high value of the cost ratio 
variable and low hourly wages relative to other states. These observations are supported 
by the industrial profile of Texas with the predominance of the oil industry and 
electronics assembly industry, and also by the fact that Texas experienced a large influx 
of workers between 1977 and 1982. However, by 1987, Texas had lost its efficient 
status. The evaluation shows 6 = 1 in 1987, indicating input efficiency. However, the 
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non zero excess input and substitutions suggest that a repositioning of inputs, given 
Texas’ identified relative prices, would allow the state to boost its output levels. Texas’ 
output inefficiency in 1987 is 0.887, indicating a 12% deficiency in outputs relative to 
efficient states. In particular paying higher hourly wages (-0.036 for Input 3 in Table 
5.17) would afford a higher participation of the population to the manufacturing labor 
force and higher growth in value-added per employee. The data shows that between 
1982 and 1987 Texas experienced a loss of manufacturing employment and growth in 
value-added per employee. However, the analysis reveals that this absolute growth is 
not at par with that of efficient states (Output 3, value-added per employee exhibits a 
slack value of 2.133 in 1987). Between 1982 and 1987 it appears that Texas suffered 
a drainage of skilled labor. 
Michigan was inefficient in 1982 but gained efficiency by 1987. In 1982 global 
input inefficiency was measured by 6 = 0.88 with the primary source of inefficiency 
stemming from Input 3 (hourly wages). In fact Michigan exhibited in 1982 the highest 
level of hourly wages across all states. The identified excess is 2.05 for that measure 
corresponding to a recommended reduction to 82% (the partial input inefficiency 
measured by 03 = (level - excess)/level = (11.47 -2.05)/11.47 = 0.82) of its original 
level. 
On the output side global inefficiency is measured by E0 = 1 /</> = 0.99 (</> = 
1.01) indicating an average deficiency in ouputs of 1%. Looking at individual outputs 
we note that the identified source of output deficiency is Output 1 (per capita income) 
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with the partial output inefficiency measured by </>, = (level + slack)/level = (1.11 + 
0.07)/1.11 = 1.063. On the other hand, Output 4 (new capital expenditures per 
establishment) shows no slack and therefore represents a source of relative strength for 
the state. This is supported by the output price ratios and /*4/^5 which are evaluated 
at their minimum and maximum allowable values repectively, and by the evaluated prices 
and ju4 which are respectively low and high when compared to the evaluated output 
1 and output 4 prices for other states. 
By 1987, despite the fact that Michigan still had the highest level of hourly 
wages, the state became efficient (6 = 1, and 0 = 1). From the particular (alternate 
prices are possible) price vector that is identified we observe that ju2/ju3 and h2//jl4 are at 
their minimum allowable level while vxlv2, vxlv^, and vxlv4 are at their maximum level. 
These data indicate that Output 2 (value-added per employee) is a weakness of Michigan 
relative to Output 3 (labor force participation) and Output 4 (new capital expenditures per 
establishment), and that Input 1 (percentage decrease in employment) is a relative input 
strength, i.e. manufacturing employment was maintained at a satisfactory level. Looking 
at the evaluated prices themselves in Table 5.19, we further note that f°r Michigan 
is low relative to other states while /*3 and ju4 are relatively high, and, on the input side, 
vx for Michigan is among the lowest across states. This information is consistent with 
the interpretation that Michigan benefited from an influx of workers between 1982 and 
1987, contributing to a low value of Input 1 (and high ux) and a high value of Output 3 
(Labor force participation). However, the productivity of this workforce as measured 
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by Output 2 (value-added per employee) appears to be trailing behind the level of new 
capital expenditures. 
Washington state was inefficient both in 1982 and in 1987 but much less so in 
1987. In 1982 the state’s evaluation lead to 6 = 0.77, 0 = 1-08 for a global efficiency 
score of 0.72, second to worst. By 1987 the scores had become d = 0.86, 0 = 1 for 
a global efficiency score of 0.86 placing the state ahead of 12 others. 
The sources of inefficiency in 1982 reside mainly with insufficient growth in 
value-added (Input 2), a low participation level (Output 3) and low density of 
manufacturing establishments (Output 5): the identified waste for individual measures are 
such that the partial inefficiency measure for Input 2 and Outputs 3 and 5 evaluate to 02 
= 0.61, 03 = 1.15 and 05 = 1.14. However, by 1987, Washington state had gained 
output efficiency and at that time its level of Output 5 (density of manufacturing 
establishments) is found high relative to other states. Indeed the 1987 evaluation requires 
that some of that variable be substituted out (substitution of 0.068 of Output 5 in Table 
5.17) to allow input inefficiency to be revealed. Input inefficiency is again concentrated, 
and more severely so than in 1982, on insufficient growth (i.e. too high percentage 
decrease) in value-added per manufacturing employee. 
Pennsylvania was inefficient in 1982 and its efficiency deteriorated by 1987. In 
1982 the state’s evaluation lead to 6 = 0.96, 0 = 1.04 for a global score of 0.93 
positioning the state ahead of 20 others. However, by 1987 those scores had become 
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0.98, 1.187 and 0.825 respectively, dropping the state to eigth before last. For both 
years looking at partial input and output efficiency scores we observe that Input 3 (hourly 
wages) which appeared as a relative weakness of Pennsylania in 1982 (03 = 1 - 0.94/8.95 
= 0.895 < 0) had become a relative strength by 1987 (03 = 0.983). Input 2 (percentage 
decrease in value-added per employee) is revealed to be very low for Pennsylvania (02 
= 0.33). On the output side inefficiency spread evenly to all measures except Output 
5 (density of manufacturing establishments) which is more severely affected. 
Pennsylvania appears in dire needs of revitalization of its manufacturing industry base. 
The overall economic performance of states in 1982 and 1987 was reassessed 
under a new set of price ratio constraints given by the Limit-Value-Ratio ranges. These 
ranges are summarized in Table 5.24 on page 218 and are radically different (generally 
much narrower) from the Limit-Price-ratio ranges given in Table 5.15 on page 209. 
The identified waste and substitutions are given in Tables 5.25 and 5.26 on pages 
219 and 220, estimated prices are given in Tables 5.27 and 5.28 on pages 221 and 222, 
their corresponding ratios for output measures are given in Tables 5.29 and 5.30 on 
pages 223 and 224, and their corresponding ratios for input measures as well as their 
associated efficiency scores are given in Tables 5.31 and 5.32 on pages 225 and 226. 
Of the 24 states found efficient in 1982 with the Limit-Price-ratio ranges only 8 
remain efficient with the Limit-Value-Ratio ranges. These 8 states are: California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New York, and Ohio. 
Some of their strengths become apparent in Table 5.27, on page 221, reporting their 
identified efficiency prices. For instance, California exhibits very high prices for Input 
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1 and Input 2 (percentage decrease in employment and in value-added respectively) 
relative to its other prices and relative to Input 1 and Input 2 prices of other states. We 
can infer that, had California not benefited from a hige influx of workers between 1977 
and 1982, the state might not have been found efficient. North Carolina and Ohio 
similarly price Input 2 very high while Louisiana’s strengths can be traced to Output 2 
(value-added per employee) and Output 4 (new capital expenditures). 
Alaska and New Jersey which were found efficient with the Limit-Price-Ratio 
ranges are now "penalized" for "excessive" Output 1 (per capita income). New Jersey 
also shows an excessive level of Output 5 (number of establishments to total population). 
These observations have to be tempered with considerations of cost-of-living for Alaska 
and a large out-of-state commuting labor force in New Jersey. Hawai on the other hand, 
owed its previous efficient rating to an extremely low level of Input 3 (hourly wages). 
This is confirmed by the data in Table 5.4, on page 198, which shows that Hawai' had 
the lowest level of hourly wages across states in 1982. Finally the results for Texas, 
which also lost its efficient rating, confirm the inferences drawn in the evaluation with 
the Limit-Price-Ratios. In particular, paying higher hourly wages would afford a higher 
participation of the population to the manufacturing labor force. 
The evaluation of units inefficient under the Limit-Price-Ratio ranges reveals the 
same weaknesses under the Limit-Value-Ratio constraints but the extent of these 
weaknesses is generally exacerbated due to the tighter ranges of allowable tradeoffs. 
Moreover, measures that were identified earlier as sources of relative (with respect to 
other measures) strengths for a unit still appear as such by showing as candidates for 
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substitution. This is illustrated by Michigan for which Output 4 (new capital expendi¬ 
tures) had been identified as a relative strength. The evaluation with the Limit-Value- 
Ratio ranges now suggests that Michigan could bear a lower level for that output 
(substitution of -0.18 for Output 4 for Michigan in Table 5.25 on page 219). 
The evaluation of the states in 1987 with the corresponding Limit-Value-Ratio 
ranges given in Table 5.24, on page 218, lead to similar conclusions. Of the 24 states 
that were efficient in 1987 with the Limit-Price-Ratio ranges only 5 remain efficient with 
the Limit-Value-ratio ranges. These 5 states are: Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, North 
Carolina, and New Hampshire. 
The Limit-Value-ratio ranges, as mentioned earlier, are much tighter than the 
Limit-Price-Ratio ranges. They bar "specialist" states, that is states which exhibit 
extreme levels in a measure, highest level across units for an output or lowest level 
across units for an input, from reaping an efficient rating, by preventing unreasonable 
prices to be attributed to these specialty measures. The above examples illustrate that 
the specification of the allowable ranges for the tradeoffs across measures is critical to 
the evaluation process. These ranges may easily be set to filter out undesirable 
behaviors. 
5.4.2 Efficiency of an Industry Across States 
This analysis concerns the comparative assessment of the industry group SIC 367, 
Electronic Components and Accessories, across all states for the year 1982. Decision- 
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making units are the industry group in the various states and will be identified by the 
state’s name. In 1982, the industry was present in 42 states. Since data for 8 of these 
states is suppressed, analysis is performed across the remaining 346. The envelope 
determined using a global orientation and an explicit pricing mechanism is defined by 12 
of the 34 states7. These DEA-efficient states are: California, Georgia, Kansas, North 
Carolina, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, 
and Washington. To identify the sources and extent of inefficiencies of other states we 
apply the frontier model constrained by the Limit-Value-Ratio ranges derived from the 
set of DEA-efficient units. These ranges are given in Table 5.34 on page 228. Table 
5.35, on page 229, reports the identified total waste and substitutions, and Table 5.36, 
on page 230, reports the evaluated output and input price ratios. Of the 12 states that 
were efficient, only 10 remain efficient with respect to the Limit-Value-Ratio constraints 
imposed with the Frontier model (Oklahoma and Washington are no longer efficient). 
Both states appear input-efficient but output inefficient. The output deficiency for 
Oklahoma is revealed by allowing the evaluation to compare Oklahoma with units which 
consume relatively more Input 1 (i.e. exhibit higher costs of material inputs) and more 
of Input 6 (number of non-production workers). It follows that these 2 measures 
represent Oklahoma’s relative strengths. Similarly we can infer that Washington’s 
6 Data is suppressed for Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
7 Table 5.33, on page 227, report the revealed waste (input excesses and output slacks) for 
each state reporting activity in that industry. States with zero total waste are efficient in that 
industry group. 
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relative strengths in 1982 reside in Input 2 (low level of wages paid out), Inputs 3, 4 
(low levels of production and non-production workers), and Output 2 (high level of 
value-added). However, these strengths failed to translate into sufficiently high levels 
of Output 1 (shipments) and Output 3 (profits) to rate Washington as efficient relative to 
all other states. 
The results of the analysis show in fact that all states, except Missouri, are input- 
efficient (6 = 1), and that inefficiency originated from deficient output levels (0 > 1). 
We may conclude that by 1982 the technology of industry group 367 was mastered by 
all players and that the degrees of inefficiency were tied to the outcomes of battles for 
market share. 
If we define large-scale producers in that industry group as the states posting at 
least 1 billion dollars in value-added, we count 7 such states in 1982 (California, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas), 3 of which are 
inefficient (Illinois, Massachusetts, and Missouri). The efficiency scores of Illinois and 
Massachusetts are evaluated at 0.821 and 0.814 respectively. The output price ratios 
of Illinois evaluate at lower bound for [ixl\x2 and upper bound for ju2/ju3, leading to the 
conclusion that Output 2 (value-added) represents Illinois’ relative strength, and that 
Outputs 1 (shipments) and 3 (profits) are deficient. The output price ratios for 
Massachusetts evaluate at lower bound for /xj//x3 and /x2/^3, indicating that Output 3 
(profits) represent Massachusetts’ relative strength and that the state’s output deficiencies 
stem essentially from Outputs 1 (shipments) and 2 (value-added). These inferences are 
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confirmed by the partial output inefficiency scores8. For Illinois these scores evaluate 
to 1.422, 1.187, 1.276 for Outputs 1, 2, and 3 respectively. The same calculations for 
Massachusetts give 1.376, 1.232, and 1.189 respectively. 
Keeping the same set of price ratio ranges, the Limit-Value-Ratio ranges, the 
Comparative Advantage model (given in Appendix E) is solved over the set of efficient 
units. This model produces an input score 6 and an output score </> such that whenever 
0 > 1, it can be inferred that the DMU’s technique is a source of its comparative 
advantage. Similarly, whenever </> < 1 it can be inferred that the DMU’s current output 
mix is a source of its comparative advantage. These scores for the states efficient in 
industry group 367 are given in Table 5.37 on page 231. The model also identifies, for 
each efficient unit, which other units are its closest competitors. This information is also 
provided in Table 5.37. Table 5.38, on page 232, gives the identified discrepancies for 
all measures between a unit’s and its closest competitor’s levels9, and the evaluated price 
ratios across all measures. 
From Table 5.37 we observe that 3 states emerge with a comparative advantage 
in inputs: Georgia, Kansas, and New Mexico, which are all small-scale producers (with 
value-added less than $100 million). All other states have a comparative advantage in 
outputs. California stands alone, more than twice the scale of its closest competitor, 
New York. In Table 5.38, on page 232, negative discrepancies represent relative 
8 The partial inefficiency score relative to Output r is given by </>r = (Output r level + 
Output r slack) / Output r level. 
9 If (xi> yi) denote the unit’s input and output vectors , and (x*, y*) denote its closest 
competitor’s input and output vectors, then the discrepancies are given by (x,- x+) and (y*- y1). 
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advantages relative to competitors and positive discrepancies represent relative 
disadvantages. Such information is valuable to help a state design assistance programs 
and target incentives that will promote growth and strength of the state’s economy. 
5.5 Conclusions 
This study has illustrated the use of data envelopment analysis to evaluate a state’s 
overall economic performance compared to other states, and the performance of a 
specific industry across states. The illustrative studies show that the technique can be 
used to gauge the effect of changes over time. Economic data series which are produced 
annually, while providing current information, are typically limited in scope (geographic 
and industry detail). Relevant data, unfortunately, is often delayed. For effective use 
of the proposed analyses in regional planning, the timeliness of the collection of such 
data is crucial. The Frontier model is geared toward the identification of sources of 
comparative disadvantage for the decision-making units. It offers flexibility through the 
specification of ranges for allowable tradeoffs across measures. The specification of 
these ranges is critical to the evaluation and allows filtering of performances. The 
Comparative Advantage model is geared toward the identification of sources of 
comparative advantage for decision-making units that exhibit frontier efficient behavior. 
Such information is valuable to help a state design assistance programs and target 
incentives that will promote growth and strength of the state’s economy. 
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Table 5.1 States 1982: Original Data Set 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 
AK82 2564.10 992.80 10.74 0.70 17370 60.90 2.87 1.30 1.00 
AL82 3.50 -30.20 7.50 0.59 8836 36.55 8.36 2.80 1.40 
AR82 79.70 8.40 6.92 0.61 8604 40.86 8.22 2.10 1.44 
AZ82 127.60 36.40 8.62 0.52 10314 41.14 5.19 2.20 1.18 
CA82 -83.00 -91.10 8.87 0.53 13238 47.08 8.09 1.80 1.92 
C082 78.20 4.30 9.04 0.55 12638 42.09 6.23 2.00 1.43 
CT82 -19.70 -48.70 8.55 0.46 14459 38.58 13.56 1.60 2.14 
DC82 1941.90 805.20 10.44 0.39 14695 55.60 2.66 1.10 0.82 
DE82 402.20 240.80 9.21 0.70 11953 36.33 11.28 5.10 1.05 
FL82 -25.00 -53.60 6.98 0.53 11315 39.86 4.34 1.40 1.31 
GA82 -32.20 -56.20 6.90 0.61 9867 38.15 8.90 2.30 1.51 
HI82 1344.90 650.80 7.27 0.68 11760 47.44 2.36 0.90 0.97 
ID82 616.40 304.80 8.71 0.60 9284 43.62 4.87 1.00 1.44 
IL82 -68.10 -82.40 9.50 0.57 12355 44.64 9.31 1.80 1.62 
IN82 -41.70 -67.40 10.30 0.58 10293 44.00 10.67 2.80 1.45 
1082 60.20 -30.40 10.22 0.62 10868 56.76 7.33 1.90 1.24 
KS82 99.90 -0.40 8.98 0.68 11811 49.45 7.08 1.90 1.34 
KY82 38.30 -28.90 8.99 0.60 9278 47.93 6.67 2.80 0.95 
LA82 68.80 -28.50 9.72 0.79 10234 58.19 4.61 6.20 0.94 
MA82 -47.00 -67.60 7.84 0.46 12751 40.36 11.20 1.50 1.92 
MD82 45.50 -17.10 9.43 0.53 12735 43.32 5.49 1.80 0.91 
ME82 209.40 108.20 7.46 0.54 9598 36.64 9.69 2.50 1.77 
MI82 -61.40 -78.50 11.47 0.60 11101 44.26 9.69 2.30 1.66 
MN82 -2.60 -45.30 9.11 0.56 11548 43.91 8.47 1.80 1.64 
M082 -16.00 -54.20 8.80 0.58 10867 45.17 8.21 1.90 1.43 
MS82 69.10 7.40 6.61 0.59 8006 38.79 7.86 3.70 1.22 
MT82 1588.10 1078.10 9.81 0.81 10083 35.32 2.51 0.70 1.35 
NC82 -57.30 -70.50 6.54 0.56 9284 35.68 13.27 2.50 1.68 
ND82 2204.10 1189.10 7.84 0.74 10520 44.06 2.20 1.70 0.87 
NE82 274.30 89.10 8.16 0.70 11054 48.79 5.73 1.30 1.21 
NH82 217.50 109.90 7.28 0.47 11592 37.28 11.33 1.20 2.09 
NJ82 -54.80 -73.40 8.55 0.55 13966 41.98 10.15 1.40 2.04 
NM82 933.30 501.40 7.10 0.64 9509 42.35 2.41 1.00 0.89 
NV82 1571.60 874.50 8.46 0.51 12498 42.28 2.33 0.90 0.97 
NY82 -76.00 -86.60 8.23 0.48 12703 44.34 8.07 1.30 1.86 
OH82 -69.10 -83.10 10.42 0.55 10932 45.05 10.23 2.50 1.57 
OK82 73.20 3.20 8.80 0.65 11357 41.36 6.09 2.00 1.29 
OR82 84.20 5.40 9.81 0.55 10581 43.07 6.93 1.10 2.12 
PA82 -71.10 -81.20 8.95 0.55 11440 37.99 9.93 1.90 1.49 
RI82 199.60 121.60 6.68 0.50 11168 33.33 11.94 0.60 3.00 
SC82 -7.20 -31.20 6.85 0.56 8710 33.25 11.41 3.60 1.31 
SD82 1291.80 664.00 8.03 0.63 9488 44.91 3.53 0.80 1.08 
TN82 -26.10 -52.80 7.31 0.56 9208 38.61 9.89 3.20 1.37 
TX82 -67.80 -84.20 8.60 0.69 11684 50.41 6.88 4.00 1.32 
UT82 309.90 143.30 8.13 0.61 9041 41.53 5.34 1.70 1.26 
VA82 -12.80 -51.30 7.75 0.53 11630 44.12 7.13 2.70 1.01 
VT82 628.60 312.70 7.72 0.45 10110 43.52 8.98 2.50 2.12 
WA82 17.00 -33.30 11.08 0.67 12018 43.22 6.81 1.60 1.59 
WI82 * -31.30 -62.70 9.65 0.56 11073 45.39 10.46 1.80 1.83 
WV82 255.90 107.60 10.15 0.58 9006 42.27 4.88 2.40 0.85 
WY82 3344.40 1961.80 8.73 0.81 12235 41.18 1.94 1.00 1.00 
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Table 5.2 States 1987: Original Data Set 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 
AK87 18.5 -7.0 11.5 0.7 18461 76.59 2.06 1.60 0.81 
AL87 -5.7 -35.2 8.9 0.5 12039 53.16 8.56 7.10 0.51 
AR87 -7.7 -26.6 8.2 0.6 11421 51.38 8.61 2.60 1.42 
AZ87 -18.7 -44.9 10.0 0.5 14322 60.67 5.42 2.00 1.22 
CA87 -5.0 -29.6 10.6 0.5 17770 63.47 7.63 1.70 1.81 
C087 4.4 -32.2 11.2 0.5 15680 64.76 5.57 1.70 1.43 
CT87 9.9 -26.7 10.9 0.4 21258 57.84 12.03 1.90 2.10 
DC87 -1.8 -40.4 11.2 0.3 19543 93.59 2.74 0.90 0.79 
DE87 0.1 -37.3 11.7 0.6 16305 58.01 10.46 4.00 1.04 
FL87 -9.0 -35.2 8.5 0.5 15594 55.99 4.15 1.20 1.30 
GA87 -11.4 -43.4 8.8 0.6 14387 59.76 9.11 2.70 1.47 
HI87 6.8 -20.7 8.8 0.6 15569 63.85 2.04 1.00 0.94 
ID87 -9.7 -32.0 9.6 0.6 11797 57.98 5.27 1.60 1.50 
IL87 8.5 -25.1 10.9 0.5 16394 64.61 8.51 2.40 1.59 
IN 87 -2.7 -34.9 11.5 0.5 13987 65.73 10.88 3.90 1.56 
1087 3.3 -16.7 11.0 0.6 14028 70.37 7.30 2.30 1.26 
KS87 -9.7 -34.6 10.7 0.6 15089 68.32 7.63 3.10 1.32 
KY87 -2.1 -34.7 10.5 0.6 11996 71.86 6.77 4.70 0.99 
LA87 26.0 -28.6 11.5 0.7 11506 102.64 3.60 3.70 0.86 
MA87 9.2 -27.5 10.1 0.4 19131 60.74 10.06 2.00 1.88 
MD87 1.30 -28.0 10.9 0.5 18217 60.82 5.10 2.10 0.94 
ME87 8.6 -23.3 9.6 0.5 13996 51.88 8.56 2.50 1.83 
MI87 -10.0 -35.6 13.3 0.6 15558 61.87 10.66 3.00 1.74 
MN87 -6.4 -34.0 10.5 0.5 15789 62.22 8.81 2.50 1.68 
M087 -3.0 -29.3 10.4 0.6 14630 61.98 8.19 2.20 1.43 
MS87 -8.3 -25.4 7.8 0.6 10301 47.71 8.38 1.90 1.26 
MT87 0.5 -36.0 10.3 0.7 12304 55.50 2.48 0.80 1.53 
NC87 -5.2 -39.8 8.1 0.5 13353 56.16 13.15 2.70 1.71 
ND87 -3.9 -33.8 8.6 0.6 12825 63.99 2.30 0.80 0.93 
NE87 1.4 -22.9 9.5 0.6 14100 64.17 5.63 1.70 1.17 
NH87 -0.9 -48.8 10.1 0.4 18083 72.13 10.27 1.50 2.21 
NJ87 10.1 -25.5 10.8 0.5 20277 62.04 8.92 1.60 1.88 
NM87 -4.6 -18.7 9.1 0.6 11889 49.69 2.31 1.50 0.88 
NV87 -13.9 -7.1 9.7 0.5 16359 39.17 2.36 1.10 0.97 
NY87 11.7 -20.7 10.2 0.5 17943 62.42 7.12 1.40 1.66 
OH87 0.5 -30.7 12.1 0.6 14575 65.33 10.14 2.80 1.62 
OK87 26.8 -17.2 10.6 0.6 12607 63.33 4.77 1.50 1.15 
OR87 -9.1 -31.0 10.3 0.6 13906 56.76 7.48 1.20 2.33 
PA87 14.0 -22.4 10.3 0.5 15198 55.77 8.67 1.90 1.50 
RI87 2.2 -22.3 8.4 0.5 15683 43.82 11.30 0.90 2.92 
SC87 -0.5 -36.1 8.4 0.5 12078 51.78 10.78 3.50 1.33 
SD87 -10.3 -25.5 8.0 0.6 12414 54.07 3.85 1.00 1.07 
TN87 -4.8 -34.2 8.9 0.5 12977 55.85 9.99 2.80 1.41 
TX87 16.0 -16.5 10.1 0.6 13840 70.07 5.44 2.20 1.21 
UT87 -7.0 -28.9 9.3 0.5 11530 54.29 5.33 1.90 1.24 
VA87 -8.5 -36.4 9.5 0.5 16539 63.49 7.23 2.50 1.04 
VT87 -3.7 -19.9 9.5 0.5 14267 52.35 8.88 2.70 2.31 
WA87 -6.0 -30.1 10.0 0.6 15634 58.14 6.83 1.60 1.68 
WI87 -3.1 -28.3 11.0 0.6 14674 61.30 10.67 2.20 1.91 
WV87 14.9 -25.3 11.4 0.5 11013 65.03 4.39 2.20 0.85 
WY87 26.9 -16.1 11.1 0.8 12836 62.27 1.59 1.30 1.02 
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Table 5.3 SIC 367-1982 Data 
Electronic Components and Accessories 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Input 5 Input 6 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
AL367 158.1 41.6 26.8 7.8 3.7 1.0 125.3 340.8 193.7 
AZ367 369.2 169.8 340.9 21.8 12.2 11.6 318.4 1189.1 829.1 
CA367 3615.7 1290.2 1489.8 159.4 82.2 52.9 3469.6 9797.8 6249.6 
C0367 81.0 31.8 33.5 5.9 3.0 1.4 29.6 174.8 94.9 
CT367 249.1 113.7 79.9 18.0 8.9 3.3 226.6 671.0 420.2 
FL367 226.3 135.1 111.8 21.5 10.8 5.2 239.2 734.6 486.1 
GA367 44.2 11.3 6.4 1.7 0.9 0.3 28.6 91.1 46.3 
IL367 601.8 240.0 157.1 34.5 18.5 6.8 457.9 1448.5 855.0 
IN367 253.0 105.6 49.3 14.8 7.8 2.3 153.8 559.0 308.7 
10367 45.1 22.1 11.7 3.3 1.6 0.7 30.2 109.5 64.0 
KS367 25.1 8.9 5.5 1.6 0.8 0.3 11.6 51.2 26.0 
MA367 573.5 296.3 241.9 42.6 21.8 9.8 565.5 1659.4 1103.7 
MD367 48.2 22.3 18.4 3.4 1.8 0.8 34.5 123.6 75.2 
ME367 70.0 35.8 22.7 6.3 3.2 1.0 112.8 232.6 171.3 
MI367 47.6 16.6 13.5 2.8 1.4 0.6 32.1 109.6 62.2 
MN367 115.5 67.8 48.1 10.3 5.3 2.1 88.2 323.1 204.1 
M0367 205.8 117.4 57.4 11.3 6.1 2.0 193.2 580.4 368.0 
NC367 886.0 94.2 160.7 13.2 6.9 5.1 424.5 1417.1 679.4 
NE367 28.5 15.3 23.1 3.5 1.7 1.3 34.0 100.7 72.4 
NH367 100.5 56.9 29.9 10.0 5.4 1.4 77.0 263.3 163.8 
NJ367 369.0 162.5 152.6 23.9 12.5 5.9 289.5 975.1 604.6 
NM367 15.3 10.5 5.7 1.8 0.9 0.3 17.7 50.0 33.9 
NY367 2679.7 428.0 807.8 57.4 28.7 28.4 1297.3 5201.1 2533.1 
OH 3 67 208.5 101.2 56.9 13.0 6.8 2.5 197.8 564.3 355.9 
OK367 36.3 15.2 7.7 2.6 1.4 0.3 23.4 81.4 46.3 
OR367 49.4 30.0 72.8 4.2 2.2 2.9 215.1 364.1 317.9 
PA367 824.1 371.0 220.7 40.6 22.0 8.1 820.7 2245.8 1412.4 
RI367 43.1 14.5 17.4 2.8 1.5 1.1 23.7 102.1 55.6 
SC367 174.7 82.5 46.0 13.1 6.4 2.3 86.7 381.9 215.2 
TN367 51.1 20.8 15.1 3.1 1.7 0.6 21.7 106.2 57.6 
TX367 601.5 276.8 404.9 36.6 18.2 15.0 866.7 2140.0 1548.4 
UT367 55.8 34.4 43.3 5.3 2.9 1.6 36.0 167.9 113.7 
VA367 160.7 57.5 28.8 7.4 3.8 1.2 248.9 493.2 335.2 
WA367 145.7 30.7 53.7 4.4 2.5 1.9 158.5 374.2 242.9 
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Table 5.4 States 1982: Transformed Data Set 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 1 
AK82 26.64 10.93 10.74 7.00 1.74 6.01 2.87 1.30 1.00 
AL82 1.04 0.70 7.50 5.90 0.88 3.66 8.36 2.80 1.40 
AR82 1.80 1.08 6.92 6.10 0.86 4.09 8.22 2.10 1.44 
AZ82 2.28 1.36 8.62 5.20 1.03 4.11 5.19 2.20 1.18 
CA82 0.17 0.09 8.87 5.30 1.32 4.71 8.09 1.80 1.92 
C082 1.78 1.04 9.04 5.50 1.26 4.21 6.23 2.00 1.43 
CT82 0.80 0.51 8.55 4.60 1.45 3.86 13.56 1.60 2.14 
DC82 20.42 9.05 10.44 3.90 1.47 5.56 2.66 1.10 0.82 
DE82 5.02 3.41 9.21 7.00 1.20 3.63 11.28 5.10 1.05 
FL82 0.75 0.46 6.98 5.30 1.13 3.99 4.34 1.40 1.31 
GA82 0.68 0.44 6.90 6.10 0.99 3.82 8.90 2.30 1.51 
HI82 14.45 7.51 7.27 6.80 1.18 4.74 2.36 0.90 0.97 
ID82 7.16 4.05 8.71 6.00 0.93 4.36 4.87 1.00 1.44 
IL82 0.32 0.18 9.50 5.70 1.24 4.46 9.31 1.80 1.62 
IN 82 0.58 0.33 10.30 5.80 1.03 4.40 10.67 2.80 1.45 
1082 1.60 0.70 10.22 6.20 1.09 5.68 7.33 1.90 1.24 
KS82 2.00 1.00 8.98 6.80 1.18 4.95 7.08 1.90 1.34 
KY82 1.38 0.71 8.99 6.00 0.93 4.79 6.67 2.80 0.95 
LA82 1.69 0.72 9.72 7.90 1.02 5.82 4.61 6.20 0.94 
MA82 0.53 0.32 7.84 4.60 1.28 4.04 11.20 1.50 1.92 
MD82 1.46 0.83 9.43 5.30 1.27 4.32 5.49 1.80 0.91 
ME82 3.09 2.08 7.46 5.40 0.96 3.66 9.69 2.50 1.77 
MI82 0.39 0.22 11.47 6.00 1.11 4.43 9.69 2.30 1.66 
MN82 0.97 0.55 9.11 5.60 1.15 4.39 8.47 1.80 1.64 
M082 0.84 0.46 8.80 5.80 1.09 4.52 8.21 1.90 1.43 
MS82 1.69 1.07 6.61 5.90 0.80 3.88 7.86 3.70 1.22 
MT82 16.88 11.78 9.81 8.10 1.01 3.53 2.51 0.70 1.35 
NC82 0.43 0.30 6.54 5.60 0.93 3.57 13.27 2.50 1.68 
ND82 23.04 12.89 7.84 7.40 1.05 4.41 2.20 1.70 0.87 
NE82 3.74 1.89 8.16 7.00 1.11 4.88 5.73 1.30 1.21 
NH82 3.18 2.10 7.28 4.70 1.16 3.73 11.33 1.20 2.09 
NJ82 0.45 0.27 8.55 5.50 1.40 4.20 10.15 1.40 2.04 
NM82 10.33 6.01 7.10 6.40 0.95 4.24 2.41 1.00 0.89 
NV82 16.72 9.75 8.46 5.10 1.25 4.23 2.33 0.90 0.97 
NY82 0.24 0.13 8.23 4.80 1.27 4.43 8.07 1.30 1.86 
OH82 0.31 0.17 10.42 5.50 1.09 4.51 10.23 2.50 1.57 
OK82 1.73 1.03 8.80 6.50 1.14 4.14 6.09 2.00 1.29 
OR82 1.84 1.05 9.81 5.50 1.06 4.31 6.93 1.10 2.12 
PA82 0.29 0.19 8.95 5.50 1.14 3.80 9.93 1.90 1.49 
RI82 3.00 2.22 6.68 5.00 1.12 3.33 11.94 0.60 3.00 
SC82 0.93 0.69 6.85 5.60 0.87 3.33 11.41 3.60 1.31 
SD82 13.92 7.64 8.03 6.30 0.95 4.49 3.53 0.80 1.08 
TN82 0.74 0.47 7.31 5.60 0.92 3.86 9.89 3.20 1.37 
TX82 0.32 0.16 8.60 6.90 1.17 5.04 6.88 4.00 1.32 
UT82 4.10 2.43 8.13 6.10 0.90 4.15 5.34 1.70 1.26 
VA82 0.87 0.49 7.75 5.30 1.16 4.41 7.13 2.70 1.01 
VT82 7.29 4.13 7.72 4.50 1.01 4.35 8.98 2.50 2.12 
WA82 1.17 0.67 11.08 6.70 1.20 4.32 6.81 1.60 1.59 
WI82 0.69 0.37 9.65 5.60 1.11 4.54 10.46 1.80 1.83 
WV82 3.56 2.08 10.15 5.80 0.90 4.23 4.88 2.40 0.85 
WY82 34.44 20.62 8.73 8.10 1.22 4.12 1.94 1.00 1.00 
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Table 5.5 States 1987: Transformed Data Set 
DMU Input 1 nput 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 
AK87 6.85 4.30 11.47 7.00 1.85 7.66 2.06 1.60 0.81 
AL87 4.43 1.48 8.93 5.40 1.20 5.32 8.56 7.10 0.51 
AR87 4.23 2.34 8.16 5.90 1.14 5.14 8.61 2.60 1.42 
AZ87 3.13 0.51 10.03 4.60 1.43 6.07 5.42 2.00 1.22 
CA87 4.50 2.04 10.58 4.80 1.78 6.35 7.63 1.70 1.81 
C087 5.44 1.78 11.20 4.90 1.57 6.48 5.57 1.70 1.43 
CT87 5.99 2.33 10.93 4.10 2.13 5.78 12.03 1.90 2.10 
DC87 4.82 0.96 11.18 2.70 1.95 9.16 2.74 0.90 0.79 
DE87 5.01 1.27 11.67 6.40 1.63 5.80 10.46 4.00 1.04 
FL87 4.10 1.48 8.50 5.10 1.56 5.60 4.15 1.20 1.30 
GA87 3.86 0.66 8.76 5.60 1.44 5.98 9.11 2.70 1.47 
HI87 5.68 2.93 8.78 5.90 1.56 6.39 2.04 1.00 0.94 
ID87 4.03 1.80 9.64 5.70 1.18 5.80 5.27 1.60 1.50 
IL87 5.85 2.49 10.91 5.20 1.64 6.46 8.51 2.40 1.59 
IN87 4.73 1.51 11.49 5.30 1.40 6.57 10.88 3.90 1.56 
1087 5.33 3.33 10.96 5.90 1.40 7.04 7.30 2.30 1.26 
K.S87 4.03 1.54 10.65 5.90 1.51 6.83 7.63 3.10 1.32 
KY87 4.79 1.53 10.53 5.70 1.20 7.19 6.77 4.70 0.99 
LA87 7.60 2.14 11.49 6.80 1.15 10.26 3.60 3.70 0.86 
MA87 5.92 2.25 10.12 4.40 1.91 6.07 10.06 2.00 1.88 
MD87 5.13 2.20 10.87 5.00 1.82 6.08 5.10 2.10 0.94 
ME87 5.86 2.67 9.64 5.10 1.40 5.19 8.56 2.50 1.83 
MI87 4.00 1.44 13.33 5.90 1.56 6.19 10.66 3.00 1.74 
MN87 4.36 1.60 10.52 5.20 1.58 6.22 8.81 2.50 1.68 
M087 4.70 2.07 10.39 5.70 1.46 6.20 8.19 2.20 1.43 
MS87 4.17 2.46 7.77 5.70 1.03 4.77 8.38 1.90 1.26 
MT87 5.05 1.40 10.27 6.80 1.23 5.55 2.48 0.80 1.53 
NC87 4.48 1.02 8.11 5.10 1.34 5.62 13.15 2.70 1.71 
ND87 4.61 1.62 8.85 6.30 1.28 6.40 2.30 0.80 0.93 
NE87 5.14 2.71 9.46 6.30 1.41 6.42 5.63 1.70 1.17 
NH87 4.91 0.12 10.07 3.60 1.81 7.21 10.27 1.50 2.21 
NJ87 6.01 2.45 10.75 4.90 2.03 6.20 8.92 1.60 1.88 
NM87 4.54 3.13 9.14 5.90 1.19 4.97 2.31 1.50 0.88 
NV87 3.61 4.29 9.69 4.90 1.64 3.92 2.36 1.10 0.97 
NY87 6.17 2.93 10.23 4.60 1.79 6.24 7.12 1.40 1.66 
OH87 5.05 1.93 12.08 5.50 1.46 6.53 10.14 2.80 1.62 
OK87 7.68 3.28 10.59 6.00 1.26 6.33 4.77 1.50 1.15 
OR87 4.09 1.90 10.34 5.50 1.39 5.68 7.48 1.20 2.33 
PA87 6.40 2.76 10.25 5.20 1.52 5.58 8.67 1.90 1.50 
RI87 5.22 2.77 8.39 4.80 1.57 4.38 11.30 0.90 2.92 
SC87 4.95 1.39 8.38 5.40 1.21 5.18 10.78 3.50 1.33 
SD87 3.97 2.45 8.04 6.20 1.24 5.41 3.85 1.00 1.07 
TN87 4.52 1.58 8.88 5.30 1.30 5.59 9.99 2.80 1.41 
TX87 6.60 3.35 10.14 6.10 1.38 7.01 5.44 2.20 1.21 
UT87 4.30 2.11 9.32 5.30 1.15 5.43 5.33 1.90 1.24 
VA87 4.15 1.36 9.52 4.90 1.65 6.35 7.23 2.50 1.04 
VT87 4.63 3.01 9.47 4.60 1.43 5.24 8.88 2.70 2.31 
WA87 4.40 1.99 10.02 6.20 1.56 5.81 6.83 1.60 1.68 
WI87 4.69 2.17 10.99 5.50 1.47 6.13 10.67 2.20 1.91 
WV87 6.49 2.47 11.39 5.20 1.10 6.50 4.39 2.20 0.85 
WY87 7.69 3.39 11.07 7.70 1.28 6.23 1.59 1.30 1.02 
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Table 5.6 States Study: Variables Definitions and Units of Measurement 
Units of Measurement 
Definition 1982 1987 
Input 1 Decrease in Manufacturing 
Employment 
7 + 1 
< 1 : growth 
7 +5 
< 5 : growth 
Input 2 Decrease in Value-Added per 
Manufacturing Employee 
7 + 1 
< 1 : growth 
7 +5 
< 5 : growth 
Input 3 Hourly Wages $/hour $/hour 
Input 4 Cost Ratio: 
Materials/Shipments 
unitless unitless 
Output 1 Income per Capita $10,000 $10,000 
Output 2 Value-Added per Manufacturing 
Employee 
$10,000 $10,000 
Output 3 Participation 7 ' o 7 
Output 4 Average New Capital Expendi¬ 
tures per Establishment 
$100,000 $100,000 
Output 5 Ratio of Number of Establish¬ 
ment to Total Population 
#7100,000 #7100,000 
200 
Table 5.7 Industry Study: Variables Definitions and Units of Measurement 
Units of Measurement 
Definition 1982 
Input 1 Cost of Material Inputs $1,000,000 
Input 2 Wages $1,000,000 
Input 3 Non-Production Wages & Sala¬ 
ries 
$1,000,000 
Input 4 Number of Hours Worked 1,000,000 
Input 5 Number of Production Workers 1,000 
Input 6 Number of Non-Production 
Workers 
1,000 
Output 1 Total Shipments $1,000,000 
Output 2 Value-Added $1,000,000 
Output 3 Profits $1,000,000 
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Table 5.8 Efficient States 
1982 1987 
AK f AL * 
AR t AZ * 
CA CA 
CT CT 
DC DC 
DE DE 
FL FL 
HI GA * 
IN HI 
io t IN 
LA KS * 
MA KY * 
MS LA 
NC MA 
NH MI * 
NJ f MS 
NY f NC 
OH t NH 
RI NV * 
sc t OR * 
TN t RI 
TX f SD * 
VA VA 
VT 
WI t 
VT 
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Table 5.9 States 1982: Total Waste 
VRS Envelopment/ Global Orientation/ Invariant Pricing 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 
AK82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AL82 0.67 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.50 2.37 0.00 0.22 
AR82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AZ82 1.60 0.94 0.17 0.02 0.32 0.00 6.82 0.00 0.75 
CA82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C082 1.19 0.68 0.75 0.00 0.02 0.00 5.08 0.52 0.38 
CT82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DC82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DE82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FL82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GA82 0.25 0.16 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 2.79 0.26 0.11 
HI82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ID82 6.01 3.43 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.14 4.99 2.65 0.12 
IL82 0.08 0.04 0.97 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.24 
IN82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1082 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
KS82 1.65 0.81 0.42 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.31 1.93 0.04 
KY82 1.11 0.57 0.32 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.23 0.00 0.70 
LA82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MA82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MD82 0.98 0.54 0.72 0.26 0.10 0.00 5.12 0.00 1.09 
ME82 2.41 1.65 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.13 2.98 0.00 0.00 
MI82 0.11 0.05 2.77 0.46 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
MN82 0.75 0.42 0.55 0.00 0.10 0.24 0.00 0.45 0.15 
M082 0.66 0.36 0.01 0.43 0.22 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.46 
MS82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MT82 13.02 9.17 0.78 1.76 0.26 0.16 9.40 3.44 0.00 
NC82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ND82 22.39 12.54 0.00 1.10 0.00 0.00 7.75 1.82 0.61 
NE82 0.60 0.25 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.31 2.27 0.00 
NH82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NJ82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NM82 6.56 3.94 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 4.65 2.12 0.34 
NV82 14.49 8.48 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 9.00 1.59 0.97 
NY82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OH82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OK82 1.04 0.60 0.24 1.36 0.25 0.00 5.90 0.16 0.66 
OR82 1.13 0.57 1.31 0.42 0.27 0.00 3.08 0.49 0.00 
PA82 0.03 0.03 0.91 0.09 0.04 0.50 0.00 0.15 0.35 
RI82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SC82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SD82 12.63 6.97 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 6.29 3.00 0.40 
TN82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TX82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
UT82 3.52 2.08 0.00 0.59 0.35 0.00 6.14 0.82 0.53 
VA82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VT82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WA82 0.92 0.54 2.36 0.52 0.04 0.57 0.62 1.41 0.00 
WI82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WV82 2.63 1.54 1.39 0.61 0.47 0.00 6.94 0.00 1.08 
WY82 32.19 19.18 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 9.19 2.68 0.51 
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Table 5.10 State 1987:Total Waste 
VRS Envelopment/ Global Orientation/ Invariant Pricing 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 
4 
Output 5 
AK87 1.57 3.44 0.88 3.28 0.00 0.00 6.23 0.00 0.94 
AL87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR87 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.46 0.10 0.23 1.70 0.00 0.00 
AZ87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
CA87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C087 0.72 1.13 1.57 0.60 0.01 0.00 4.04 1.98 0.00 
CT87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 
DC87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DE87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FL87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GA87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HI87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ID87 0.00 1.03 1.04 0.23 0.23 0.07 4.82 1.23 0.00 
IL87 1.02 2.15 1.02 1.31 0.07 0.45 1.49 0.00 0.35 
IN87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1087 0.42 2.98 1.01 1.98 0.31 0.00 2.58 0.00 0.69 
KS87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
KY87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LA87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MA87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MD87 0.03 1.48 0.72 1.28 0.00 0.65 5.40 0.00 1.09 
ME87 1.08 2.23 0.00 1.03 0.26 1.53 1.83 0.00 0.06 
MI87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MN87 0.00 1.16 0.70 0.99 0.03 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.01 
M087 0.00 1.36 0.82 1.31 0.08 0.19 1.33 1.75 0.04 
MS87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MT87 0.58 0.31 2.04 1.66 0.09 0.02 9.98 2.56 0.00 
NC87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ND87 0.00 0.71 0.00 1.74 0.20 0.00 8.80 1.49 0.69 
NE87 0.44 2.05 0.00 1.95 0.15 0.00 4.49 1.69 0.45 
NH87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NJ87 0.35 0.80 0.09 0.95 0.00 0.02 2.57 0.18 0.25 
NM87 0.06 2.11 1.03 0.80 0.15 0.65 10.84 1.20 0.83 
NV87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NY87 0.96 1.66 0.09 0.41 0.00 0.00 3.44 1.51 0.13 
OH87 0.28 1.44 2.42 1.39 0.18 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.18 
OK87 2.99 2.53 1.05 1.57 0.27 0.00 4.71 2.60 0.27 
OR87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PA87 1.69 2.07 0.66 0.85 0.04 0.84 0.87 1.94 0.00 
RI87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SC87 0.46 0.33 0.00 0.32 0.13 0.47 1.31 0.00 0.17 
SD87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TN87 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.56 0.18 0.53 1.25 0.00 0.29 
TX87 1.73 3.05 0.20 2.26 0.35 0.00 4.57 0.00 0.78 
UT87 0.00 1.09 0.86 0.00 0.18 0.22 5.75 1.73 0.15 
VA87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VT87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WA87 0.00 1.47 2.65 1.52 0.01 0.63 2.73 1.12 0.00 
WI87 0.00 1.71 1.55 1.27 0.16 0.49 0.00 0.08 0.00 
WV87 1.64 2.18 1.46 1.38 0.63 0.47 5.67 0.00 1.15 
WY87 3.05 2.71 2.21 3.17 0.23 0.00 10.46 0.94 0.88 
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Table 5.11 States 1982: Input Price Ratios of Efficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Global Orientation/ Invariant Pricing 
DMU vjv2 vjv* v2tv2 vjvt 
AK82 0.60 0.10 0.24 0.16 0.39 2.39 
AR82 0.70 0.58 0.48 0.83 0.69 0.83 
CA82 0.58 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.82 
CT82 0.55 0.09 0.06 0.17 0.11 0.65 
DC82 0.52 0.01 0.47 0.02 0.91 51.24 
DE82 0.58 0.01 0.62 0.02 1.06 54.48 
FL82 0.57 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.12 
H182 0.68 1.83 1.39 2.70 2.05 0.76 
IN82 0.66 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.52 
1082 0.67 0.50 0.35 0.75 0.51 0.69 
LA82 0.60 3.79 2.29 6.32 3.81 0.60 
MA82 0.60 0.01 3.40 0.02 5.63 354.47 
MS82 0.57 6.48 3.64 11.38 6.39 0.56 
NC82 0.51 6.50 2.88 12.64 5.60 0.44 
NH82 0.74 0.76 6.03 1.03 8.14 7.91 
NJ82 0.57 9.47 5.73 16.61 10.05 0.61 
NY82 0.56 0.02 6.08 0.04 10.88 261.22 
OH82 0.26 5.03 0.40 19.25 1.51 0.08 
RI82 0.90 23.32 13.53 25.87 15.01 0.58 
SC82 2.10 66.44 37.41 31.60 17.79 0.56 
TN82 0.69 15.32 13.12 22.17 18.98 0.86 
TX82 0.59 18.92 12.17 32.14 20.68 0.64 
VA82 0.65 30.97 19.03 47.61 29.26 0.62 
VT82 0.55 29.78 17.87 53.98 32.39 0.60 
WI82 0.49 26.71 21.43 54.43 43.67 0.80 
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Table 5.12 States 1987: Input Price Ratios of Efficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Global Orientation/ Invariant Pricing 
DMU 'A *A "A >A *A vjK 
AL87 1.42 8.56 5.18 6.03 3.65 0.61 
AZ87 0.83 16.26 7.46 16.67 9.02 0.46 
CA87 23.01 119.34 54.15 5.19 2.35 0.45 
CT87 0.39 1.83 0.16 4.69 0.40 0.09 
DC87 0.20 2.32 0.56 11.65 2.81 0.24 
DE87 1.90 60.33 33.09 31.74 17.41 0.55 
FL87 3.34 0.41 11.51 0.12 3.45 28.06 
GA87 0.94 12.46 7.96 13.27 8.49 0.64 
HI87 0.52 0.01 1.04 0.01 2.01 188.27 
IN87 0.32 2.43 1.12 7.61 3.51 0.46 
KS87 317.84 2198.07 1217.71 6.92 3.83 0.55 
KY87 1.68 11.56 6.26 6.88 3.73 0.54 
LA87 0.28 1.51 0.90 5.37 3.18 0.59 
MA87 0.38 0.03 0.74 0.07 1.96 29.36 
MI87 4.63 42.89 18.98 9.26 4.10 0.44 
MS87 0.59 0.03 1.37 0.06 2.32 40.86 
NC87 0.23 1.81 1.14 7.95 5.00 0.63 
NH87 0.02 2.05 0.73 83.92 30.00 0.63 
NV87 76.41 172.58 87.27 2.26 1.14 0.51 
OR87 4.74 25.82 13.73 5.44 2.90 0.53 
RI87 7.66 23.21 13.28 3.03 1.73 0.57 
SD87 184.27 1.81 466.32 0.01 2.53 257.20 
VA87 9.83 68.83 35.43 7.00 3.60 0.52 
VT87 6.75 21.25 4.29 3.15 0.64 0.20 
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Table 5.13 States 1982: Output Price Ratios of Efficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Global Orientation/ Invariant Pricing 
DMU m/Mz M/M 3 /VM5 /Vmj Ih'Hs M3/M4 fiJUt 
AK82 0.70 1.63 0.84 0.84 2.33 1.20 1.20 0.52 0.52 1.00 
AR82 3.50 2.49 0.69 0.37 0.71 0.20 0.11 0.28 0.15 0.53 
CA82 0.32 1.86 0.72 0.78 5.90 2.28 2.46 0.39 0.42 1.08 
CT82 0.63 3.72 0.84 1.14 5.91 1.34 1.81 0.23 0.31 1.35 
DC 82 3.26 66.56 25.38 27.36 20.45 7.80 8.41 0.38 0.41 1.08 
DE82 0.78 21.75 9.02 8.03 27.97 11.61 10.33 0.42 0.37 0.89 
FL82 4.31 8.88 2.47 2.10 2.06 0.57 0.49 0.28 0.24 0.85 
HI82 3.04 1.77 0.60 0.88 0.58 0.20 0.29 0.34 0.50 1.46 
IN 82 3.22 9.77 1.04 1.80 3.04 0.32 0.56 0.11 0.18 1.74 
1082 3.82 10.11 0.48 0.26 2.65 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.53 
LA82 2.80 5.03 1.28 1.14 1.80 0.46 0.41 0.25 0.23 0.89 
MA82 0.01 0.19 2.44 1.67 17.45 221.27 151.73 12.68 8.69 0.69 
MS82 1.53 4.31 1.34 0.72 2.82 0.87 0.47 0.31 0.17 0.53 
NC82 4.44 7.19 1.60 1.02 1.62 0.36 0.23 0.22 0.14 0.64 
NH82 3.82 13.10 0.57 1.50 3.43 0.15 0.39 0.04 0.12 2.66 
NJ82 3.60 5.67 1.33 0.72 1.58 0.37 0.20 0.24 0.13 0.54 
NY82 2.01 40.46 328.07 122.72 20.12 163.18 61.04 8.11 3.03 0.37 
OH82 4.19 7.30 0.34 1.49 1.74 0.08 0.36 0.05 0.20 4.32 
RI82 0.09 0.49 1.63 0.23 5.38 17.85 2.54 3.32 0.47 0.14 
SC82 0.05 0.16 0.17 1.41 3.10 3.39 28.11 1.10 9.08 8.28 
TN82 3.84 4.04 1.49 1.81 1.05 0.39 0.47 0.37 0.45 1.21 
TX82 82.67 199.87 27.57 40.17 2.42 0.33 0.49 0.14 0.20 1.46 
VA82 3.32 2.04 1.66 1.30 0.62 0.50 0.39 0.81 0.64 0.78 
VT82 1.83 3.56 6.35 5.71 1.94 3.46 3.12 1.78 1.60 0.90 
WI82 4.31 5.89 0.22 1.13 1.37 0.05 0.26 0.04 0.19 5.18 
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Table 5.14 States 1987: Output Price Ratios of Efficient Units 
VRS Envelopment/ Global Orientation/ Invariant Pricing 
DMU nJth Ml ^4 /VMj th'fh Mz^ M^Ms MjV* Ms^Ms M^M 5 
AL87 0.46 7.11 0.57 0.42 15.38 1.24 0.92 0.08 0.06 0.74 
AZ87 4.24 3.78 1.40 0.85 0.89 0.33 0.20 0.37 0.23 0.61 
CA87 273.3 328.5 73.20 10.30 1.20 0.27 0.04 0.22 0.03 0.14 
CT87 30.62 63.69 10.06 11.12 2.08 0.33 0.36 0.16 0.18 1.11 
DC87 1.45 10.74 3.53 3.10 7.41 2.43 2.14 0.33 0.29 0.88 
DE87 6.12 5.98 4.24 26.07 0.98 0.69 4.26 0.71 4.36 6.15 
FL87 147.1 109.1 31.53 34.16 0.74 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.31 1.08 
GA87 4.15 2.28 0.98 1.02 0.55 0.24 0.25 0.43 0.45 1.05 
HI87 5.75 174.2 85.39 80.27 30.30 14.85 13.96 0.49 0.46 0.94 
IN87 0.46 1.44 0.63 1.12 3.15 1.37 2.44 0.44 0.78 1.78 
KS87 0.21 212.6 0.38 36.79 1027.1 1.82 177.7 0.00 0.17 97.46 
KY87 0.47 5.64 0.76 0.83 12.11 1.63 1.77 0.14 0.15 1.09 
LA87 0.50 3.13 3.22 0.75 6.24 6.42 1.49 1.03 0.24 0.23 
MA87 20.60 252.8 21.47 47.24 12.27 1.04 2.29 0.09 0.19 2.20 
MI87 3.98 2.06 1.93 0.18 0.52 0.49 0.05 0.94 0.09 0.09 
MS87 4.63 8.14 1.84 1.22 1.76 0.40 0.26 0.23 0.15 0.66 
NC87 4.21 1.63 2.02 1.28 0.39 0.48 0.30 1.24 0.79 0.63 
NH87 3.99 5.68 0.83 1.22 1.42 0.21 0.31 0.15 0.22 1.47 
NV87 238.0 143.4 66.84 58.94 0.60 0.28 0.25 0.47 0.41 0.88 
OR87 4.08 5.38 0.86 0.19 1.32 0.21 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.22 
RI87 2.79 7.21 0.57 0.12 2.58 0.21 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.20 
SD87 471.9 336.1 87.29 93.40 0.71 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.28 1.07 
VA87 188.2 214.3 11.27 30.82 1.14 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.14 2.74 
VT87 3.67 6.22 0.65 0.24 1.70 0.18 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.38 
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Table 5.15 States Study: Limit-Price-Ratio Ranges 
1982 1987 
MIN MAX MIN MAX 
0.261 2.103 0.024 317.844 
0.011 66.440 0.006 2198.072 
*\!*a 0.056 37.413 0.157 1217.711 
0.018 54.430 0.010 83.917 
v1lvi 0.016 43.671 0.404 30.000 
0.123 354.469 0.202 257.202 
b\'bi 0.011 82.672 0.207 471.985 
0.155 199.886 1.438 336.071 
JVM4 0.482 328.068 0.377 87.291 
bl/bi 0.232 122.722 0.181 93.402 
bl'bi 0.582 27.970 0.387 1027.102 
bi'b* 0.051 221.272 0.060 6.417 
bi'bs 0.106 151.729 0.042 177.690 
bi'bA 0.037 12.679 0.002 1.028 
bi'bi 0.025 9.081 0.016 4.358 
bJtH 0.142 8.284 0.094 97.461 
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Table 5.16 States 1982: Total Waste and Substitutions 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Price-Ratios Derived from Limit Price Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 
AK82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AL82 -0.05 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.51 2.53 0.36 0.18 
AR82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AZ82 -0.02 0.10 0.35 0.01 0.14 0.45 3.13 0.23 0.61 
CA82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C082 1.03 0.60 1.02 0.62 0.02 -0.08 4.08 0.01 0.20 
CT82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DC82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DE82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FL82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GA82 0.01 0.02 1.60 0.49 -0.00 -0.07 2.03 0.02 0.07 
HI82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ID82 3.05 1.78 0.28 0.06 0.13 0.52 2.52 2.77 0.19 
IL82 0.04 0.01 0.95 0.53 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.27 
IN82 0.01 0.01 0.83 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.18 
1082 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
KS82 1.61 0.79 0.45 0.27 0.00 -0.01 0.00 1.65 0.06 
KY82 0.09 0.05 0.57 0.38 0.21 -0.02 0.43 -0.10 0.15 
LA82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MA82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MD82 0.21 0.10 1.39 0.62 0.00 -0.19 5.40 -0.13 1.06 
ME82 0.38 0.49 0.34 0.24 0.04 0.13 2.00 0.03 0.07 
MI82 0.05 0.02 2.05 0.61 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.02 
MN82 0.11 0.07 1.01 0.62 0.06 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.01 
M082 0.06 0.05 0.67 0.44 0.07 -0.00 0.00 0.28 -0.04 
MS82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MT82 3.30 5.82 0.97 1.90 0.40 1.30 4.49 0.72 0.48 
NC82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ND82 12.70 7.52 0.15 0.54 0.12 0.45 1.42 0.18 0.19 
NE82 0.11 -0.01 0.06 0.20 0.00 -0.02 0.29 1.86 0.03 
NH82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NJ82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NM82 1.40 1.30 -0.02 -0.08 0.09 0.22 2.53 0.43 0.29 
NV82 16.18 9.42 0.61 0.50 0.03 -0.20 8.89 0.60 0.95 
NY82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OH82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OK82 0.23 0.21 1.16 1.15 0.05 0.15 1.16 0.09 0.06 
OR82 0.30 0.16 1.54 0.82 0.24 -0.10 3.33 0.50 -0.12 
PA82 0.01 0.01 0.94 0.14 0.04 0.48 0.13 0.12 0.35 
RI82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SC82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SD82 4.84 2.89 -0.05 -0.27 0.14 0.47 1.05 2.01 0.15 
TN82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TX82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
UT82 0.00 0.19 -0.00 0.00 0.14 0.61 1.81 1.64 0.27 
VA82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VT82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WA82 0.26 0.26 2.50 1.51 0.09 0.31 1.01 0.12 0.22 
WI82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WV82 -0.12 0.25 0.84 -0.10 0.22 1.00 2.10 0.53 0.62 
WY82 19.98 14.30 -0.48 2.04 0.29 0.83 4.84 0.33 0.42 
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Table 5.17 States 1987: Total Waste and Substitutions 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Price-Ratios Derived from Limit Price Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 
AK87 1.99 3.88 1.14 3.57 -0.03 0.01 6.02 0.00 0.92 
AL87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR87 0.00 0.85 -0.01 0.46 0.10 0.23 1.68 0.04 0.01 
AZ87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CA87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C087 0.52 1.12 0.95 1.29 0.23 0.96 2.55 0.25 0.21 
CT87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DC87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DE87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FL87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GA87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HI87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ID87 0.00 1.39 -0.02 1.17 0.40 0.69 3.08 0.42 0.16 
IL87 0.83 1.60 0.92 1.21 0.10 0.39 0.60 0.14 0.10 
IN87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1087 0.66 2.39 1.34 0.95 0.12 0.21 0.23 0.07 0.04 
KS87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
KY87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LA87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MA87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MD87 0.37 0.34 0.78 0.48 0.00 0.06 3.16 0.02 0.44 
ME87 1.02 1.29 0.63 0.51 0.13 0.49 2.06 0.24 0.15 
MI87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MN87 0.16 1.01 0.40 0.57 0.00 0.23 0.19 0.00 -0.01 
M087 0.53 1.44 1.16 0.74 0.09 0.34 0.46 0.12 0.08 
MS87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MT87 0.03 1.11 0.03 3.14 0.56 1.99 6.76 0.74 0.48 
NC87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ND87 0.00 0.60 -0.01 1.72 0.19 0.10 8.33 1.51 0.56 
NE87 0.43 1.68 -0.03 2.15 0.18 0.81 2.91 0.28 0.13 
NH87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NJ87 0.35 0.79 0.08 0.95 0.00 0.01 2.58 0.18 0.25 
NM87 0.00 2.27 -0.03 1.51 0.38 1.69 7.14 0.51 0.67 
NV87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NY87 0.77 1.79 -0.03 0.68 0.11 0.38 3.44 0.32 0.44 
OH87 0.66 0.92 1.57 0.45 0.10 0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.06 
OK87 2.14 2.44 -0.04 1.77 0.40 2.04 2.13 0.48 0.37 
OR87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PA87 1.23 1.84 0.18 1.20 0.28 1.04 1.62 0.36 0.45 
RI87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SC87 0.47 0.26 0.06 0.22 0.10 0.38 1.24 0.26 0.09 
SD87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TN87 0.09 0.67 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.45 0.81 0.23 0.11 
TX87 1.22 2.31 -0.04 1.56 0.17 0.90 2.06 0.28 0.16 
UT87 0.00 1.44 -0.02 0.30 0.39 1.26 3.15 0.45 0.26 
VA87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VT87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WA87 0.60 1.48 1.64 1.77 0.00 0.62 0.71 0.32 -0.07 
WI87 0.27 1.20 0.65 0.56 0.07 0.11 0.20 0.04 0.03 
WV87 0.43 1.17 0.61 0.13 0.38 2.21 1.48 0.75 0.35 
WY87 2.34 2.56 0.34 3.84 0.45 2.25 4.55 0.47 0.37 
211 
Table 5.18 States 1982: Efficiency Prices 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Price-Ratios Derived from Limit Price Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 
AK82 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.39 0.49 0.02 0.00 0.00 
AL82 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.14 
AR82 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.00 
AZ82 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.01 0.07 0.01 
CA82 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.55 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 
C082 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.44 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.00 
CT82 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.48 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 
DC82 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.00 
DE82 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.19 0.02 
FL82 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.25 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.00 
GA82 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.24 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.00 
HI82 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.21 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.00 
ID82 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.01 
IL82 0.16 0.63 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.19 0.07 0.01 0.01 
IN 82 0.95 0.45 0.01 0.03 0.40 2.47 0.82 0.83 0.10 
1082 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.60 0.70 0.05 0.00 0.01 
KS82 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.00 
KY82 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.00 
LA82 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.01 
MA82 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.52 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 
MD82 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.01 
ME82 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.37 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.10 
MI82 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.01 
MN82 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.01 
M082 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.01 
MS82 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.55 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.02 
MT82 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.07 
NC82 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.45 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.00 
ND82 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.14 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.00 
NE82 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.00 
NH82 0.02 0.01 0.28 0.26 0.00 0.24 0.01 0.00 0.00 
NJ82 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.56 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 
NM82 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.00 
NV82 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.47 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NY82 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.27 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 
OH82 0.13 0.51 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.97 0.23 0.07 0.03 
OK82 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.37 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 
OR82 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.12 
PA82 0.54 0.26 0.02 0.12 0.21 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01 
RI82 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.74 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 
SC82 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.02 
SD82 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.00 
TN82 0.05 0.18 0.03 0.21 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.17 0.02 
TX82 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.00 
UT82 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.00 
VA82 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.37 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.00 
VT82 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.02 
WA82 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.25 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.00 
W182 0.68 0.79 0.02 0.02 0.28 2.75 0.52 0.17 1.19 
WV82 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.01 
WY82 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.53 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
212 
Table 5.19 States 1987: Efficiency Prices 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Price-Ratios Derived from Limit Price Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 
AK87 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 
AL87 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.01 
AR87 0.56 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.29 
AZ87 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.00 
CA87 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 
C087 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.39 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.01 
CT87 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 
DC87 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
DE87 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.01 
FL87 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
GA87 0.21 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.30 
HI87 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.38 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 
ID87 0.16 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.12 
IL87 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.37 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 
IN87 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.01 
1087 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.05 
KS87 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.00 
KY87 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.07 0.00 
LA87 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.00 
MA87 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.36 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 
MD87 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.51 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
ME87 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.36 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.08 
MI87 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.07 
MN87 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.57 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.12 
M087 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.05 
MS87 0.35 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.09 0.00 
MT87 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.12 
NC87 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.14 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.00 
ND87 0.05 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.00 
NE87 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.03 
NH87 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 
NJ87 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.39 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 
NM87 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.52 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.01 
NV87 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
NY87 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.43 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 
OH87 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.01 
OK87 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.24 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.04 
OR87 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.33 
PA87 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.40 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.00 
RI87 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.31 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12 
SC87 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.13 
SD87 0.37 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.08 0.00 
TN87 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.06 
TX87 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.21 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.03 
UT87 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.10 
VA87 ‘ 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
VT87 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.35 
WA87 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.22 
WI87 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.19 
WV87 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.24 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.00 
WY87 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.27 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.05 
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Table 5.20 States 1982: Output Price Ratios 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Price-Ratios Derived from Limit Price Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU M1/M2 M2V5 
AK82 0.81 22.62 178.96 122.71 27.97 221.26 151.71 7.91 5.42 0.69 
AL82 2.10 56.91 2.11 1.42 27.09 1.00 0.68 0.04 0.03 0.68 
AR82 0.01 0.31 2.43 1.67 27.97 221.31 151.73 7.91 5.43 0.69 
AZ82 0.59 16.51 1.43 11.83 27.97 2.42 20.03 0.09 0.72 8.28 
CA82 7.15 199.88 22.32 122.71 27.97 3.12 17.17 0.11 0.61 5.50 
C082 5.09 142.47 13.79 114.21 27.97 2.71 22.42 0.10 0.80 8.28 
CT82 23.22 13.51 14.81 122.73 0.58 0.64 5.29 1.10 9.08 8.28 
DC82 0.01 0.31 2.44 1.67 27.97 221.39 151.73 7.92 5.43 0.69 
DE82 4.09 2.38 0.48 3.99 0.58 0.12 0.98 0.20 1.68 8.28 
FL82 1.48 41.47 327.96 122.75 27.97 221.20 82.79 7.91 2.96 0.37 
GA82 1.24 34.74 274.80 122.75 27.97 221.25 98.80 7.91 3.53 0.45 
HI82 1.32 36.92 292.06 122.76 27.97 221.22 92.98 7.91 3.33 0.42 
ID82 0.27 7.44 58.89 8.36 27.97 221.27 31.42 7.91 1.12 0.14 
IL82 0.06 0.16 1.97 1.41 2.48 31.49 22.55 12.68 9.08 0.72 
IN82 0.16 0.49 0.48 3.99 3.02 2.99 24.76 0.99 8.20 8.28 
1082 0.86 13.51 171.40 122.36 15.64 198.31 142.03 12.68 9.08 0.72 
KS82 0.52 13.02 115.70 79.36 24.90 221.25 151.75 8.89 6.10 0.69 
KY82 0.03 0.74 0.48 3.99 27.97 18.32 151.77 0.66 5.43 8.29 
LA82 4.14 115.77 4.28 35.49 27.97 1.04 8.57 0.04 0.31 8.28 
MA82 7.15 199.86 328.04 46.59 27.97 45.90 6.52 1.64 0.23 0.14 
MD82 0.84 23.57 1.91 15.81 27.97 2.27 18.77 0.08 0.67 8.28 
ME82 7.98 99.16 3.67 3.59 12.43 0.46 0.45 0.04 0.04 0.98 
MI82 0.40 2.58 0.48 3.99 6.53 1.22 10.10 0.19 1.55 8.28 
MN82 0.02 0.31 0.48 0.52 16.09 25.39 27.58 1.58 1.71 1.09 
MQ82 0.01 0.21 1.70 0.24 19.32 154.67 21.97 8.01 1.14 0.14 
MS82 82.67 113.95 4.22 34.93 1.38 0.05 0.42 0.04 0.31 8.28 
MT82 1.83 51.13 29.92 4.25 27.97 16.37 2.32 0.59 0.08 0.14 
NC82 23.22 13.51 14.81 122.73 0.58 0.64 5.29 1.10 9.08 8.29 
ND82 0.74 20.60 10.53 87.27 27.97 14.30 118.49 0.51 4.24 8.29 
NE82 0.12 3.48 27.51 18.87 27.97 221.20 151.71 7.91 5.42 0.69 
NH82 0.01 0.31 2.43 1.67 27.97 221.29 151.77 7.91 5.43 0.69 
NJ82 5.84 163.26 328.04 122.72 27.97 56.19 21.02 2.01 0.75 0.37 
NM82 0.01 0.31 2.43 1.67 27.97 221.24 151.72 7.91 5.42 0.69 
NV82 5.04 141.01 328.02 122.71 27.97 65.07 24.34 2.33 0.87 0.37 
NY82 2.04 56.05 328.07 122.71 27.97 163.72 61.24 5.85 2.19 0.37 
OH82 0.04 0.16 0.48 1.41 4.31 13.39 39.11 3.11 9.08 2.92 
OK82 2.88 80.48 48.07 58.91 27.97 16.71 20.47 0.60 0.73 1.23 
OR82 0.18 4.95 1.63 0.23 27.97 9.23 1.31 0.33 0.05 0.14 
FA82 6.01 3.50 44.35 31.76 0.58 7.38 5.29 12.68 9.08 0.72 
RI82 30.98 199.88 328.11 46.59 6.45 10.59 1.50 1.64 0.23 0.14 
SC82 9.45 5.50 0.48 3.99 0.58 0.05 0.42 0.09 0.73 8.28 
SD82 0.01 0.31 2.44 1.67 27.97 221.35 151.72 7.91 5.42 0.69 
TN82 1.12 13.03 0.48 3.99 11.61 0.43 3.56 0.04 0.31 8.28 
TX82 0.01 0.31 0.68 1.67 27.97 61.71 151.67 2.21 5.42 2.46 
UT82 0.02 0.45 3.54 2.43 27.97 221.30 151.70 7.91 5.42 0.69 
VA82 3.41 95.50 15.04 122.73 27.97 4.40 35.95 0.16 1.29 8.16 
VT82 0.47 13.03 0.48 3.99 27.97 1.04 8.57 0.04 0.31 8.28 
WA82 1.70 47.58 18.00 122.71 27.97 10.58 72.12 0.38 2.58 6.82 
WI82 0.10 0.54 1.63 0.23 5.33 16.26 2.31 3.05 0.43 0.14 
WV82 0.25 6.91 0.88 7.32 27.97 3.58 29.62 0.13 1.06 8.28 
WY82 6.50 181.74 328.10 122.08 27.97 50.50 18.89 1.81 0.68 0.37 
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Table 5.21 States 1987: Output Price Ratios 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Price-Ratios Derived from Limit Price Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU */*= Ft/** *,/* ft/* ft/ft ft/ft ft/*. th'th 
AK87 8.18 336.10 9.78 93.41 41.08 130 11.42 0.03 0.28 935 
AL87 3.72 1.44 1.11 637 039 030 1.69 0.77 436 5.65 
AR87 4.89 12.84 038 031 2.63 0.08 0.04 ! 0.03 0.02 035 
AZS7 0_53 21.43 0.96 9334 40.78 1.82 17737 0.05 436 97.40 
CAS 7 407.28 157.62 87.29 17.11 039 031 0.04 035 0.11 0.20 
0087 8.54 335.95 9.11 44.14 3932 1.07 5.17 0.03 0.13 4.85 
CT87 471.94 182.65 2832 93.40 039 0.06 0.20 0.16 031 330 
DC87 472.09 336.01 8739 93.40 0.71 0.19 030 0.26 0.28 1.07 
DE87 50.60 19.58 7.12 8533 039 0.14 1.69 | 036 | 436 11.98 
FLS7 471.96 336.02 8739 93.40 0.71 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.28 1.07 
GA87 4.31 10.65 0.40 0.18 2.47 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.45 
HIS 7 6.16 336.14 3932 93.40 54.58 6.42 15.17 0.12 0.28 2.36 
IDS 7 0.21 1338 133 031 64.61 6.42 1.03 0.10 0.02 0.16 
IL87 8.62 335.96 9.73 88.05 38.99 1.13 10.22 0.03 0.26 9.05 
INST 031 1.44 0.95 637 438 3.04 19.96 0.66 436 638 
IOS7 0.21 2.60 0.64 0.45 1234 3.09 2.19 0.25 0.18 0.71 
KSS7 0.21 1.44 038 637 6.95 1.82 3037 0.26 4.36 16.62 
KY87 0.21 188.64 038 36.79 911.28 1.82 177.72 0.00 0.20 97.47 
LAST 0.21 212.82 0.43 36.79 1028.20 2.05 177.73 0.00 0.17 86.52 
MAST 9.23 336.19 11.14 93.41 36.43 131 10.12 0.03 0.28 8.39 
MUST 110.64 336.06 44.86 93.40 3.04 0.41 0.84 0.13 0.28 2.08 
ME87 937 27738 6.40 4.44 29.60 0.68 0.47 0.02 0.02 0.69 
SOS7 64.97 25.14 3.90 4.72 039 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.19 1.21 
MNS7 110.06 2SS.87 6.96 4.62 2.63 0.06 0.04 j 0.02 0.02 0.66 
MOST 0.21 2.60 0.64 0.45 1234 3.09 2.19 0.25 0.18 0.71 
MSS7 0.21 8.44 038 36.78 40.77 1.82 177.70 0.05 4.36 97.47 
MT87 0.21 14.41 133 033 6939 6.42 1.11 0.09 0.02 0.17 
NC8T 1.28 21.43 334 9339 16.70 2.76 72.75 0.17 436 26.40 
NDST 0.21 212.98 133 36.78 1028.90 6.42 177.70 0.01 0.17 27.69 
NEST 1.39 335.75 8.93 538 24131 6.42 3.87 0.03 0.02 0.60 
NH87 159.65 6939 7134 6.71 0.44 0.45 0.04 1.03 0.10 0.09 
MS 7 12-57 336.01 80.64 93.40 26.74 6.42 7.43 0.24 0.28 1.16 
NM87 8.05 336.06 16.67 93.40 41.75 1.70 11.60 0.04 0.28 6.83 
NV87 471.80 336.13 8739 93.40 0.71 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.28 1.07 
NY87 13.10 336.07 84.05 93.40 25.66 6.42 7.13 0.25 0.28 1.11 
OHS7 0.42 1.44 0.98 637 3.42 233 14.92 0.68 436 6.42 
OK87 2.61 336.09 533 633 128.63 2.00 2.42 0.02 0.02 1.21 
ORS7 4_31 1131 1.93 0.18 2.63 0.45 0.04 0.17 0.02 0.09 
PAS7 8.61 80.17 9.44 93.40 931 1.10 10.84 0.12 1.17 9.90 
RIS7 60.43 26.28 27.00 2_54 0.44 0.45 0.04 1.03 0.10 0.09 
SC87 0-25 12.11 038 0.19 47.86 1.49 0.77 0.03 0.02 0.51 
SDS7 0.53 336.45 0.96 93.41 640.07 1.82 177.71 0.00 0.28 97.47 
TN87 0.86 24.89 2.08 1 1.59 28.96 2.42 1.85 0.08 0.06 0.76 
TXS7 2.61 336.03 533 633 128.61 2.00 2.42 0.02 0.02 i 1.21 
UTS 7 0.21 19.45 0.85 031 93.95 4.11 130 0.04 0.02 037 
VAST 133.24 84.91 8739 93.40 0.64 0.66 0.70 1.03 1.10 1.07 
VT87 431 1131 0.76 0.18 2.63 0.18 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.24 
WA87 45.13 118.46 20.16 1.90 2.63 0.45 0.04 0.17 0.02 0.09 
W1S7 0.62 1.83 1.13 0.18 2.96 1.83 0.29 0.62 0.10 0.16 
wvs7 2.70 2136 5.49 93.07 7.92 2.04 3431 0.26 436 16.95 
WYI7 3.22 336.09 4.99 5.83 104.48 135 1.81 0.02 0.02 1.17 
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Table 5.22 States 1982: Input Price Ratios and Efficiency Scores 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Price-Ratios Derived from Limit Price Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU *Jh 7,/r, vjvt hi*j hi** hlh 6 E 
AK82 0.86 0.11 37.43 0.12 43.70 354.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AL82 2.10 0.15 0.19 0.07 0.09 1.26 1.00 1.14 0.88 
AR82 0.26 0.03 11.39 0.12 43.64 354.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AZ82 2.10 0.64 0.08 0.30 0.04 0.12 0.99 1.13 0.88 
CA82 0.86 0.60 37.41 0.70 43.66 62.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 
C082 0.61 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.09 5.09 0.89 1.02 0.87 
CT82 0.86 0.11 37.40 0.12 43.65 354.32 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DC82 2.10 0.46 0.06 0.22 0.03 0.12 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DE82 0.86 0.11 37.43 0.12 43.69 354.64 1.00 1.00 1.00 
FL82 0.26 0.03 11.39 0.12 43.64 354.18 1.00 1.00 1.00 
GA82 2.10 0.04 14.26 0.02 6.78 354.25 0.98 1.00 0.98 
HI82 2.10 0.04 13.42 0.02 6.38 354.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ID82 0.93 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 3.34 0.96 1.14 0.85 
IL82 0.26 10.89 1.34 41.71 5.13 0.12 0.91 1.00 0.91 
IN82 2.10 66.44 37.41 31.59 17.79 0.56 0.97 1.00 0.97 
1082 0.86 0.11 37.39 0.12 43.65 354.31 1.00 1.00 1.00 
KS82 1.21 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05 2.58 0.95 1.00 0.95 
KY82 0.43 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.13 1.41 0.94 1.00 0.94 
LA82 0.86 0.11 37.40 0.12 43.65 354.31 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MA82 0.86 0.11 37.40 0.12 43.66 354.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MD82 0.89 0.46 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.12 0.88 1.00 0.88 
ME82 1.30 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 2.40 0.95 1.04 0.92 
MI82 0.26 2.58 0.32 9.87 1.21 0.12 0.88 1.01 0.87 
MN82 2.10 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.07 1.83 0.89 1.00 0.89 
M082 2.10 0.07 0.17 0.03 0.08 2.52 0.92 1.00 0.92 
MS82 0.61 0.01 3.90 0.02 6.38 354.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MT82 0.61 0.01 0.90 0.02 6.37 354.15 0.89 1.40 0.64 
NC82 2.10 0.11 37.45 0.05 17.81 354.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ND82 0.61 0.01 3.90 0.02 6.38 354.48 0.95 1.11 0.85 
NE82 0.26 0.01 4.40 0.05 16.86 354.72 0.99 1.00 0.99 
NH82 2.10 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 1.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NJ82 0.86 0.11 37.45 0.12 43.71 354.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NM82 0.75 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.08 4.18 1.00 1.07 0.93 
NV82 0.61 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.09 5.09 0.89 1.03 0.87 
NY82 0.86 0.32 37.40 0.37 43.65 117.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 
OH82 0.26 1.70 11.40 6.51 43.67 6.71 1.00 1.00 1.00 
OK82 1.85 0.03 11.78 0.02 6.39 354.67 0.87 1.04 0.83 
OR82 1.04 0.46 0.06 0.44 0.05 0.12 0.85 1.00 0.85 
PA82 2.10 36.15 4.45 17.19 2.11 0.12 0.96 1.04 0.93 
R182 0.86 0.11 37.39 0.12 43.65 354.27 1.00 1.00 1.00 
SC82 0.86 0.11 37.44 0.12 43.70 354.69 1.00 1.00 1.00 
SD82 0.79 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07 3.96 1.00 1.11 0.90 
TN82 0.26 1.86 0.23 7.14 0.88 0.12 1.00 1.00 1.00 
TX82 2.10 0.11 37.38 0.05 17.78 354.16 1.00 1.00 1.00 
UT82 1.11 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.08 4.35 1.00 1.16 0.86 
VA82k 0.73 0.01 4.66 0.02 6.39 354.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 
VT82 2.10 0.46 0.06 0.22 0.03 0.12 1.00 1.00 1.00 
WA82 1.75 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.04 2.18 0.77 1.08 0.72 
W182 0.86 46.63 37.41 54.43 43.67 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 
WV82 2.10 0.61 0.08 0.29 0.04 0.12 1.00 1.24 0.80 
WY82 0.61 0.01 3.90 0.02 6.39 354.69 1.00 1.24 0.81 
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Table 5.23 States 1987: Input Price Ratios and Efficiency Scores 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Price-Ratios Derived from Limit Price Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU V'a vi/yA v2lvA vilvA 0 <t> E 
AK87 0.60 0.01 1.54 0.01 2.57 256.98 0.90 1.00 0.90 
AL87 319.89 2206.52 1216.57 6.94 3.83 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AR87 134.82 1.35 346.77 0.01 2.57 257.23 1.00 1.03 0.98 
AZ87 317.84 2196.39 1215.56 6.91 3.82 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CA87 317.76 2192.82 1216.90 6.91 3.83 0.56 1.00 1.15 1.00 
C087 0.60 0.01 1.54 0.01 2.57 257.20 0.91 1.00 0.80 
CT87 26.19 2189.69 785.78 83.60 30.00 0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DC87 40.59 4.73 1217.10 0.12 29.98 257.07 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DE87 2.13 178.39 63.80 83.90 30.01 0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 
FL87 26.73 0.27 68.75 0.01 2.57 257.:25 1.00 1.00 1.00 
GA87 1.03 86.29 30.85 83.91 30.00 0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 
HI87 0.60 0.01 1.54 0.01 2.57 257.28 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ID87 270.26 2.70 693.75 0.01 2.57 256.81 1.00 1.13 0.88 
IL87 0.60 0.01 1.54 0.01 2.57 257.03 0.91 1.06 0.86 
IN87 40.60 4.73 1218.59 0.12 30.02 257.39 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1087 119.75 1.20 308.78 0.01 2.58 257.67 0.88 1.03 0.85 
KS87 317.80 2207.56 1217.97 6.95 3.83 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 
KY87 317.78 2191.03 1217.24 6.90 3.83 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LA87 3.68 0.43 110.17 0.12 29.98 256.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MA87 0.60 0.01 1.55 0.01 2.58 257.44 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MD87 218.61 2.19 561.42 0.01 2.57 257.77 0.93 1.01 0.92 
ME87 0.60 0.01 1.54 0.01 2.57 257.16 0.93 1.09 0.85 
MI87 317.65 2203.89 1214.82 6.94 3.82 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MN87 317.89 7.67 1218.22 0.02 3.83 158.77 0.96 1.00 0.96 
M087 119.94 1.20 308.28 0.01 2.57 257.20 0.89 1.06 0.84 
MS87 87.45 0.87 224.97 0.01 2.57 257.28 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MT87 95.38 0.95 245.32 0.01 2.57 257.23 1.00 1.38 0.72 
NC87 2.20 0.26 65.92 0.12 29.98 257.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ND87 34.45 0.34 88.56 0.01 2.57 257.08 1.00 1.06 0.95 
NE87 0.60 0.01 1.54 0.01 2.57 257.17 1.00 1.13 0.89 
NH87 40.59 4.73 1213.56 0.12 29.90 256.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NJ87 0.60 0.01 1.54 0.01 2.57 257.21 0.99 1.01 0.99 
NM87 27.94 0.28 71.90 0.01 2.57 257.41 1.00 1.34 0.75 
NV87 318.12 4.73 1215.42 0.02 3.82 256.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NY87 0.60 0.01 1.54 0.01 2.57 256.97 1.00 1.07 0.94 
OH87 17.87 13.34 7.22 0.75 0.40 0.54 0.87 1.00 0.87 
OK87 0.60 0.01 1.54 0.01 2.57 257.28 1.00 1.32 0.76 
OR87 318.01 2194.54 1217.97 6.90 3.83 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 
PA87 0.60 0.01 1.54 0.01 2.57 257.31 0.98 1.19 0.83 
RI87 40.60 4.74 1220.32 0.12 30.06 257.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 
SC87 0.60 0.01 1.55 0.01 2.57 257.43 0.99 1.07 0.92 
SD87 90.35 0.90 232.44 0.01 2.57 257.27 1.00 1.00 1.00 
TN87 66.14 0.66 169.89 0.01 2.57 256.85 0.98 1.08 0.91 
TX87 0.60 0.01 1.55 0.01 2.58 257.48 1.00 1.13 0.89 
UT87 66.81 0.67 172.00 0.01 2.57 257.44 1.00 1.24 0.81 
VA87 317.62 3.18 817.28 0.01 2.57 257.13 1.00 1.00 1.00 
VT87 40.59 2187.76 1219.62 53.90 30.05 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 
WA87 317.69 53.54 1218.70 0.17 3.84 22.76 0.86 1.00 0.86 
W187 317.80 10.05 1215.25 0.03 3.82 120.92 0.94 1.02 0.92 
WV87 0.60 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.40 40.40 0.95 1.34 0.71 
WY87 0.60 0.01 1.54 0.01 2.57 257.03 0.97 1.36 0.71 
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Table 5.24 States Study: Limit-Value-Ratio Ranges 
1982 1987 
MIN MAX MIN MAX 
vjv2 0.41 0.74 0.02 1.19 
X,/Kj 0.40 52.18 1.51 3.33 
vjvt 0.26 31.18 0.56 1.56 
Vj/Vj 0.97 99.66 2.26 83.92 
p2/v4 0.64 59.65 1.14 30.00 
I'J/"4 0.37 0.74 0.24 0.77 
bJbi 0.18 0.37 0.11 0.42 
bJbi 0.07 0.61 0.12 0.76 
bJb* 0.17 1.86 0.17 2.17 
b Jbi 0.37 1.79 0.54 2.47 
bi* bi 0.28 2.09 0.39 3.34 
bt>b* 0.71 5.56 0.75 10.18 
bJbi 1.11 6.78 2.27 11.93 
bJb* 0.74 19.90 1.21 12.56 
bi/bi 2.43 10.74 2.17 16.78 
bJbi 0.20 6.60 0.31 13.92 
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Table 5.25 States 1982: Total Waste and Substitutions 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Value-Ratios Derived from Limit Value Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 
AK82 25.91 10.46 2.58 2.21 -0.39 -2.21 10.63 0.47 1.05 
AL82 0.59 0.39 0.86 0.35 0.07 -0.07 4.93 -0.35 0.30 
AR82 1.37 0.79 0.38 0.50 0.07 -0.52 5.05 0.40 0.24 
AZ82 1.71 0.99 1.35 -0.04 0.09 -0.44 8.19 -0.03 0.67 
CA82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C082 1.17 0.64 1.51 0.39 -0.08 -0.50 7.18 0.06 0.48 
CT82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DC82 19.64 8.55 2.00 -0.75 -0.05 -1.72 10.88 0.55 1.30 
DE82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FL82 0.22 0.11 -0.11 -0.03 -0.06 -0.34 9.01 0.85 0.50 
GA82 0.25 0.14 0.36 0.50 -0.06 -0.25 4.37 0.20 0.17 
HI82 13.65 7.00 -1.28 2.20 0.27 -0.89 11.20 0.70 1.17 
ID82 6.36 3.54 0.16 1.40 0.52 -0.50 8.69 0.60 0.70 
IL82 0.05 0.01 1.53 0.29 -0.06 -0.20 0.77 0.27 0.21 
IN82 0.16 0.03 3.75 0.20 -0.10 -0.83 2.60 -0.30 0.23 
1082 0.93 0.26 2.39 1.24 0.17 -1.92 6.13 0.02 0.74 
KS82 1.48 0.65 1.93 1.46 -0.12 -1.30 6.26 0.37 0.46 
KY82 0.80 0.33 1.62 0.81 0.21 -1.11 6.72 -0.67 0.92 
LA82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MA82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MD82 0.74 0.37 1.36 0.46 0.05 -0.53 8.00 0.01 1.12 
ME82 2.67 1.79 0.92 -0.20 -0.03 -0.10 3.58 0.00 -0.09 
MI82 0.10 0.03 3.68 0.56 0.03 -0.25 0.80 -0.18 0.15 
MN82 0.29 0.10 1.21 0.68 0.13 -0.63 5.00 0.09 0.35 
M082 0.21 0.04 1.16 0.75 0.13 -0.79 5.22 0.11 0.50 
MS82 1.26 0.78 0.07 0.30 0.13 -0.31 5.41 -1.20 0.46 
MT82 16.08 11.27 1.26 3.50 0.44 0.33 11.05 0.90 0.79 
NC82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ND82 22.61 12.60 1.30 1.80 -0.12 -0.84 11.07 0.80 0.81 
NE82 3.01 1.42 -0.04 2.23 0.25 -1.07 7.78 0.46 0.85 
NH82 2.48 1.65 -0.70 -0.18 0.14 0.05 2.15 0.66 -0.08 
NJ82 0.06 0.00 1.65 -0.05 -0.41 -0.46 2.33 0.99 -0.32 
NM82 9.65 5.57 -0.83 1.49 0.34 -0.47 11.06 0.88 1.11 
NV82 15.95 9.26 0.12 0.39 0.14 -0.40 11.20 0.80 1.12 
NY82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OH82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OK82 1.27 0.72 2.07 1.00 -0.16 -0.54 7.21 0.41 0.43 
OR82 1.04 0.54 1.26 0.90 0.39 -0.45 6.63 0.50 0.02 
PA82 0.01 0.01 1.06 0.07 0.01 0.43 0.33 0.19 0.33 
RI82 2.57 1.92 0.14 -0.60 -0.19 0.24 1.33 1.90 -1.32 
SC82 0.50 0.39 0.31 0.00 0.06 0.24 1.86 -1.10 0.37 
SD82 13.12 7.13 -0.52 1.70 0.50 -0.63 10.03 0.80 1.06 
TN82 0.24 0.14 0.40 0.18 0.10 -0.24 3.43 -0.87 0.39 
TX82 0.03 -0.01 -1.58 1.42 -0.05 -0.53 3.18 -1.58 0.29 
UT82 3.66 2.13 1.55 0.52 0.04 -0.58 7.94 0.78 0.43 
VA82 0.28 0.10 0.35 0.13 -0.01 -0.72 6.26 -0.58 0.87 
VT82 6.86 3.83 1.18 -1.10 -0.08 -0.78 4.29 0.00 -0.44 
WA82 0.47 0.22 3.10 1.82 0.10 -0.55 6.67 0.26 0.42 
WI82 0.16 0.02 2.58 0.26 -0.04 -0.90 2.89 0.46 -0.03 
WV82 3.02 1.72 3.01 0.50 0.18 -0.57 8.48 -0.17 0.97 
WY82 33.79 20.19 0.96 3.11 0.02 -0.37 11.51 0.95 0.96 
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Table 5.26 States 1987: Total Waste and Substitutions 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model:Limit-Value-Ratios Derived from Limit Value Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 
AK87 1.94 4.18 1.40 3.40 -0.04 -0.45 8.21 -0.10 1.40 
AL87 -0.05 0.46 0.82 0.30 0.13 0.30 4.59 -4.40 1.20 
AR87 -0.46 1.76 -0.92 1.54 0.43 1.27 3.12 -0.49 0.54 
AZ87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CA87 -0.41 1.92 0.51 1.20 0.03 0.87 2.64 -0.20 0.40 
C087 0.53 1.66 1.13 1.30 0.24 0.74 4.70 -0.20 0.78 
CT87 1.36 1.62 2.15 -0.49 -0.63 0.38 0.14 0.39 -0.22 
DC87 -0.09 0.84 1.11 -0.90 -0.15 -1.95 7.53 0.60 1.42 
DE87 0.42 0.49 3.04 1.70 -0.17 0.24 1.93 -1.62 0.80 
FL87 -0.81 1.36 -1.57 1.50 0.25 1.61 6.12 0.30 0.91 
GA87 -0.91 0.25 -0.67 1.51 0.22 0.72 2.10 -0.81 0.58 
HI87 0.77 2.81 -1.29 2.30 0.25 0.83 8.23 0.50 1.27 
ID87 -0.88 1.68 -0.43 2.10 0.63 1.42 5.00 -0.10 0.71 
IL87 0.96 2.34 0.92 1.54 0.15 0.69 1.87 -0.85 0.60 
IN87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1087 0.42 3.21 0.89 2.30 0.41 0.18 2.97 -0.80 0.95 
KS87 -0.88 1.42 0.58 2.30 0.30 0.38 2.64 -1.60 0.89 
KY87 -0.12 1.41 0.46 2.10 0.61 0.03 3.50 -3.20 1.22 
LA87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MA87 1.14 1.86 0.64 0.35 -0.25 0.66 1.07 -0.14 0.18 
MD87 0.22 2.08 0.80 1.40 -0.01 1.13 5.17 -0.60 1.27 
ME87 1.15 2.14 0.47 0.81 0.19 1.29 3.03 -0.45 0.15 
MI87 -0.68 0.85 4.29 1.51 0.00 0.19 1.12 -0.87 0.21 
MN87 -0.48 1.33 0.78 1.35 0.15 0.72 1.95 -0.80 0.45 
M087 -0.20 1.92 0.39 2.05 0.33 0.96 2.18 -0.66 0.76 
MS87 -0.52 1.89 -1.32 1.35 0.54 1.64 3.34 0.20 0.70 
MT87 0.14 1.28 0.20 3.20 0.58 1.66 7.79 0.70 0.68 
NC87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ND87 -0.30 1.50 -1.22 2.70 0.53 0.81 7.97 0.70 1.28 
NE87 0.23 2.59 -0.61 2.70 0.40 0.80 4.64 -0.20 1.04 
NH87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NJ87 1.11 2.32 0.71 1.28 -0.23 0.99 1.39 -0.08 0.23 
NM87 -0.37 3.01 -0.93 2.30 0.62 2.24 7.96 0.00 1.33 
NV87 -1.30 4.17 -0.38 1.30 0.17 3.30 7.91 0.40 1.24 
NY87 1.26 2.81 0.16 1.00 0.01 0.97 3.15 0.10 0.55 
OH87 0.29 1.51 2.67 1.39 0.19 0.14 1.01 -0.90 0.42 
OK87 2.77 3.16 0.52 2.40 0.55 0.88 5.50 0.00 1.06 
OR87 -0.82 1.78 0.27 1.90 0.42 1.54 2.79 0.30 -0.12 
PA87 1.60 2.42 0.67 1.23 0.17 1.24 3.32 -0.10 0.59 
RI87 0.74 1.75 0.28 -0.30 -0.23 1.23 1.85 1.80 -1.21 
SC87 0.44 0.42 0.15 0.39 0.16 0.53 2.20 -0.87 0.41 
SD87 -0.94 2.33 -2.03 2.60 0.57 1.81 6.42 0.50 1.14 
TN87 -0.13 0.92 -0.01 0.80 0.23 0.67 2.02 -0.58 0.50 
TX87 1.69 3.23 0.07 2.50 0.42 0.21 4.83 -0.70 1.00 
UT87 -0.61 1.99 -0.75 1.70 0.66 1.78 4.94 -0.40 0.97 
VA87 -0.76 1.24 -0.55 1.30 0.15 0.86 3.04 -1.00 1.17 
VT87 -0.04 2.39 0.49 0.17 0.12 1.09 2.99 -0.53 -0.38 
WA87 -0.51 1.87 1.95 2.60 0.25 1.40 3.44 -0.10 0.53 
WI87 -0.03 1.65 1.80 1.23 0.13 0.37 0.89 -0.16 0.08 
WV87 1.58 2.35 1.32 1.60 0.71 0.71 5.88 -0.70 1.36 
WY87 2.78 3.27 1.00 4.10 0.53 0.99 8.68 0.20 1.19 
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Table 5.27 States 1982: Efficiency Prices 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Value-Ratios Derived from Limit Value Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 
AK82 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.02 
AL82 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.02 
AR82 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.02 
AZ82 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.02 
CA82 1.47 2.81 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.01 
C082 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.02 
CT82 0.47 0.90 0.01 0.02 0.21 0.80 0.38 0.14 0.12 
DC82 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.02 
DE82 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.55 0.57 0.77 0.12 
FL82 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.03 
GA82 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.02 
HI82 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.02 
ID82 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.03 
IL82 0.24 0.59 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.02 
IN 82 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.01 
1082 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.01 
KS82 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.02 
KY82 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.01 
LA82 0.25 0.61 0.01 0.01 0.27 1.51 0.72 0.98 0.22 
MA82 0.07 0.18 0.10 0.28 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.01 
MD82 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.02 
ME82 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.02 
M182 0.26 0.63 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.01 
MN82 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.02 
M082 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.01 
MS82 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.01 
MT82 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.03 0.04 
NC82 0.75 1.44 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.01 
ND82 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.02 
NE82 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.02 
NH82 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.02 
NJ82 0.23 0.57 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.02 
NM82 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.03 
NV82 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.03 
NY82 0.28 0.68 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.02 
OH82 0.75 1.82 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.02 
OK82 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.02 
OR82 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.02 
PA82 0.86 1.16 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.01 
RI82 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.03 
SC82 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.01 
SD82 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.02 
TN82 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.01 
TX82 0.54 1.33 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.21 0.10 0.14 0.03 
UT82 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.02 
VA82 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.01 
VT82 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.02 
WA82 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.02 
W182 0.08 0.20 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.02 
WV82 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.02 
WY82 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.03 
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Table 5.28 States 1987: Efficiency Prices 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Value-Ratios Derived from Limit Value Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 
AK87 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01 
AL87 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00 
AR87 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.01 
AZ87 0.37 0.31 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.01 
CA87 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.01 
C087 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01 
CT87 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.02 
DC87 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.01 
DE87 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.01 
FL87 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.01 
GA87 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.01 
HI87 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.01 
ID87 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.01 
IL87 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.01 
IN87 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.68 0.29 0.24 0.06 
1087 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.01 
KS87 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.01 
KY87 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.01 
LA87 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.27 0.08 0.07 0.02 
MA87 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.01 
MD87 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.01 
ME87 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.02 
MI87 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.01 
MN87 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.01 
M087 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.01 
MS87 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.01 
MT87 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.02 
NC87 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00 
ND87 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.01 
NE87 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01 
NH87 0.06 1.45 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 
NJ87 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.01 
NM87 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.04 0.01 
NV87 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.05 0.02 
NY87 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01 
OH87 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.01 
OK87 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.01 
OR87 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.02 
PA87 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.01 
RI87 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.03 
SC87 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.01 
SD87 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.01 
TN87 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.01 
TX87 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01 
UT87 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.01 
VA87 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01 
VT87 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.02 
WA87 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01 
WI87 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.02 
WV87 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.01 
WY87 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.01 
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Table 5.29 States 1982: Output Price Ratios 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Value-Ratios Derived from Limit Value Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU nJth. M1V3 M1V4 M2/M5 M3/M4 nJn5 
AK82 0.29 0.61 0.55 1.79 2.09 1.88 6.13 0.90 2.93 3.26 
AL82 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.79 2.09 1.55 6.13 0.74 2.93 3.97 
AR82 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.48 2.09 1.55 5.08 0.74 2.43 3.28 
AZ82 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.79 2.09 1.55 6.13 0.74 2.93 3.97 
CA82 0.37 0.37 0.27 1.79 0.99 0.73 4.84 0.74 4.88 6.60 
C082 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.48 2.09 1.55 5.08 0.74 2.43 3.28 
CT82 0.26 0.55 1.47 1.79 2.09 5.56 6.78 2.66 3.24 1.22 
DC82 0.29 0.61 0.58 1.79 2.09 1.99 6.13 0.95 2.93 3.09 
DE82 0.37 0.35 0.26 1.73 0.96 0.71 4.69 0.74 4.88 6.60 
FL82 0.29 0.61 0.92 1.48 2.09 3.16 5.08 1.51 2.43 1.61 
GA82 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.48 2.09 1.55 5.08 0.74 2.43 3.28 
HI82 0.29 0.61 1.62 1.79 2.09 5.56 6.13 2.66 2.93 1.10 
ID82 0.18 0.38 1.00 0.91 2.09 5.56 5.08 2.66 2.43 0.91 
IL82 0.26 0.55 1.47 1.79 2.09 5.56 6.78 2.66 3.24 1.22 
IN 82 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.79 2.09 1.55 6.13 0.74 2.93 3.97 
1082 0.18 0.38 0.28 1.22 2.09 1.55 6.78 0.74 3.24 4.38 
KS82 0.29 0.61 0.96 1.79 2.09 3.28 6.13 1.57 2.93 1.87 
KY82 0.18 0.38 0.28 1.22 2.09 1.55 6.78 0.74 3.24 4.38 
LA82 0.18 0.38 0.28 1.22 2.09 1.55 6.78 0.74 3.24 4.38 
MA82 0.26 0.37 0.27 1.79 1.39 1.03 6.78 0.74 4.88 6.60 
MD82 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.79 2.09 1.55 6.13 0.74 2.93 3.97 
ME82 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.48 2.09 1.55 5.08 0.74 2.43 3.28 
MI82 0.18 0.38 0.28 1.22 2.09 1.55 6.78 0.74 3.24 4.38 
MN82 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.79 2.09 1.55 6.13 0.74 2.93 3.97 
M082 0.26 0.55 0.41 1.79 2.09 1.55 6.78 0.74 3.24 4.38 
MS82 0.18 0.38 0.28 1.22 2.09 1.55 6.78 0.74 3.24 4.38 
MT82 0.29 0.61 1.62 1.48 2.09 5.56 5.08 2.66 2.43 0.91 
NC82 0.25 0.07 1.39 0.75 0.28 5.56 3.01 19.86 10.74 0.54 
ND82 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.79 2.09 1.55 6.13 0.74 2.93 3.97 
NE82 0.26 0.55 1.06 1.79 2.09 4.03 6.78 1.93 3.24 1.68 
NH82 0.25 0.52 1.39 1.27 2.09 5.56 5.08 2.66 2.43 0.91 
NJ82 0.29 0.61 1.62 1.48 2.09 5.56 5.08 2.66 2.43 0.91 
NM82 0.29 0.61 0.58 1.79 2.09 1.99 6.13 0.95 2.93 3.09 
NV82 0.29 0.61 0.54 1.79 2.09 1.85 6.13 0.89 2.93 3.32 
NY82 0.29 0.61 1.62 1.48 2.09 5.56 5.08 2.66 2.43 0.91 
OH82 0.24 0.18 0.17 1.12 0.77 0.71 4.69 0.93 6.11 6.60 
OK82 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.48 2.09 1.55 5.08 0.74 2.43 3.28 
OR82 0.18 0.38 1.00 0.91 2.09 5.56 5.08 2.66 2.43 0.91 
PA82 0.33 0.09 1.86 1.01 0.28 5.56 3.01 19.86 10.74 0.54 
RI82 0.34 0.15 1.86 0.37 0.46 5.55 1.11 12.15 2.43 0.20 
SC82 0.24 0.23 0.17 1.12 0.96 0.71 4.69 0.74 4.88 6.60 
SD82 0.26 0.55 1.47 1.79 2.09 5.56 6.78 2.66 3.24 1.22 
TN82 0.18 0.38 0.28 1.22 2.09 1.55 6.78 0.74 3.24 4.38 
TX82 0.26 0.55 0.41 1.79 2.09 1.55 6.78 0.74 3.24 4.38 
UT82 0.29 0.61 0.73 1.48 2.09 2.52 5.08 1.20 2.43 2.02 
VA82 0.26 0.55 0.41 1.79 2.09 1.55 6.78 0.74 3.24 4.38 
VT82 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.48 2.09 1.55 5.08 0.74 2.43 3.28 
WA82 0.29 0.61 0.45 1.48 2.09 1.55 5.08 0.74 2.43 3.28 
WI82 0.29 0.61 1.62 1.48 2.09 5.56 5.08 2.66 2.43 0.91 
WV82 0.26 0.55 0.41 1.79 2.09 1.55 6.78 0.74 3.24 4.38 
WY82 0.29 0.61 0.47 1.79 2.09 1.61 6.13 0.77 2.93 3.80 
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Table 5.30 States 1987: Output Price Ratios 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Value-Ratios Derived from Limit Value Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU n\ln2 /xl//x3 Iil/n4 M1/m5 \xlly2 M2//x4 /i3/M4 /u3/^t5 M4/ji5 
AK87 0.21 0.69 0.84 2.47 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
AL87 0.20 0.14 0.17 2.36 0.71 0.86 11.93 1.21 16.78 13.87 
AR87 0.11 0.20 0.24 1.31 1.77 2.15 11.93 1.21 6.73 5.56 
AZ87 0.23 0.37 0.45 1.31 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
CA87 0.21 0.76 0.92 2.47 3.34 4.04 10.86 1.21 3.25 2.69 
C087 0.42 0.69 0.84 2.47 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
CT87 0.21 0.25 2.17 0.95 0.59 5.17 2.27 8.83 3.88 0.44 
DC87 0.21 0.69 2.11 2.47 3.34 10.18 11.93 3.05 3.57 1.17 
DE87 0.23 0.32 0.39 2.47 1.54 1.87 11.93 1.21 7.74 6.40 
FL87 0.11 0.76 0.92 2.47 3.34 4.04 10.86 1.21 3.25 2.69 
GA87 0.23 0.19 0.23 1.31 1.17 2.06 11.93 1.21 7.02 5.80 
HI87 0.11 0.76 2.17 2.47 3.34 9.54 10.86 2.86 3.25 1.14 
ID87 0.21 0.37 0.45 1.31 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
IL87 0.21 0.36 0.44 2.47 1.75 2.12 11.93 1.21 6.80 5.62 
IN 87 0.11 0.48 0.59 2.47 2.34 2.83 11.93 1.21 5.11 4.22 
1087 0.11 0.37 0.45 1.31 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
KS87 0.11 0.37 0.45 1.31 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
KY87 0.11 0.37 0.45 1.31 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
LA87 0.11 0.37 0.45 1.31 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
MA87 0.42 0.63 0.76 2.47 1.49 1.81 5.88 1.21 3.94 2.95 
MD87 0.23 0.76 0.92 2.47 3.34 4.04 10.86 1.21 3.25 3.26 
ME87 0.42 0.64 0.77 1.38 1.52 1.83 3.29 1.21 2.17 2.69 
MI87 0.21 0.31 0.38 2.47 1.51 1.83 11.93 1.21 7.90 1.79 
MN87 0.21 0.35 0.42 2.47 1.68 2.03 11.93 1.21 7.10 6.53 
M087 0.11 0.20 0.24 1.31 1.78 2.15 11.93 1.21 6.70 5.87 
MS87 0.11 0.20 0.24 1.31 1.80 2.18 11.93 1.21 6.63 5.54 
MT87 0.23 0.76 2.17 1.65 3.34 9.54 7.25 2.86 2.17 0.76 
NC87 0.24 0.15 0.18 2.47 0.62 0.75 10.40 1.21 16.78 13.87 
ND87 0.21 0.69 2.11 2.47 3.34 10.18 11.93 3.05 3.57 1.17 
NE87 0.11 0.37 0.45 1.31 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
NH87 0.21 0.69 2.11 2.47 3.34 10.18 11.93 3.05 3.57 1.17 
NJ87 0.42 0.65 0.78 2.47 1.54 1.87 5.88 1.21 3.81 3.15 
NM87 0.23 0.76 0.92 2.47 3.34 4.04 10.86 1.21 3.25 2.69 
NV87 0.23 0.76 0.92 2.47 3.34 4.04 10.86 1.21 3.25 2.69 
NY87 0.23 0.76 0.92 2.47 3.34 4.04 10.86 1.21 3.25 2.69 
OH87 0.11 0.19 0.23 1.31 1.74 2.11 11.93 1.21 6.85 5.66 
OK87 0.11 0.37 0.45 1.31 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
OR87 0.11 0.37 0.45 0.80 3.34 4.04 7.25 1.21 2.17 1.79 
PA87 0.42 0.67 0.81 2.47 1.59 1.92 5.88 1.21 3.70 3.06 
RI87 0.30 0.31 2.17 0.67 1.05 7.32 2.27 7.00 2.17 0.31 
SC87 0.11 0.14 0.17 1.31 1.30 1.57 11.93 1.21 9.18 7.58 
SD87 0.21 0.69 0.84 2.47 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
TN87 0.11 0.19 0.23 1.31 1.70 2.06 11.93 1.21 7.01 5.79 
TX87 0.11 0.37 0.45 1.31 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
UT87 0.11 0.37 0.45 1.31 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
VA87 0.21 0.69 0.84 2.47 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
VT87 0.42 0.61 0.74 1.32 1.45 1.76 3.15 1.21 2.17 1.79 
WA87 0.23 0.76 0.92 2.47 3.34 4.04 10.86 1.21 3.25 2.69 
WI87 0.15 0.25 0.30 0.54 1.62 1.96 3.52 1.21 2.17 1.79 
WV87 0.11 0.37 0.45 1.31 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
WY87 0.21 0.69 0.84 2.47 3.34 4.04 11.93 1.21 3.57 2.95 
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Table 5.31 States 1982: Input Price Ratios and Efficiency Scores 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Value-Ratios Derived from Limit Value Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU v,/r2 I'j/i'j vJvA vjvt hi** vjvt e E 
AK82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.38 1.36 0.28 
AL82 0.41 0.63 0.26 1.54 0.64 0.41 0.89 1.21 0.73 
AR82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.86 1.22 0.71 
AZ82 0.41 0.62 0.26 1.51 0.64 0.42 0.84 1.42 0.59 
CA82 0.52 52.18 31.18 99.66 59.55 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 
C082 0.41 0.61 0.26 1.49 0.64 0.43 0.83 1.33 0.62 
CT82 0.52 42.13 31.18 80.47 59.55 0.74 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DC82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.98 0.64 0.66 0.49 1.50 0.33 
DE82 0.52 42.14 31.19 80.48 59.56 0.74 1.00 1.00 1.00 
FL82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 1.00 1.61 0.62 
GA82 0.41 0.40 0.30 0.97 0.72 0.74 0.92 1.20 0.77 
HI82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.53 1.74 0.31 
ID82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.66 1.55 0.43 
IL82 0.41 7.42 2.74 18.09 6.69 0.37 0.91 1.02 0.89 
IN82 0.41 0.95 0.35 2.31 0.86 0.37 0.83 1.02 0.82 
1082 0.41 0.69 0.26 1.67 0.64 0.38 0.77 1.11 0.69 
KS82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.98 0.64 0.66 0.75 1.19 0.62 
KY82 0.41 0.69 0.26 1.67 0.64 0.38 0.82 1.18 0.69 
LA82 0.41 40.86 24.42 99.65 59.55 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MA82 0.41 0.71 0.26 1.73 0.64 0.37 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MD82 0.41 0.62 0.26 1.52 0.64 0.42 0.86 1.41 0.61 
ME82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.98 0.64 0.66 0.82 1.15 0.71 
MI82 0.41 9.29 3.44 22.67 8.39 0.37 0.81 1.00 0.81 
MN82 0.41 0.63 0.26 1.54 0.64 0.41 0.87 1.19 0.73 
M082 0.41 0.65 0.26 1.59 0.64 0.40 0.87 1.19 0.73 
MS82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.90 1.15 0.78 
MT82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.41 2.12 0.19 
NC82 0.52 42.13 31.18 80.47 59.55 0.74 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ND82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.38 1.72 0.22 
NE82 0.41 0.40 0.30 0.97 0.72 0.74 0.74 1.35 0.54 
NH82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.91 1.12 0.81 
NJ82 0.41 7.34 2.71 17.89 6.62 0.37 0.94 1.06 0.88 
NM82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.60 1.88 0.32 
NV82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.50 1.88 0.27 
NY82 0.41 5.95 2.20 14.50 5.37 0.37 1.00 1.00 1.00 
OH82 0.41 40.86 15.12 99.66 36.87 0.37 1.00 1.00 1.00 
OK82 0.41 0.60 0.26 1.47 0.64 0.44 0.77 1.36 0.56 
OR82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.82 1.34 0.61 
PA82 0.74 38.47 14.23 51.98 19.23 0.37 0.95 1.04 0.91 
RI82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.98 0.64 0.66 0.88 1.07 0.82 
SC82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.98 0.64 0.66 0.95 1.03 0.91 
SD82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.53 1.68 0.32 
TN82 0.41 0.69 0.26 1.67 0.64 0.38 0.95 1.08 0.87 
TX82 0.41 15.88 11.75 38.73 28.66 0.74 0.98 1.00 0.98 
UT82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.98 0.64 0.66 0.73 1.46 0.50 
VA82 k 0.41 0.65 0.26 1.59 0.64 0.40 0.95 1.20 0.79 
VT82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.98 0.64 0.66 0.72 1.11 0.65 
WA82 0.41 0.60 0.26 1.46 0.64 0.44 0.72 1.31 0.55 
WI82 0.41 2.27 0.84 5.54 2.05 0.37 0.87 1.05 0.82 
WV82 0.41 0.63 0.26 1.54 0.64 0.42 0.70 1.42 0.50 
WY82 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.97 0.64 0.66 0.29 1.95 0.15 
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Table 5.32 States 1987: Input Price Ratios and Efficiency Scores 
VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model: Limit-Value-Ratios Derived from Limit Value Ratios 
of Units Efficient under Global Orientation and Invariant Pricing Evaluation 
DMU v\hl 9\b3 rl/i>4 92/93 92b A 93 bA 0 <t> E 
AK87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.58 1.23 0.47 
AL87 1.19 3.33 1.36 2.80 1.14 0.41 0.94 1.07 0.88 
AR87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.87 1.25 0.70 
AZ87 1.19 3.33 1.56 2.80 1.31 0.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CA87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.84 1.17 0.71 
C087 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.78 1.25 0.62 
CT87 0.49 1.51 0.56 3.07 1.14 0.37 0.79 1.01 0.79 
DC87 0.70 3.33 0.80 4.75 1.14 0.24 0.98 1.04 0.94 
DE87 1.19 3.33 1.56 2.80 1.31 0.47 0.79 1.04 0.76 
FL87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.94 1.48 0.64 
GA87 0.90 2.03 1.56 2.26 1.74 0.77 1.00 1.13 0.89 
HI87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.73 1.47 0.50 
ID87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.87 1.38 0.63 
IL87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.72 1.11 0.65 
IN87 0.67 1.51 1.16 2.26 1.74 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1087 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.69 1.10 0.63 
KS87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.85 1.09 0.78 
KY87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.81 1.04 0.78 
LA87 0.67 1.51 1.16 2.26 1.74 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MA87 1.19 2.69 1.36 2.26 1.14 0.50 0.78 1.08 0.73 
MD87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.78 1.31 0.60 
ME87 1.19 2.69 1.36 2.26 1.14 0.50 0.76 1.24 0.61 
MI87 1.19 3.33 1.56 2.80 1.31 0.47 0.82 1.03 0.80 
MN87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.86 1.12 0.77 
M087 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.79 1.16 0.68 
MS87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.89 1.35 0.66 
MT87 0.90 2.03 1.56 2.26 1.74 0.77 0.77 1.63 0.47 
NC87 0.90 2.03 1.56 2.26 1.74 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ND87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.83 1.46 0.57 
NE87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.74 1.26 0.59 
NH87 0.04 1.51 1.16 38.96 30.00 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NJ87 1.19 2.69 1.36 2.26 1.14 0.50 0.73 1.13 0.65 
NM87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.77 1.77 0.44 
NV87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.79 2.10 0.38 
NY87 1.19 2.69 1.36 2.26 1.14 0.50 0.72 1.22 0.59 
OH87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.77 1.03 0.74 
OK87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.61 1.32 0.46 
OR87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.85 1.29 0.66 
PA87 1.19 2.69 1.36 2.26 1.14 0.50 0.71 1.22 0.58 
R187 1.19 2.69 1.36 2.26 1.14 0.50 0.85 1.16 0.74 
SC87 0.67 1.51 0.76 2.26 1.14 0.50 0.91 1.11 0.83 
SD87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.85 1.57 0.54 
TN87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.91 1.13 0.81 
TX87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.65 1.17 0.55 
UT87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.86 1.43 0.60 
VA87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.92 1.17 0.79 
VT87 1.19 2.69 1.36 2.26 1.14 0.50 0.84 1.20 0.70 
WA87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.76 1.29 0.59 
W187 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.80 1.06 0.76 
WV87 1.19 2.69 1.36 2.26 1.14 0.50 0.69 1.29 0.53 
WY87 1.19 2.69 1.56 2.26 1.31 0.58 0.67 1.52 0.37 
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Table 5.33 SIC367 Total Waste 1982 Data 
VRS Envelopment/ Global Orientation/ Invariant Pricing 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Input 5 Input 6 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
AL367 41.56 1.61 6.49 2.56 1.00 0.14 40.10 0.00 32.00 
AZ367 7.92 29.52 144.18 4.03 3.00 4.33 181.31 0.00 7.54 
CA367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C0367 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.60 0.77 0.03 125.32 124.83 125.32 
CT367 21.10 24.40 31.63 7.23 3.25 1.40 80.31 0.00 24.28 
FL367 0.00 45.46 28.55 9.83 4.89 2.00 99.99 0.00 25.98 
GA367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IL367 79.50 11.62 23.70 9.00 4.78 1.84 102.67 0.00 67.36 
IN367 67.39 36.33 13.30 6.15 3.32 0.84 116.57 0.00 66.94 
10367 0.00 1.79 0.00 0.33 0.09 0.17 37.82 35.65 36.03 
KS367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MA367 0.00 83.15 12.96 15.72 8.04 1.45 96.11 7.50 0.00 
MD367 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.01 52.86 52.15 52.72 
ME367 0.00 6.66 1.36 2.27 1.14 0.09 8.02 7.83 0.00 
MI367 0.00 0.00 4.65 0.37 0.15 0.19 19.15 14.98 14.50 
MN367 0.00 21.47 1.43 4.20 2.15 0.21 146.97 117.67 124.07 
M0367 12.09 44.30 19.05 2.25 1.39 0.46 84.15 0.00 20.80 
NC367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NE367 4.81 0.00 0.88 1.11 0.48 0.36 32.29 26.62 31.41 
NH367 0.00 18.86 10.66 4.92 2.80 0.57 76.17 46.40 46.65 
NJ367 29.36 41.16 48.13 8.63 4.64 2.02 126.21 0.00 36.92 
NM367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NY367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OH367 20.89 30.98 20.32 4.25 2.26 1.02 74.30 0.00 23.00 
OK367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OR367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PA367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RI367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.37 0.37 35.65 32.23 35.65 
SC367 14.00 25.00 17.20 5.70 2.60 1.10 162.20 111.30 120.00 
TN367 0.00 0.00 1.55 0.11 0.17 0.00 52.85 53.69 51.31 
TX367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
UT367 0.00 7.09 4.07 1.46 0.92 0.00 108.99 97.86 97.83 
VA367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WA367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 5.34 Industry Study: Limit-Value-Ratio Ranges 
1982 
MIN MAX 
vxlv2 0.106 0.686 
0.145 1.474 
vJva 0.015 0.118 
V\/v$ 0.008 0.059 
V\lv6 0.006 0.059 
V2/p3 0.501 1.887 
v2lvA 0.109 0.180 
v2lv5 0.059 0.092 
V2lv6 0.021 0.097 
v3/v^ 0.058 0.338 
P3/P5 0.030 0.182 
0.032 0.055 
vjvs 0.497 0.568 
vjv6 0.162 0.690 
vjv6 0.214 1.318 
Ml/^2 0.227 0.591 
Mi/a* 3 0.446 0.743 
1.145 2.053 
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Table 5.35 SIC367 Total Waste and Substitution/ Frontier Model 
Limit-Value-Ratios derived from Limit Value Ratios of DEA-Efficient Units 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Input 5 Input 6 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
AL367 12.67 -9.84 0.94 1.15 0.28 -0.08 94.72 99.69 103.63 
AZ367 -33.23 -12.79 67.14 -2.27 0.14 1.40 298.42 278.68 244.06 
CA367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C0367 -8.43 -4.89 -0.22 0.96 0.46 0.01 143.67 156.49 148.79 
CT367 -56.69 -1.74 -3.13 3.89 1.56 0.17 153.81 210.22 158.68 
FL367 -113.07 11.32 -11.43 5.89 2.75 0.63 190.76 275.15 190.87 
GA367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IL367 -22.47 -32.10 -10.95 4.13 2.17 0.60 193.27 271.35 236.32 
IN367 -11.12 -0.77 -9.42 2.22 1.16 0.02 184.24 207.42 194.43 
10367 -2.95 0.66 -1.78 0.19 0.02 0.10 45.55 49.10 46.67 
KS367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MA367 -166.19 14.64 -11.44 8.81 4.14 0.63 212.45 385.27 209.25 
MD367 -2.29 -0.56 -0.07 0.12 0.13 0.00 55.82 58.12 56.45 
ME367 -23.04 -0.53 -0.41 1.42 0.70 0.02 40.27 71.62 41.21 
MI367 0.00 -1.47 -0.09 0.17 0.05 0.01 32.78 34.53 34.33 
MN367 -49.38 6.18 -2.06 2.35 1.21 0.11 179.65 218.09 175.53 
M0367 18.52 50.42 17.36 2.73 1.70 0.40 80.48 -15.62 12.70 
NC367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NE367 -4.86 -3.51 -3.47 0.69 0.26 0.19 54.20 65.68 61.19 
NH367 -53.69 0.98 -1.69 2.78 1.69 0.09 170.08 222.74 170.79 
NJ367 -74.77 3.00 -3.40 3.91 2.20 0.19 229.04 294.49 229.44 
NM367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NY367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OH367 -39.06 8.10 -3.31 1.54 0.84 0.18 129.27 160.79 124.49 
OK367 -13.02 1.87 0.32 0.65 0.37 -0.04 14.87 27.35 12.68 
OR367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PA367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RI367 0.00 -3.06 -3.82 0.23 0.17 0.21 52.76 55.93 59.64 
SC367 -45.98 1.21 -5.40 2.94 1.14 0.30 216.66 271.76 220.85 
TN367 0.00 -0.96 0.89 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 57.20 59.59 57.28 
TX367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
UT367 -18.20 1.35 2.24 0.78 0.57 -0.07 135.47 149.73 131.88 
VA367 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WA367 58.97 -5.73 6.64 -0.50 -0.04 0.00 38.27 -9.62 37.37 
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Table 5.36 SIC367 Price Ratios VRS Envelopment/ Frontier Model 
Limit-Value-Ratios derived from Limit Value Ratios of DEA-Efficient Units 
DMU AVMj 'As V*4 'As 'A. 
AL367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.11 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.77 
AZ367 0.23 0.46 105 0.69 1.29 0.08 0.05 0.06 1.89 
CA367 0.37 0.75 2.03 0.64 0.32 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.51 
CO 367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.66 0.61 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.94 
CT367 0.23 0.47 2.06 0.66 0.52 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.80 
FL367 0.23 0.45 1.97 0.69 0.86 0.12 0.06 0.05 1.26 
OA367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.11 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.76 
IL367 0.23 0.47 2.06 0.64 0.51 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.80 
IN367 0.23 0.47 2.06 0.64 0.32 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.51 
10367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.69 0.62 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.90 
KS367 0.59 0.74 1.26 0.11 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.76 
MA367 0.39 0.45 1.15 0.69 0.51 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.74 
MD367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.66 0.61 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.94 
ME367 0.39 0.45 1.15 0.66 0.57 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.87 
Ml 367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.60 0.59 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.99 
MN367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.69 0.87 0.12 0.06 0.05 1.27 
M0367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.69 0.81 0.10 0.06 0.03 1.18 
NC367 0.23 0.47 105 0.11 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.89 
NE367 0.23 0.47 105 0.66 0.61 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.94 
NH367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.69 0.87 0.12 0.06 0.05 1.27 
NJ367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.69 0.87 0.12 0.06 0.05 1.27 
NM367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.61 1.07 0.09 0.05 0.06 1.76 
NY367 0.23 0.47 107 0.42 0.79 0.05 0.03 0.03 1.89 
OH367 0.23 0.47 2.06 0.69 0.53 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.78 
OK367 0.23 0.45 1.97 0.69 0.60 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.87 
OR367 0.59 0.68 1.15 0.69 1.30 0.12 0.06 0.06 1.89 
PA367 0.23 0.46 2.05 0.64 0.32 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.51 
RJ367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.60 0.59 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.99 
SC367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.69 0.53 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.78 
TN367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.64 0.78 0.10 0.06 0.03 1.22 
TX367 0.39 0.44 1.14 0.61 1.15 0.09 0.05 0.06 1.89 
UT367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.69 0.80 0.12 0.06 0.03 1.17 
VA367 0.53 0.74 1.39 0.14 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.41 
WA367 0.23 0.47 2.05 0.11 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.89 
DMU 'A. *Jh V'* *S^4 'As V'i 'As 'A. 'A. 
AL367 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.51 0.31 0.62 
AZ367 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.57 0.69 1.22 
CA367 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.32 0.18 0.05 0.57 0.16 0.29 
C0367 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.50 0.29 0.57 
CT367 0.18 0.09 0.04 0.23 0.11 0.06 0.50 0.24 0.49 
FL367 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.50 0.40 0.81 
OA367 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.53 0.69 1.29 
1L367 0.18 0.09 0.04 0.23 0.12 0.06 0.51 0.25 0.48 
IN367 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.34 0.18 0.06 0.54 0.16 0.30 
10367 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.50 0.29 0.58 
KS367 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.52 0.69 1.32 
MA367 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.23 0.12 0.06 0.50 0.24 0.48 
MD367 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.50 0.29 0.57 
ME367 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.50 0.27 0.53 
Ml 367 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.51 0.30 0.59 
MN367 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.50 0.41 0.81 
M0367 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.57 0.25 0.44 
NC367 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.57 0.43 0.75 
NE367 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.50 0.29 0.57 
NH367 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.50 0.41 0.81 
NJ367 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.50 0.41 0.81 
NM367 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.52 0.69 1.32 
NY367 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.50 0.66 1.32 
OH367 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.22 0.11 0.06 0.50 0.25 0.50 
OK 367 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.20 0.10 0.03 0.50 0.16 0.32 
OR367 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.50 0.50 1.01 
PA367 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.32 0.18 0.05 0.57 0.16 0.29 
R1367 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.51 0.30 0.59 
SC367 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.22 0.11 0.06 0.50 0.25 0.50 
TN367 0.16 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.57 0.24 0.43 
TX367 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.52 0.69 1.32 
UT367 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.50 0.22 
0.44 
VA367 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.52 0.69 1.32 
WA367 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.53 0.58 
1.09 
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Table 5.37 SIC 367 1982 Data: Comparative Advantage 
DMU e <t> Closest Competitors 
CA367 1.00 0.47 NY367 
GA367 1.15 1.00 KS367 GA367 
KS367 1.09 1.00 NM367 
NC367 1.00 0.88 VA367 NY367 
NM367 1.10 1.00 KS367 GA367 OR367 
NY367 1.00 0.91 CA367 NC367 
OR367 1.00 0.74 NM367 VA367 
PA367 1.00 0.95 CA367 NC367 VA367 
TX367 1.00 0.98 CA367 OR367 
VA367 1.00 0.69 GA367 NC367 OR367 
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Table 5.38 SIC367 1982 Data: 
Comparative Advantage 
DATA SET 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Input 6 Input 6 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
CA367 3616.70 1290.20 1489.80 169.40 82.20 62.90 3469.60 9797.80 6249.60 
GA367 44.20 11.30 6.40 1.70 0.90 0.30 28.60 91.10 46.30 
KS367 26.10 8.90 6.60 1.60 0.80 0.30 11.60 61.20 26.00 
NC367 886.00 94.20 160.70 13.20 6.90 6.10 424.60 1417.10 679.40 
NM367 16.30 10.60 6.70 1.80 0.90 0.30 17.70 60.00 33.90 
NY367 2679.70 428.00 807.80 67.40 28.70 28.40 1297.30 6201.10 2633.10 
OR367 49.40 30.00 72.80 4.20 2.20 2.90 216.10 364.10 317.90 
PA367 824.10 371.00 220.70 40.60 222.00 8.10 820.70 2246.80 1412.40 
TX367 601.60 276.80 404.90 36.60 18.20 16.00 866.70 2140.00 1648.40 
VA367 160.70 67.60 28.80 7.40 3.80 1.20 248.90 493.20 336.20 
TOTAL WASTE and SUSTITUTIONS 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Input 6 Input 6 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
CA367 936.00 862.20 682.00 102.00 63.60 24.60 -2172.30 -4696.70 -3716.60 
GA367 7.86 -1.63 -1.03 -0.38 -0.16 -0.08 2.69 -3.22 6.36 
KS367 9.80 -1.60 -0.20 -0.20 -0.10 0.00 6.10 -1.20 7.90 
NC367 344.64 -19.30 14.16 -1.76 -0.66 -0.21 -17.13 -212.28 -11.98 
NM367 -10.68 1.31 -0.66 0.17 0.08 -0.03 -3.43 6.68 -4.18 
NY367 804.66 -99.68 166.49 -8.78 -6.49 6.98 230.63 -747.16 164.72 
OR367 -48.96 -7.36 63.90 -0.80 -0.36 2.09 -66.32 -60.91 -111.87 
PA367 0.00 107.19 -64.72 7.69 4.97 -2.08 -21.86 -106.83 -64.33 
TX367 -131.23 6.34 60.69 2.66 0.67 2.62 -28.01 31.67 -93.94 
VA367 0.00 28.64 -21.23 3.28 1.64 -0.64 -102.86 -128.46 -110.16 
PRICE RATIOS 
DMU I'M nM I'M Y/Y Y/Y Y/Y Y/Y y/y Y/Y 
CA367 0.69 0.68 1.16 . — _ _ __ _ __ 
GA367 0.23 0.47 2.06 0.14 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.07 
KS367 0.11 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.89 
NC367 0.23 0.47 2.06 0.11 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.89 
NM367 0.69 0.68 1.14 0.69 0.68 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.99 
NY367 0.23 0.47 2.07 0.11 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.89 
OR367 0.69 0.68 1.16 0.69 1.29 0.09 0.04 0.06 1.89 
PA367 0.23 0.47 2.06 0.42 0.21 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.60 
TX367 0.69 0.68 1.16 0.69 1.30 0.02 0.06 0.06 1.89 
VA367 0.69 0.68 1.16 0.30 0.16 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.60 
DMU Y/Y Y/Y Y/Y Y/Y Y/Y Y/Y Y/Y Y/Y Y/Y 
CA367 -.- . — _ _ _ __ 
GA367 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.63 0.40 0.76 
KS367 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.63 0.69 1.29 
NC367 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.63 0.43 0.80 
NM367 0.17 0.09 0.06 0.17 0.09 0.06 0.60 0.32 0.63 
NY367 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.63 0.69 1.29 
OR367 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.62 0.69 1.32 
PA367 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.32 0.18 0.06 0.67 0.16 0.29 
TX367 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.60 0.60 1.00 
VA367 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.32 0.18 0.06 0.67 0.16 0.29 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Over the past decades the explosion of information technology has altered the 
dynamics of economic competition by accelerating the pace toward equilibria in all 
economic and geographic spheres. Adequate and fast processing of information is a 
requisite to develop strategies and policies that will maintain and foster economic health 
and wealth. However, preliminary to continuous improvement, the phrase so often 
construed as the key to guaranteed productivity and competitiveness in industrial circles, 
are continuous assessment of one’s competitive environment and of one’s relative 
performance within that environment. The contributions this dissertation made relate to 
the latter, closely intertwined tasks. These contributions are summarized and put into 
perspective in this chapter. 
The performance of an economic or decision-making unit is assessed by means 
of comparison with the performance of other economic units. An immediate difficulty 
stems from the fact that any reasonable and constructive assessment is likely to demand 
simultaneous consideration of multiple indicators of performance. Moreover, an 
important characteristic of the conclusions of such assessments is their relativity. It is 
recognized, at the outset, that there is no single, absolute, normative best performance. 
Instead there is an array of acknowledged best, or declared efficient, performances 
which, together, constitute an empirical frontier of feasible achievements. The concept 
of frontier conveys the message that extremal levels are sought for the indicators of 
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performance. In particular, when higher levels of an indicator are preferred, that 
indicator is generically referred to as an "output" measure. Similarly, when lower levels 
of an indicator are preferred, that indicator is generically referred to as an "input" 
measure. It follows that the first step toward performance assessment is the selection of 
relevant input and output measures. Once this is done the actual performance assessment 
is effected through a three-point procedure: 
i) identify the empirical frontier defined by the selected measures. 
Depending on the nature of the selected indicators, specific characteristics 
may be expected regarding the shape of the frontier. 
ii) identify, for each economic unit, an ideal performance on that frontier. 
The statement of this point is intended to stress the fact that there cannot 
be a value-free assessment. Tradeoffs across the selected measures are 
reflected in the selection of an efficient, i.e. frontier defining, 
performance and these tradeoffs have to be recognized. 
iii) gauge each economic unit’s distance between their current and identified 
ideal performances, thereby measuring their relative efficiency. 
Each component of the assessment procedure, namely the choice of performance 
indicators, the characteristics of the envelopment surface, the valuation mechanism, has 
to be reflected upon and designed carefully to ensure that the results of the assessment 
and their associated recommendations match the concerns and objectives of the user of 
such assessments. 
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To this effect Chapter 2 took an indepth look at concepts and measures of 
efficiency. In dealing with measures of efficiency, necessary properties, that entail some 
fairness in the comparison of the efficiency score across assessed units, were considered 
and served to clarify and contrast the purpose of existing efficiency measures as well as 
define the expression of a new measure that satisfies all these necessary/desirable 
properties. This new measure incorporates recommendations to the evaluated units on 
how to gain efficiency. Indeed the measure gauges the distance between a unit’s current 
position and its ideal position on the frontier of feasible and acceptable achievements, 
thereby indicating what this ideal position is. 
Chapter 3 dealt with the methodological aspects of efficiency measurement and 
showed how highly effective a tool Data Envelopement Analysis (DEA) can be to assess 
the relative efficiency of decision-making units. In particular Chapter 3 offered a 
unifying perspective of DEA models. A taxonomy for the models was developed that 
stresses the differences across evaluation procedures. These differ in terms of embedded 
economic principles and implicit managerial objectives. The taxonomy affords systematic 
connections between the various models and production theory, hence providing a 
consistent interpretation of all models along with their limitations within the context of 
production theory. In particular the taxonomy differentiates the various DEA models 
according to the type of envelopment surface that is assumed, the prioritization of the 
search for waste across types of measures (input, output, or no distinction), and the 
pricing mechanism applied to the measures and their associated amounts of waste. That 
is, given a type of envelopment surface: CRS (i.e. constant-retums-to-scale or polyhedral 
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cone) or VRS (i.e. variable-returns-to-scale or convex polyhedron), DEA models, in the 
process of identifying excessive input consumption and deficient output production, may 
focus primarily on controlling input consumption or primarily on output production, or 
on avoiding waste without distinction between inputs and outputs. Moreover, the models 
account for the identified waste via a pricing mechanism that may offer various degrees 
of flexibility regarding the relative tradeoffs across inputs and across outputs that the 
estimated prices imply. The viability of the DEA methodology hinges on the realism that 
the implemented pricing mechanism imparts the evaluations. Hence, the central role of 
the pricing mechanism was emphasized. The identification of relative values (efficiency 
prices) for the various measures allows the aggregation of non-commensurable inputs and 
outputs necessary to compute efficiency scores and rank/compare the observed behaviors. 
The proposed taxonomy further distinguished between two classes of pricing mechanisms: 
explicit pricing mechanism and constrained implicit pricing mechanisms. An explicit 
pricing mechanism attributes explicit values to the measures for which waste has been 
identified but it allows free determination of prices when no waste is present. A 
constrained implicit pricing mechanism recognizes that price ratios across measures 
represent tradeoffs across measures and that these tradeoffs are constrained to some 
acceptable ranges, either by market conditions, by societal valuations, or by the 
conscious choice of decision-making units. Consequently this latter mechanism allows 
prices to be determined freely across measures subject to the condition that they evaluate 
to permissible tradeoffs. A new model, called the Frontier model, was developed with 
the specific purpose to strengthen the bridge between DEA and economics by allowing 
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the measurement of economic efficiency. That is, this new model ensures that pricing 
is consistently effected across all units and completely avoids unrealistic implicit tradeoff 
values across inputs and across inputs. The Frontier model is built on the assumption 
that a DMU’s current input ratios and output ratios are characteristic of the economic 
environment and supply and demand conditions in which the DMU operates. It follows 
that, in dealing with its main concerns of gauging inefficiency and identifying sources of 
inefficiency, the model seeks to identify waste proportionately across all input and across 
all output measures. 
Chapter 4 built on the results of Chapter 3 and formalized the application of Data 
Envelopment Analysis to strategic planning. A new mathematical model, called the 
Comparative Advantage model, was developed that adapts the methodology of Data 
Envelopment to identify a DMU’s most direct competitors and, hence, derive information 
regarding the DMU’s comparative strengths and weaknesses. In this type of analysis 
input measures are aggregated to form a universal "cost" function, and, analogously, 
output measures are aggregated to form a universal "revenue" function. The identified 
competitors threaten the unit’s efficiency by means of similar low cost operations or high 
revenue output mixes. The assessment of its current competitive environment represents 
critical information to assist the unit in formulating its strategy to help it maintain its 
efficiency and eventually sharpen its competitive edge. The Comparative Advantage 
model also allows the extent of the unit’s comparative advantage to be gauged providing 
► 
the unit with a means to control the progress and success of its strategy, defined in terms 
of choice of technique of production (described by its input ratios) and its choice of 
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output mix. Finally, central to the formulation of a strategy are the identification of 
strategic prices which define tradeoffs across inputs and across outputs. The 
Comparative Advantage model by evaluating such strategic prices allows the derivation 
of these tradeoffs. An efficient unit can maintain its efficient status and protect its 
comparative advantage as long as substitutions, effected according to these tradeoffs, 
keep the unit within the facet of the frontier where these tradeoffs are valid. 
An application to regional economics was presented in Chapter 5. A comparative 
statics analysis was performed to evaluate the relative efficiency of the economy of states 
in the U.S. This illustrative study showed that frontier analysis can be used to gauge the 
effect of changes over time and that the Frontier model, geared toward the identification 
of sources of comparative disadvantage, offers ample flexibility through the specification 
of ranges for allowable tradeoffs across measures. The specification of these ranges is 
critical to the evaluation and allows filtering of performances. A second study was aimed 
at identifying, for a particular industry, which states were the leaders and what their 
comparative advantages were. The Comparative Advantage model was applied to the 
states found to exhibit frontier behavior and revealed which measures contributed to 
building comparative advantage. Such information is valuable to help a state design 
assistance programs and target incentives that will promote growth and strength of the 
state’s economy. Moreover, these studies revealed the acute need for identifying and 
collecting relevant data to support decision-making. Economic data series which are 
produced annually, while providing current information, are typically limited in scope 
(geographic and industry detail). Relevant data, unfortunately, is often delayed. For 
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effective use of such analyses in regional planning or any other area of application, the 
timeliness of the collection of such data is crucial. 
Data Envelopment Analysis stands as a viable methodology to investigate any type 
of frontier behavior. The host of available models are as many testimonies of the 
versatility of the methodology. Beyond the common principles of identifying an 
envelopment surface, it should be clearly understood that each of these available models 
effect evaluations and offer recommendations that are answers to different questions. A 
lot can be learned by "evaluating the evaluations". A wrong evaluation might be the best 
indicator that the wrong question was asked, i.e. that an inadequate model was selected. 
Recognizing similarities across areas of research in terms of the types of questions asked 
will contribute to the dissemination of the methodology to new areas of applications. 
Alternatively, recognizing new questions will lead to the development of new models and 
the advancement of the theory of Data Envelopment Analysis. 
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APPENDIX A 
MONOTONICITY OF DEBREU-FARRELL MEASURE OF EFFICIENCY 
Lemma: Given the class of technologies described by (IC1)-(IC4) and the 
assumption of strong disposability of essential inputs, 
EDF(x,y) = Min{ 0: Ox E L(y)} is monotonically decreasing in inputs: 
x* < x => EDF(x*,y) > EDF(x,y). 
Proof: Let x, x' E L(y) and 0* = Min{ 0: Ox E L(y)} 
x' > x => 0*x' > 0*x 
0*x’ E L(y) by weak disposability of inputs, 
hence, O' = Min{ 0: Ox' E L(y)} is such that O' < 0* ■ 
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APPENDIX B 
STRICT 
Lemma: 
Proof: 
MONOTONICITY OF FARE-LOVELL MEASURE OF EFFICIENCY 
Given the class of technologies described by (IC1)-(IC4) and the 
assumption of strong disposability of essential inputs, 
i m x e 
EjJx.y) = Min,.eH%) {—L} 
m i=1 Xj 
is monotonically stricly decreasing in inputs: 
x‘ < x => EFL(x’,y) > EFL(x,y). 
Let x, x' E L(y), x' > x, x' = x + Ax with Ax ^ 0 
EFL(x,y) 
Xi 
x. 1 
1A Xj* 
m tf Xj+Axj 
since x* > 0 V i 
It follows: 
1 X 1 X 
EFL(x’,y) = Minx , £ — E — < EFL(x<y) 
m i=1 Xj m i=1 x. 
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APPENDIX C 
THE INVARIANT ADDITIVE DEA MODEL 
The invariant additive model determines which of n decision-making units 
(DMUs) determine an envelopment surface when considering m input variables and s 
output variables. For each decision-making unit j = l,...,n, x,j denote the i* input 
measure and denote the r* output measure. For each decision-making unit, 1, the 
following linear program is solved. 
Minx,»,e 
r=l yrl «=1 
St 
m 
Ey^-s. = yr. 
j=i 
n 
Exsxi - ei - - 
j=i 
r = l,...,s 
i = l,...,m 
(ADD Primal) 
Ex* 
j=i 
= 1 
X: > 0 
Sr, e{ > 0 r = 
j 1,... ,n 
1,...,s i = 1,...,m 
An optimal solution to the above linear program identifies an n-vector X, an s- 
vector s, and an m-vector e. The convex combination of DMUs j such that Xj > 0 
represents a point on the envelopment surface against which DMU/s efficiency is 
gauged. Sources of inefficiency for DMU, are given by s which represents slack output 
quantities for DMU,, and by e which represents excess input consumptions for DMU,. 
The corresponding dual program, whose formulation follows, identifies an s- 
vector n, an s-vector v, and a scalar co,. 
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s m 
Max,.r.«, E /*,yrt - E "ixii+ « 
r=l i=l 
St 
ni 
E^y, - E"ixij+ “i £ 0 j = 1>-->n 
1 
r=l i=l (ADD Dual) 
r * 
yr, 
1 
r = 
v.x > — i = 
Co, unrestricted 
The vectors \i and v are efficiency price vectors which serve to define a revenue 
function and a cost function respectively. The scalar ai, at optimality represents the 
negative of the maximum profit level attainable by any DMU given the prices /t and v. 
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APPENDIX D 
THE FRONTIER MODEL 
The frontier model determines which of n decision-making units (DMUs) 
determine an envelopment surface when considering m input variables and s output 
variables. For each decision-making unit j = l,...,n, denote the i* input measure and 
yfj denote the r* output measure. Xj and yj denote, respectively, the vectors of input and 
output measures and X and Y respectively denote the m x n matrix of inputs and s x n 
matrix of outputs. 
The vectors n and v are efficiency price vectors which serve to define a revenue 
function and a cost function respectively. The scalar oj, at optimality represents the 
negative of the maximum profit level attainable by any DMU given the prices \i and v. 
The frontier model makes the role of prices explicit in the evaluation of 
efficiency. This is accomplished by restricting the range of rates of substitution across 
inputs and across outputs that are implied by the ratios of identified efficiency prices. 
For any two inputs i, j, and any two outputs k, 1, lower and upper bounds for their 
respective rates of substitution are predefined that translates into the following 
constraints: 
vi — 
d s 7 s r« 
j 
These conditions are easily converted into linear constraints on the efficiency 
prices to be estimated: 
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-vt + l^Vj fi 0 Vf - tjjVj s 0 
-tik + r^Hj sO (ik - r^, s 0 
Such constraints summarize to a global matrix format: 
vR* z 0 \iRo <, 0 
where R; and R0 are respectively m x 2(m2) and s x 2(*2). These constraints, added to the 
dual model, translate into the inclusion of substitution variables, summarized by the 
2(m2)-vector Oj, and the 2(s2)-vector <r0, in the primal formulation. 
The scalars 9 and </> represent respectively the proportional input reduction from DMU,’s 
levels and the proportional output augmentation from DMUj’s levels that would render 
DMUj efficient. In particular DMU, is efficient iff 0 = 1 and <£ = 1. 
The mathematical statement of the primal model is given by: 
0 
0 
1 (Frontier Primal) 
1 
-1 
0 
st < 
MinM,x„„ 0 - * 
<t> y,+ YX + Roffo = 
0Xj- XX + Rj = 
1.X 
4> ^ 
-9 > 
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The corresponding dual is given by: 
st 
Max co, + R - C 
H,v,o)vR,C 1 
fiY - p\ + cOj < 0 
VXy ~ C < 1 
- /jy, + R < -1 
(-R, < 0 
/*R„ ^ 0 
R, C > 0 
H, v, Wj unrestricted 
(Frontier Dual) 
The scalars R and C are such that R - C evaluates to the profit level attained by 
DMU! given the identified prices \i and v. 
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APPENDIX E 
THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE MODEL 
The comparative advantage model effects a relative assessment of patterns of input 
consumptions and output productions across n decision-making units (DMUs) when 
considering m input variables and s output variables. For each decision-making unit j 
= l,...,n, Xjj denote the i1*1 input measure and yd denote the r* output measure. Xj and 
yj denote, respectively, the vectors of input and output measures and X and Y 
respectively denote the m x (n-1) matrix of inputs and s x (n-1) matrix of outputs across 
all DMUs except DM^ being evaluated. 
The vectors n and v are efficiency price vectors which serve to define a revenue 
function and a cost function respectively. The scalar at optimality represents the 
negative of the maximum profit level attainable by any DMU other than DMU, being 
evaluated, given the prices n and v. 
The comparative advantage model makes the role of prices explicit in the 
evaluation. This is accomplished by restricting the range of rates of substitution across 
inputs and across outputs that are implied by the ratios of identified efficiency prices. 
For any two inputs i, j, and any two outputs k, 1, lower and upper bounds for their 
respective rates of substitution are predefined that translates into the following 
constraints: 
These conditions are easily converted into linear constraints on the efficiency 
prices to be estimated: 
-Vi + rilVj s 0 Vj - ryVj s 0 
-V-i + r^ln, s 0 - rkl(x1 s 0 
Such constraints summarize to a global matrix format: 
vRj £ 0 pRo ^ 0 
where Rj and R0 are respectively m x 2(m2) and s x 2(s2). These constraints, added to the 
dual model, translate into the inclusion of substitution variables, summarized by the 
2(m2)-vector a-, and the 2(s2)-vector <r0, in the primal formulation. 
The scalars 6 and <£ represent respectively the proportional input augmentation from 
DMUj’s levels and the proportional output reduction from DMU,’s levels that would 
match the levels of the best convex combination of other DMUs to match DMU1 in terms 
of revenues and costs. In particular DMUj has a comparative advantage in inputs if 6 > 
1 and it has a comparative advantage in outputs if <t> < 1 at optimality. 
The mathematical statement of the primal model is given by: 
6 - ^ 
- 0y,+ YX + R„a0 = 0 
0xr XX + Ri a. = 0 
l.X = 1 
-4> > -1 
6 > 1 
a„< ai s o 
(C-A Primal) 
248 
The corresponding dual is given by: 
st 
Max to. - (R - C) 
HY - xX + u, < 0 
^x, + C < 1 
ftY, + R > 1 
xR, < 0 
mR„ ^ 0 
R, C > 0 
H, i/, u, unrestricted 
(C-A Dual) 
The scalars R and C are such that R - C evaluates to the profit level attained by 
DMU, given the identified prices n and x. 
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APPENDIX F 
STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 
MANUFACTURING DIVISION 
20 FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 
201 Meat Products 
202 Dairy Products 
203 Preserved Fruit & Vegetables 
204 Grain Mill Products 
205 Bakery Goods 
206 Sugar & Confectionery Products 
207 Fats & Oils 
208 Beverages 
209 Misc. Food & Kindred Products 
21 TOBACCO PRODUCTS 
211 Cigarettes 
212 Cigars 
213 Chewing and Smoking Tobacco 
214 Tobacco Stemming and Redrying 
22 TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 
221 Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton 
222 Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Manmade 
223 Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Wool 
224 Narrow Fabric Mills 
225 Knitting Mills 
226 Textile Finishing, Except Wool 
227 Carpet and Rugs 
228 Yam and Thread Mills 
229 Misc. Textile Goods 
23 APPAREL AND OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS 
231 Men’s and Boy’s Suits and Coats 
232 Men’s and Boy’s Furnishings 
233 Women’s and Misses’ Outerwear 
234 Women’s and Misses’ Undergarments 
235 Hats, Caps, and Millinery 
236 Girl’s and Children’s Outerwear 
237 Fur Goods 
238 Misc. Apparel and Accessories 
239 Misc. Fabricates Textile Products 
24 LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS 
241 Logging 
242 Sawmills and Planing Mills 
243 Millwork, Plywood, & Struc. Members 
244 Wood Containers 
245 Wood Building and Mobile Homes 
249 Misc. Wood Products 
25 FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 
251 Household Furniture 
252 Office Furniture 
253 Public Building & Related Furniture 
254 Partitions and Fixtures 
259 Misc. Furniture and Fixtures 
26 PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 
261 Pulp Mills 
262 Paper Mills 
263 Paperboard Mills 
265 Paperboard Containers & Boxes 
267 Misc. Converted Paper Products 
27 PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 
271 Newspapers 
272 Periodicals 
273 Books 
274 Misc. Publishing 
275 Commercial Printing 
276 Manifold Business Forms 
277 Greeting Cards 
278 Blankbooks and Bookbinding 
279 Printing Trade Services 
28 CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 
281 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 
282 Plastic Materials and Synthetics 
283 Drugs 
284 Soap, Cleansers, and Toilet Goods 
285 Paint and Allied Products 
286 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 
287 Agricultural Chemicals 
289 Misc. Chemical Products 
29 PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS 
291 Petroleum Refining 299 Misc. Petroleum & Coal Products 
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295 Asphalt Paving & Roofing Materials 
30 RUBBER AND MISC. PLASTIC PRODUCTS 
301 Tires and Inner Tubes 
302 Rubber and Plastics Footwear 
305 Hose & Belting & Gaskets & Packing 
306 Fabricated Rubber Products, NEC 
308 Misc. Plastics Products, NEC 
31 LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS 
311 Leather Tanning and Finishing 
313 Footwear Cut Stock 
314 Footwear, except rubber 
315 Leather Gloves and Mittens 
316 Luggage 
317 Handbags & Pers. Leath. Products 
319 Leather Goods, NEC 
32 STONE, CLAY, AND GLASS PRODUCTS 
321 Flat Glass 
322 Glass & Glassware, Pressed, Blown 
323 Products of Purchases Glass 
324 Cement, Hydraulic 
325 Structural Clay Products 
326 Pottery and Related Products 
327 Concrete, Gyps., & Plaster Prod. 
328 Cut Stone and Stone Products 
329 Misc. Nonmetal. Mineral Products 
33 PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES 
331 Blast Furnace & Basic Steel Products 
332 Iron and Steel Foundries 
333 Primary Nonferrous Metals 
334 Secondary Nonferrous Metals 
335 Nonferrous Rolling and Drawing 
336 Nonferrous Foundries (Castings) 
339 Misc. Primary Metal Products 
34 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 
341 Metal Cans and Shipping Containers 
342 Cutlery, Handtools, and Hardware 
343 Plumbing and Heating, exc. Electrics 
344 Fabricated Structural Metal Products 
345 Screw Machine Prod., Bolts, etc. 
346 Metal Forgings and Stampings 
347 Metal Services, NEC 
348 Ordnance and Accessories, NEC 
349 Misc. Fabricated Metal Products 
35 INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 
351 Engines and Turbines 
352 Farm and Garden Equipment 
353 Construction and Related Machinery 
354 Metalworking Machinery 
355 Special Industry Machinery 
356 General Industrial Machinery 
357 Computer and Office Equipment 
358 Refriger. and Service Machinery 
359 Industrial Machinery, NEC 
36 ELECTRONIC & OTHER ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 
361 Electric Distribution Equipment 
362 Electrical Industrial Apparatus 
363 Household Appliances 
364 Electrical Lighting & Wiring Equipment 
365 Househ. Audio & Video Equipmt 
366 Communications Equipment 
367 Electronic Compon. & Accessor. 
369 Misc, Electrical Equip. & Supplies 
37 TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 
371 Motor Vehicles and Equipment 
372 Aircraft and Parts 
373 Ship & Boat Building & Repairing 
374 Railroad Equipment 
375 Motorcycles, Bicycles, and Parts 
376 Guided Miss., Space Vehic., Parts 
379 Misc. Transportation Equipment 
38 INSTRUMENTS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT 
381 Search & Navigation Equipment 
382 Measuring and Controlling Devices 
384 Medical Instruments & Supplies 
385 Ophthalmic Goods 
386 Photographic Equip. & Supplies 
387 Watches, Clocks, Watchcas., Parts 
39 MISC. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
391 Jewelry, Silverware & Plated Ware 
393 Musical Instruments 
394 Toys and Sporting Goods 
395 Pens, Pencils, Off. & Art Supplies 
396 Costume Jewelry and Notions 
399 Misc. Manufactures 
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